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ABSTRACT 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
The lead researcher, with his wife, owned a UK-based healthcare company, HC-Co, which 
they were planning to retire from. However, academic research indicated that 72% of UK 
companies failed to successfully transition to second-generation leadership, and they 
recognised they had little understanding as to why this was. For both themselves, their 
staff and clients, it was vital the transition was successful. They therefore needed to close 
this knowledge gap, which they sought to do by addressing the research question: 
What are the drivers of founder-leadership succession within family-owned SME’s 
that may relate to HC-Co. 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Building on the findings of a literature review, the lead researcher undertook a 
Participatory Action Research process with a representative twelve participant-
researchers, drawn from the company’s employees and professional advisors, to address 
the research question. Through a number of iterations, they assessed what the drivers of 
success and failure were generally for family-owned SME’s, and specifically in regard to HC-
Co. They also considered which succession models or frameworks might be useful in this 
regard. 
FINDINGS 
A number of drivers were identified, some of which were relevant to the whole succession 
process, whilst others were limited to specific phases: i.e. pre-succession, succession, and 
post-succession. These drivers were compared and contrasted against a leadership-
succession framework synthesised from the literature and segmented by resource-based-
view type (Barney, 1991). This framework was also used as the basis for assessing how 
these drivers might apply to HC-Co, and which were found to be moderated by cultural and 
other company-specific factors. 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The drivers were useful in identifying those issues that may promote or prevent a founder 
leadership succession, and which should therefore be planned for, mitigated or monitored. 
However, cultural and other factors meant that how and to what degree they applied 
required specific analysis from the perspective of each company considering a leadership 
transition. 
KEY WORDS 
Founder leadership succession; Family-owned SME’s; Participatory Action Research 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Leadership is an intrinsic part of any company and whose primary purpose, according to 
the Resourced-Based View of management, is to combine an organisation’s tangible, 
intangible and human resources to create and maintain a competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). When an organisation is started, it is the founder who typically takes the principal 
leadership role (Mathews and Blumentritt, 2015). However, save where an organisation 
ceases to exist, sooner or later he or she will need to be replaced. 
My own company, HC-Co, had already embarked on a partial employee-ownership 
transition, implicit in which was that there would also be a leadership transition. This was 
a high-risk time for many companies, but particularly for SME’s and family-owned SME’s 
(Lomax et al., 2015), of which HC-Co was one. We therefore knew we were heading into a 
storm in which 72% of companies foundered, but with no real idea as to how to prepare 
for or manage the voyage.  
Note: HC-Co is a pseudonym for my company, which I used to enable me to write 
more openly than I would feel able to if the Company was easily identifiable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Focus of Thesis  
Adapted from Barney, 1991 
  
We were not alone. According to the Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy 
(2017), of the 5.7 million firms in the UK at the end of 2016, 99.9% were classed as either 
Organisations 
Non-Family 
Owned 
Size 
Large SME’s Intangible Tangible 
Succession 
Human 
Resources 
Leadership 
Subsequent 
Successions 
Founder 
Succession 
Family 
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small (99.3%) or medium in size (0.6%); collectively known as Small to Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SME’s). Whilst 76% of these SME’s had no employees other than the owner, 
the remainder accounted for 60% of all UK employment, and were collectively responsible 
for 51% of UK company turnover (Ibid). SME’s therefore made a significant contribution to 
the UK economy, but their smaller size was a key determinant in leadership succession 
outcomes. Whereas larger organisations may experience a change in performance 
following leadership succession, the change was seldom critical. In contrast, only 28% of 
SME’s survived the founder-leadership transition (Lomax et al., 2015), and the odds did not 
improve with subsequent successions. Only 16% survived a second leadership succession, 
6% a third, and just 3% remained after a fourth. The focus of this thesis was therefore to 
fill my and my colleague’s knowledge gap in the hope this would help HC-Co to be one of 
the 28% that survived the first leadership transition. 
From an initial trawl through the literature, there seemed to be a number of reasons why 
larger companies were far better at managing the succession process. For example, larger 
companies tended to be run by professional leaders drawn from a wide pool of candidates, 
whereas family-owned SME’s typically came from family members or existing employees 
(Motwani et al., 2006). Larger organisations also typically had ongoing leadership 
succession programmes, but for the 72% of family-owned SME’s (Lomax et al., 2015) this 
was seldom the case (Molly et al., 2010). For larger companies, replacing the leader was 
also a well-practiced and anticipated routine, but only happened every 20 to 25 years on 
average for family-owned SME’s, and with little to no planning (Motwani et al., 2006; 
Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014). Larger companies also typically employed solely objective 
criteria to select the next leader, whilst family-owned SME’s often had to balance 
organisational and family objectives (Motwani et al., 2006; Holt & Popp, 2013). However, 
possibly the largest factor was the influence that company founders had both during their 
tenure of leadership, and after. 
Company Size SME’s Large Enterprises 
Family Ownership High Low 
Frequency Low High 
Succession Expertise Low High 
Succession Complexity High Lower 
Succession Clarity Confused/Subjective Objective 
Succession Type Founder Succession Follow on Successions 
Fig. 2: SME - Large Company Comparison  
Adapted from Lomax et al., (2015); Schlepphorst & Moog, (2014), and; Holt & Popp, 
(2013) 
By virtue of the fact they founded their organisation, founders: tended to own most of the 
equity (Schulze et al., 2003); had a far greater degree of intrinsic knowledge than successor 
 ________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
  Introduction - Page 10 of 161 
leaders (Lee et al., 2003); had identities that were far more closely linked to the 
organisation (Lansberg, 1988); viewed the organisation more subjectively (Sharma and 
Irving, 2005; Hoang and Gimeno, 2010), and; had influence that often cast a shadow over 
their successor. Understanding the Drivers of founder-leadership succession was therefore 
of key importance to any company, but particularly for family-owned SME’s, such as my 
own. 
1.2 HC-CO BACKGROUND 
I therefore wanted to start by clarifying why avoiding being one of the 72% who fail (Lomax 
et al., 2015) was important to me, my wife and the other people involved in our Company. 
HC-Co was a healthcare company I started in 1986, with my wife joining me as co-owner in 
the early 1990’s. Working with about 100 colleagues, our company cared for approximately 
100 elderly clients in both their own homes, and our care homes in the South East of 
England. Whilst this had been a largely enjoyable and rewarding career, our thoughts 
progressively turned towards what was next for us personally.  
As mentioned above, we answered part of this question in 2014 when we started to move 
HC-Co towards partial employee ownership. However, whilst this transition appeared to 
be providing a mutually-beneficial solution to the ownership of HC-Co, if my wife and I were 
to have the time to enjoy whatever came next, we needed to also make ourselves 
redundant from our leadership roles, or at least largely so; we enjoyed working with our 
colleagues and would have been happy to continue doing so in a way that gave us greater 
freedom. 
Whilst our outlook remained positive, the risks of company failure during a founder-
leadership succession were not lost on us. If we were to be amongst the 72% of UK family-
owned SME’s that failed through this process, the impact for my wife and me would have 
been significant; at best leaving a large hole in our retirement finances, and at worst 
deferring that retirement for many years. For our employees, the high employment 
situation in the UK, and particularly in the care sector, meant they should find alternative 
employment easily, but the loss of community was likely to be traumatic (Gómez-mejía et 
al., 2007). However, the greatest impact would be for our clients. 
For our residential clients, those who lived in our care homes, were those homes to close 
the forced relocation that would be the inevitable consequence would lead to a 
significantly increased risk of both poor health and earlier death (Glasby et al., 2019; Jolley 
et al., 2011). Whilst the impact would likely be less for those clients we cared for in their 
own homes, as the change would be limited to who cared for them rather than where they 
lived, their morbidity and mortality risk would likely increase too (Glasby et al., 2019). 
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It was therefore important we closed our knowledge gap to maximise our chance of being 
one of the 28% who successfully completed a founder-leadership succession (Lomax et al., 
2015), and so I next considered what research aims and objectives would best achieve this. 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS & OBJECTIVES 
I started by returning to the Resource-Based View (Barney, 1991) that had helped me to 
set the context of this thesis. In the same way that my role as HC-Co’s founder had been to 
coordinate the Company’s tangible, intangible and human resources to create and 
maintain a competitive advantage, for the leadership transition to be successful, my 
successor would have to do the same. Unfortunately, how to transition the leadership from 
myself, the founder, to my successor was a process we knew little about. The key problem 
I therefore had to address was filling this knowledge gap. In short, the question I needed 
to research (the Research Question) was: 
What were the drivers of founder-leadership succession within family-owned SME’s 
that may relate to HC-Co. 
 
Note: For the avoidance of ambiguity, the term ‘driver’ (Driver) was used to denote 
any factor that had the potential to impact a founder-leadership succession, whether 
positively to move it forward, or negatively to inhibit its progress. 
In order to answer this question and start to fill our knowledge gap, I felt there were a 
number of objectives I had to keep in mind: 
I first needed to understand what leadership meant to those involved in the process; 
what was the essence of what was being transferred. Certainly the ability to 
coordinate the Company’s resources to create a competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991), but what did this mean to the various people who were part of, or who 
interacted with HC-Co? 
Further, I needed to understand how the family-owned SME context was relevant to 
the founder-leadership succession; my initial literature review, summarised above, 
had indicated this context was significant. 
Taking these first two objectives into account, I also had to identify which Drivers 
were key to my successor being able to maintain HC-Co’s competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991). The initial literature review had hinted at some Tangible-Resource 
Drivers, such as a failure rate of 72% (Lomax et al., 2015), and issues around equity 
(Schulze et al., 2003) could indicate that there may be some financial Drivers. In 
regard to potential Intangible-Resource Drivers, process Drivers such as planning had 
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already been highlighted (Molly et al., 2010), as were systems-type Drivers (Holt & 
Popp, 2013). Human-Resource Drivers had also been highlighted in my initial review, 
such as quality of leadership, commitment (Motwani et al., 2006), and objectivity 
Drivers (Hoang and Gimeno, 2010). A key objective was ensuring we had as complete 
a list of Drivers as possible. 
Finally, I had to understand how these Drivers might impact on HC-Co’s own founder-
leadership succession as a basis to structure our own transition process. 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
Having clarified my Research Question, I started to address it by building on my initial 
review of relevant academic articles with a more detailed  critical literature review . The 
purposes of this were to set the Research Question within the context of the existing 
academic knowledge, and to explore what succession models or frameworks might be 
helpful to help structure my research and analysis into the Research Question. 
In the Research Methodology chapter, I next looked at the best approach to understand 
the issues around the Research Question, including considering what ethical, ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological factors were relevant. 
My next Analysis and Discussion chapter detailed how the Research Question was 
addressed, and what results were achieved. 
Finally, in the Conclusions chapter, I summarised the principal findings, and considered how 
well I felt the Research Question had been addressed, what gaps remained, and what the 
implications were for both my professional and organisation’s practice.
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2 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW FOCUS 
I decided in the introduction, above, that the Research Question I needed to address was 
‘what [were] the drivers of founder leadership succession within family-owned SME’s that 
may relate to HC-Co’. The key focus of this question was in regard to how it related to HC-
Co but, after my initial literature review, I wanted to find out more about what was already 
known in regard to founder-leadership succession, and whether there were any models or 
frameworks that might be helpful to my analysis. The focus of this more detailed literature 
review was therefore: 
• To consider appropriate peer-reviewed articles in order to place the 
Research Question within the context of the existing academic literature, 
and in particular to identify any drivers (the Drivers) of founder-leadership 
succession within family-owned SME’s, and; 
• To consider succession models that may be useful as a framework for 
investigating the Research Question, and particularly in regard to HC-Co.  
I approached these objectives by applying Tranfield et al's (2003) Systematic Literature 
Review methodology. This suggests a three-stage approach by first planning the review, 
conducting it, and then writing up the findings. 
During the planning stage I reflected further on what the  critical literature review needed 
to achieve. The key purpose was to place the Research Question within the context of the 
existing academic literature, and consider what other models and frameworks might help 
with my analysis. However, before approaching this, I felt I needed to understand the 
Research Question in more detail. As discussed in the research aims and objectives section 
above, in essence, the Research Question invited me to consider: 
• What did leadership mean in regard to founder-leadership succession; 
• What was the relevance of the family-owned SME context, and; 
• Considering the above, what were the relevant founder-leadership Drivers 
that may apply to HC-Co? 
However, whilst I felt this gave me greater clarity for my literature review, it was still not 
sufficiently focused. An initial search of the available literature revealed many thousands 
of possible articles, and I therefore needed to narrow down my search further if my review 
was to be practical. I therefore considered what filters might help to sort the relevant from 
the irrelevant and, in this regard: 
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• I used key words to identify articles that may be appropriate based on the 
analysis of my Research Question, which I used in combinations to maintain 
the focus on leadership Drivers within the context of family-owned SME’s: 
e.g. ‘leadership succession’ or ‘founder succession’, and; SME’s, or family-
owned SME’s. 
• In order to ensure a degree of rigour, I restricted my research to peer-
reviewed articles in academic journals recognised by the Chartered 
Association of Business Schools’ Academic Journal Guide 2018, and that 
were either published within the last ten years, or were cited more than 
200* times. 
• I also specifically searched for articles written by authors specialising in the 
field of founder-leadership succession. 
• Finally, I drew on additional articles cited in any of the above. 
Note: 200 citations was an arbitrary number but, having reviewed a number of 
potential articles more than ten years old, this seemed a sensible cut-off for 
identifying articles that could be considered seminal. 
2.2 ARTICLES REVIEWED 
Using the above search criteria, I first shortlisted articles according to their abstracts, and 
then applied Tranfield et al's  (2003) Systematic Literature Review methodology to those 
that I believed were likely to provide insights into the Research Question by classifying 
them by their: title, journal, journal rating (Academic Journal Guide 2018), number of 
citations (Google Scholar, November 2018), author, year of publication, and focus. This 
allowed me to get a more rounded sense of what approaches the articles were taking to 
the subject. 
Title Journal Rating Citations 
Author Year Approach Focus Key Findings 
The succession process from a resource- and knowledge-based view of the family 
firm – Family Business Review - 3 - 942 
Cabrera-
Suarez et 
al.  
2001 Multiple 
Issues 
Resource-
based and 
Knowledge-
Based 
Theory 
Family firms are better at 
transferring tacit knowledge, and 
should develop systems to facilitate 
this, and only diversify into areas 
they know well.  
Fig. 3: Example of Article Classification 
I had originally filtered articles according to the quality of the journals in the expectation 
that this would lead to a higher quality foundation for my review, but what became 
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apparent was that it risked missing key writers who tended to only appear in more 
specialist, but lower ranked journals. For example, Handler (1994; 1988), Motwani et al. 
(2006) and Sharma et al. (2001) were all highly regarded writers in the field, but whose 
work appeared in middle-ranking journals. I therefore broadened my search to include all 
articles that appeared in peer-reviewed journals, which produced a total of 110 articles. 
However, ultimately all those which made it into the principal articles reviewed in detail  
were published in journals rated in the top three rankings of the Academic Journal Guide 
2018 (3, 4 and 4*). 
Whilst I did not search specifically via journals, as I wanted to consider all the relevant 
literature that met my search criteria, some journals were more prevalent than others. For 
example, of the thirty-eight principal articles reviewed eleven were published in the Family 
Business Review, and four were published in Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. A 
further nine were clustered in four journals: Journal of Business Venturing; International 
Small Business Journal; Leadership Quarterly, and; Journal of Family Business Strategy. On 
reflection, this was not surprising as this tended to reflect the editorial policies of the 
particular journals. However, there were other articles from more specialist journals, such 
as the Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, which tended to focus on more nuanced 
aspects of founder-leadership succession; in this example, the link between successor 
longevity and firm performance (Hillier and McColgan, 2009). 
Whilst thirty-eight was the number of articles that I initially selected, being the total that 
passed the filtering process set out above, this number expanded when I started to review 
them. For instance, where Drivers that appeared important were from other articles cited 
in the principal articles reviewed, such as Lauterbach et al. (1999) and Fox et al. (1996) who 
were cited in Motwani et al. (2006) in regard to the infrequency of leadership successions 
in SME’s, I therefore reviewed the cited articles too. Similarly, where articles cited 
information that was dated or from different geographical regions, I included reports that 
provided more up-to-date and relevant statistical information, such as Lomax et al's  (2015) 
small-busienss survey which discussed survival rates in regard to leadership successions. 
This had the effect of increasing the total number of papers considered from the principal 
38 to 64 in total. 
2.3 KEY DEBATES 
Before addressing what succession frameworks might be helpful to my research, I wanted 
to get a sense of the key debates in the literature, of which four stood out. 
The first was in regard to succession models or frameworks themselves, which I address in 
more detail in the next section, but in essence tended to focus on timing and the type of 
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approach taken. For example, each would identify succession phases and what should be 
achieved in each, but some started from when the (family) successor first became aware 
of the company, such as Churchill and Hatten (1987), whereas others started with the 
development of the successor once he was already an employee, e.g. Nordqvist et al. 
(2013). Most also presumed the successor would be a member of the founder’s family. 
Many also focused on a gradual transition of power from founder to successor. 
Another key debate to run through much of the literature, and touched on above, was the 
role of family. This was a factor which arguably did not apply to HC-Co as neither my wife 
nor I had family members involved in the company, nor as potential successors. Its 
prevalence was also surprising, given that between 39% and 49%, depending on size, of 
SME’s were not family owned (Lomax et al., 2015), with only 25% anticipating an intra-
family transfer. Much of the debate focused around the idiosyncratic behaviour of family 
members, particularly in regard to pursuing their interests, and the key question to me was 
how analogous this behaviour might be for HC-Co. 
I was also concerned by how analogous other founders’ behaviour might be to my own. 
The literature was full of examples of how the founder can get in the way of a successful 
succession, including: not letting go; falling out with their successor; failing to transfer the 
appropriate knowledge; becoming a back-seat driver, and; making bad choices in regard to 
timing. I also recognised that it may be difficult for me to take an impartial view on this 
matter. 
However, the most surprising debate, which was hinted at in my initial literature review, 
was the sheer complexity of founder-leadership successions. For example, some of the 
issues raised related to: reciprocity (Blumentritt et al., 2012; Janjuha-Jivraj and Spence, 
2009); socio-economic factors (Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin, 1993); communications (Daspit 
et al., 2016); successor requirements (Schlepphorst and Moog, 2014); family issues (Liu et 
al., 2015); knowledge transfer (Cabrera-Suarez et al., 2001); planning (Bruce and Picard, 
2006); motivation (Gilding et al., 2015), and; finance (Schepker et al., 2017). 
To make sense of this, I recognised it would be helpful to have a framework to assess all 
the different concepts against. 
2.4 MODEL ANALYSIS 
My next task was therefore to review succession models in the literature to try to distil 
them into one model that I could use for my subsequent analysis. These  typically looked 
at succession either as a series of phases, issues, or a combination of both. For example, 
Churchill and Hatten's (1987) model saw succession as happening in three phases being: 
the pre-succession phase, where the founder creates the company and is then joined by 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
 Critical Literature Review - Page 17 of 161 
his or her offspring; the succession phase, where the founder and successor operate in 
partnership prior to a formal power transfer, and; the post succession phase, where the 
founder is no longer in the picture. There was a strong presumption througout this and 
many of the articles that the successor would be a family member. 
This was similar to Nordqvist et al. (2013) who cited a four-stage process: start up; running 
the company; succession process, and; post succession. There was no presumption the 
successor would be a family member, although they acknowledged this was often the case. 
However, they went beyond identifying solely phases, and listed a number of potential 
Drivers to be considered: succession planning during the ‘running the company’ phase; 
managing family relations, deciding betweeen internal and external candidates, the 
successor and founder working together, and governance in the ‘succession process’ 
phase, and; on satisfaction and performance in the ‘post-succession’ phase. 
Longenecker & Schoen (1978) took a slightly shorter time frame, starting from when the 
potential successor joined the firm. Their model also presumed the successor was likely to 
be a family member, with the pre-succession phase including working in preparatory roles 
and learning about the business prior to joining formally. After joining, their model moved 
on to the need for a formal business orientation prior to progressing through organisational 
functions and management positions, which would lead to taking on senior positions from 
which the succession process formally starts. They broke this down into early and mature 
succession phases, identifying different issues likely to affect each. This gradual increase in 
responsibilities was something that Handler (1990) was also sympathetic to.  
Brockhaus (2004) approach was more time-limited, considering succession solely within 
Churchill & Hatten’s succession phase. He suggested a strategic analysis should precede a 
business analysis as a means to define the type of successor the business required, prior to 
selecting and developing the succession candidate.  Dyck et al. (2002) took a similar view, 
starting with identifying organisational needs and the best selection process, but then 
identified timing as a key issue along with post-succession conflict management. 
Rothwell's (2011) model also focused on a number of key stages, starting with maintaining 
management commitment throughout the process. Against this background, he 
recommended starting by clarifying organisational, people and task needs, and having an 
effective performance management system to address these. In regard to selecting a 
successor, he saw assessing the available talent as a precursor to filling any development 
needs they may have and evaluating progress. 
Finally, De Massis et al. (2008) and Le Breton-Miller et al. (2004) also identified a number 
of Drivers likely to be helpful in addressing the Research Question. They focused on four 
key issues, but from a narrower context. Theirs included personal goals, family ties, 
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capabilities and appetite, and financial and legal issues, whilst Motwani et al. (2006) saw 
the key issues as having a succession plan, naming the successor, and training and 
mentoring them.  
2.4.1.1 Defining an Analysis Model or Framework 
Whilst the articles typically spoke of succession models, the fact there were so many 
indicated that no one model could fit all successions. My focus needed to be on identifying 
a set of possible stages and Drivers, but which I realised could only be developed into a 
succession model when assessed against specific founder-leadership successions. For 
example, the starting point for a family successor joining the firm from school would be 
different to a non-family successor candidate. At this stage, I also did not know which 
Drivers might be relevant and how they might apply. I therefore concluded I needed to 
focus on capturing the possible Drivers and probable stages in a framework (Analysis 
Framework) as a basis for assessing what specifically was relevant to HC-Co. 
With this in mind, I started to consider how the models in the literature could best be 
combined into a Analysis Framework whose principal purpose was to support the analysis 
of the Research Question. The issue of timing within the models was often varied and 
subject to other events; whether the succession process was starting as the founder 
announces their wish to leave, at an earlier stage when potential successors join, or 
initiated by some form of crisis. There was a general logic to the order recommended by 
the models that focused on an assessment and preparatory pre-succession phase, a 
transference of power during the succession phase, and addressing post-succession Drivers 
as a final phase. However, whilst the Drivers raised were often common to more than one 
model, no model encompassed them all. They also tended to take a macro rather than 
micro perspective. For example, some of the literature talked about identifying 
organisational needs (Dyck et al., 2002), maintaining commitment (Rothwell, 2011), and 
filling capability gaps De Massis et al. (2008) without exploring the detail of these. 
I started with Churchill and Hatten (1987) three-stages model, as models that started 
before candidates joined the company, such as Longenecker & Schoen (1978), were not 
relevant to the Research Question; HC-Co had no leadership candidates who were family 
members. This was based on pre-succession, succession and post-succession phases. The 
pre-succession phase (P1) was a preparatory phase up to, but not including the transfer of 
leadership; the succession phase (P2) included the time from when the founder started to 
hand over authority to the successor to when that transfer was complete, and; the post-
succession phase (P3) started when the successor had full executive responsibility for the 
firm. 
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A model which took a different approach was Sund et al's. (2015). This broke down the 
succession process into four aspects: antecedents, focusing on family culture and 
preparation; psychological factors, including ensuring stakeholders were aware, and 
founders and successors were ready and willing; legal and financial issues, addressing 
compensation and cost matters (and also ownership), and; goals, addressing what success 
meant, stakeholder satisfaction, avoidance of negligence, financial limitations, and 
strategic development. However, this model seemed incomplete too. The model inferred 
that the issues in the antecedent phase were distinct from the other phases but, taking 
preparatory training as an example, this may or may not be sufficient; it seemed 
conceivable that a succession may move from the pre-succession phase to the succession 
phase in anticipation of completing unfinished training, rather than hold up the succession 
until every item were accomplished. I felt this was true in regard to commitment as a Driver 
also, where the drawn-out nature of the succession would seem to give rise to plenty of 
opportunities for various people’s commitment to waiver as they sought to clarify their 
own interests (Lansberg & Astrachan, 1994), or some unexpected outcome happened 
(Gouldner, 1960). I therefore concluded that the Analysis Framework should include 
distinct phases of the succession process (first A, second B, and then C etc.), but also 
recognising that Drivers often permeated more than one phase. 
Most models also suggested distinct perspectives, some of which overlapped other 
models, and some of which were more obviously relevant to the Research Question than 
others. For example, I was not sure how relevant focusing on the timeframe before a 
potential successor joined the Company was to HC-Co. Whilst it was obviously a formative 
period for the candidate, and would be informative as to what capabilities gaps they 
arrived at the Company with, it did not seem relevant in the sense the authors concerned 
gave to it; i.e. a pre-work induction phase to their family’s company. In the case of HC-Co, 
none of the stakeholders would have had any meaningful knowledge of, or interactions 
with the Company prior to formally becoming involved with it, however, phases that 
covered from when potential candidates joined HC-Co seemed more obviously relevant to 
me.  
Many of the models also seemed too limited in their scope. For instance, they rightly 
focused on key players, such as the founder, successor and family members, but often with 
the presumption that other stakeholders would be happy to go along with whatever they 
decided. However, Hollander’s (1992) concept of followership, whereby leaders could only 
lead where others were prepared to follow, was a concept that was both largely accepted 
in leaderhship thinking, but overlooked within the succession literature. The staff group 
therefore seemed to be a taken-for-granted, but necessary stakeholder whose 
commitment was likely to be important as a Driver. Given that approximately 72% of 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
 Critical Literature Review - Page 20 of 161 
companies going through a founder-leadership succession failed to perform to the extent 
that they went out of business (Lomax et al., 2015), monitoring performance during the 
succession process also seemed to me to be an overlooked criteria, other than by Rothwell 
(2011).  
The conclusion I reached was that succession was a process, and my Analysis Framework 
should therefore identify both the Drivers that needed to be addressed, and the order they 
needed to be addressed in. Whilst some models included an early stage before when the 
family-successor joined the firm, this was clearly not relevant to HC-Co’s founder-
leadership succession, however, I felt the subsequent stages were. Whilst the models sliced 
these stages up differently,  the ones that seemed to give the greatest clarity were Churchill 
and Hatten's (1987) three-stage model, which coincided with the final three stages of 
Nordqvist et al's (2013) four stage model: pre-succession; succession, and; post-succession. 
Similarly, none of the models included all the potential Drivers that might need to be 
addressed, but nor did I consider that any Drivers could be ruled out at this stage. Whilst 
relevance of some was not yet clear, it seemed to me that all deserved consideration during 
the research phases. 
I also recognised that a key objective was identifying the Drivers that would allow my 
successor to maintain HC-Co’s competitive advantage. Apart from highlighting which 
succession phase each Driver was likely to impact, I therefore also categorised them by the 
type of resource they were (Barney, 1991); tangible, intangible, or human. However, this 
in itself was ambiguous as some could be classified as either an Intangible Driver, such as 
successor development being a process, or as a human-resource type Driver, due to the 
impact it had on the capabilities of the successor. In deciding how to categorise each, I 
followed Barney’s (1991) view that human resources included, “the training, experience, 
judgement, intelligence, relationships, and insights of individual managers and workers in 
a firm”. So whilst Drivers such as successor development, communications, and managing 
commitment could be viewed from an intangible process perspective, I classified them as 
Human-Resource Drivers, which led to the Preliminary Analysis Framework, below. Whilst 
stakeholders could include people who were not ‘managers’ or ‘workers’, such as external 
stakeholders, I categorised this as a Human-Resource Driver also. 
  
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
 Critical Literature Review - Page 21 of 161 
 
Tangible-Resource Drivers Pre-Succession (P1) Succession (P2) Post-Succession (P3) 
Capital    
Intangible-Resource Drivers    
Succession Planning    
Successor Selection    
Performance Management    
Governance    
Strategy    
Human-Resource Drivers    
Stakeholder Salience    
Founder-Successor Issues    
Successor Development    
Managing Commitment    
Fig. 4: Preliminary Analysis Framework 
2.5 DRIVER ANALYSIS 
Having defined my Preliminary Analysis Framework and three different classes of Drivers, 
I then undertook an analysis of how relevant these were to the Research Question, and in 
particular regard to HC-Co.  
2.5.1 Tangible-Resource Drivers 
2.5.1.1 Capital 
There were a number of Drivers that may impact a firm’s access to capital during a founder-
leadership succession. 
2.5.1.1.1 DIVIDEND POLICY 
For example, post-succession firms were more likely to have both active and passive 
shareholders when there was an accompanying ownership transition, which may lead to 
conflict as well as a dividend policy that may result in less capital remaining in the company 
(Davis and Harveston, 1999). Non-active shareholders may also use debt as a means of 
control by limiting the options available to the active shareholders  (Blanco-Mazagatos et 
al., 2007). Whilst the latter had not been considered by my wife and me, the accompanying 
employee-ownership transition meant there would be both active and passive 
shareholders, which was therefore a Driver that needed considering as part of the Research 
Question. 
2.5.1.1.2 OWNERSHIP-TRANSITION DRIVERS 
Further potential consequences of an accompanying ownership transition were noted by 
Brockhaus (2004) and Sund et al. (2015), who observed this can bring additional financial 
and legal consequences, including an increased tax burden (De Massis et al., 2008). If the 
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change in ownership needed to be funded, this added cash-flow burden was likely to 
impact profitability (Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008). A higher personal debt could also be a 
factor where the new owners had to finance the purchase, leading to demands for higher 
salaries (Bjuggren and Sund, 2014). Whilst we were going through our own partial 
ownership transition at the same time as we were preparing for a leadership transition, 
the nature of this transition meant there would be no additional debt as a result, thereby 
avoiding the Drivers identified above. There would be legal costs, but these were 
predictable and not significant when compared to HC-Co’s profits. I therefore took the view 
that a detailed examination of ownership transition Drivers were beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
2.5.1.1.3 RISK APPETITE 
However, there were other factors that might impact the availability of capital. For 
example, the appetite for further finance may be less due to an increase in risk aversion 
post-succession (Ward, 2011). Dunn et al. (1999) believed this may be because post-
succession firms became more family oriented and did not want to use any source of 
finance that may reduce family control, such as issuing new equity. This unwillingness to 
use debt financing in the same way after succession may also be because the offspring 
tended to be more risk averse than their parents (Kaye and Hamilton, 2004). Having 
inherited wealth themselves, they felt an obligation to pass something on to the next 
generation (Ward, 2011). This risk aversion was also a factor in family-owned firms being 
more reluctant to innovate although, counterintuitively, they were more successful at it 
when they did (Matzler et al., 2015). Whilst many of these factors were not an obvious fit 
for HC-Co, others were. I felt this Driver should therefore be considered further in the 
research phases. 
2.5.1.1.4 ACCESS TO DEBT 
Another issue was whether successors would enjoy the same access to debt as the founder. 
Smith & Amoako-Adu (1999) noted that stock prices tended to fall when a family successor 
was apointed, typically because they were younger and unknown, which could effect a 
company’s access to debt. Whilst this was not directly relevant to the Research Question, 
as HC-Co was not a public company, it may be indicative of confidence generally. For 
example, where there was a perception that the successor was less competent than the 
founder, banks and suppliers were found to be more risk averse (Anderson et al., 2003), 
although the opposite was also true. 
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2.5.2 Intangible-Resource Drivers 
Whilst the key debate regarding Tangible-Resource Drivers was in regard to access to 
capital, there were a number of themes that emerged in regard to Intangible-Resource 
Drivers. These related to processes, such as succession planning and successor selection, 
and systems regarding performance management and governance. 
2.5.2.1 Succession Planning 
Although a section on planning might be expected to detail how to plan for a succession, 
there was little support for this in the literature.  
2.5.2.1.1 PLANNING FAILURES 
Instead, it focused on an almost universal failure by SME’s to plan (Bruce & Picard, 2006). 
This was found to be the case by Nordqvist et al. (2013) and Rothwell (2011) too, who 
recognised the importance of succession planning, whilst Motwani et al. (2006) observed 
that the degree of planning was often correlated to a firm’s size. However, whilst failing to 
plan seemed to be a clear Driver for many founder-leadership successions, given the focus 
of this thesis, my conclusion was that this was less of a Driver in regard to the Research 
Question. However, the literature also made clear there were plenty of opportunities to 
do it wrong.  
In some ways, the succession process is very simple whereby an incumbent hands over 
leadership to a successor in accordance with a transition process  (Barry, 1975). In practice, 
successions were seldom simple and had to address a number of complicating factors. For 
example, founder-leadership succession typically happened every 20 to 25 years 
(Schlepphorst and Moog, 2014; Fox et al., 1996), and leadership succession was therefore 
both unfamiliar as well as being one of the most complex tasks SME’s had to face (Miller 
et al., 2003). SME’s also had fewer resources than larger companies, including a smaller 
pool of potential successors to draw from (Mussolino and Calabrò, 2014; Giarmarco, 2012). 
They also had to navigate around family dynamics, which typically complicated planning, 
founder-successor issues, external issues, defining selection and succession processes, and 
post-succession consequences. They may also have underestimated what a founder-
leadership succession involved, with Lomax et al. (2015) finding that leadership succession 
was more typically seen as a ‘coronation’ than an objective process. Nordqvist et al. (2013) 
also observed that factors such as governance, demographics, and culture were often 
overlooked. 
A number of these Drivers seemed clearly relevant to the Research Question. Whilst it was 
not a ‘coronation’ in the case of HC-Co, it was the first to happen in the Company’s thirty 
plus year history, and we did only have a small pool of internal candidates to choose from. 
Whilst family dynamics may or may not be relevant, all the remaining Drivers did seem 
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potentially relevant, and I therefore concluded they should be considered in the analysis 
phases of this research.  
2.5.2.1.2 FIRM VS FAMILY OBJECTIVES 
The family theme continued in the literature, where founders were cited as also more likely 
to prioritise family objectives over business objectives (Motwani et al., 2006; Holt & Popp, 
2013). Whilst I believed that neither my wife nor I were driven by the need to leave a 
‘legacy’, we were motivated to do the right thing by our colleagues and clients; perhaps 
they were our pseudo family. We were also keen to leave on a basis that afforded us a 
comfortable lifestyle. To my mind, conflicting personal and business objectives could 
therefore be a Driver in relation to HC-Co’s Research Question.   
2.5.2.1.3 GENERAL RISKS 
Whether we planned or not, there were also inherent risks in the process that needed to 
be addressed. For example, Rothwell (2011a) highlighted the risk of losing key personnel, 
and therefore recommended carrying out a people-needs analysis so that any vacancies 
could quickly be addressed. Whereas De Massis et al. (2008) took a more detailed 
approach, considering risks which they grouped as either individual, relational, financial, 
context, or process factors. Another complicating factor was that, as opposed to larger 
firms where the board would typically make succession decisions, it was often the 
incumbent who took the lead (Motwani et al., 2006; Pitcher et al., 2000). Apart from the 
risk of a general lack of objectivity and expertise, this also raised the possibility of self-
selection bias (James, 2006) whereby incumbents may subconsciously make decisions that 
favoured themselves. All seemed to be potential Drivers in the context of the Research 
Question. 
2.5.2.2 Successor Selection 
Succession planning therefore offered plenty of Drivers that could influence the outcome 
of the founder-leadership succession, but obviously a key area was ensuring the right 
successor was chosen. Brockhaus (2004) and Dyck et al. (2002) recommended starting with 
a needs assessment, which Rothwell (2011b) observed was not an easy task when 
undertaken by the founder. In fact, a failure to set rational and objective selection criteria 
was found to result in the process being seen as unfair and leading to conflicts (Levinson, 
1971). Further, this sense of unfairness may be exacerbated when the people judging the 
succession process were not clearly defined (Ward, 2011).  
In regard to which selection criteria were most appropriate, a number of different 
approaches were taken in the literature. Brockhaus (2004) suggested three areas to 
consider: education; technological, management and financial skills; and with a lesser focus 
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on sex, age and birth order. Daspit et al's (2016) focus was on softer skills such as integrity 
and commitment to the business. 
Taking a more specific approach, Greiner (1998) found that incumbents typically had strong 
entrepreneurial skills, but that internal organisational and administrative skills were more 
important to the successor. However, Nordqvist et al. (2013) saw the exit of the founder 
as part of the entrepreneurial process, and that family-firm succession would be more 
effective by seeing this as a core foundation of the ongoing business. This resonated with 
me as, during the Company’s thirty-plus-year history, there had been three significant 
changes of direction: branching into domiciliary care; focusing solely on private clients, 
and; the transition to employee ownership. It seemed reasonable to presume that there 
would be further changes required in the future, and therefore the entrepreneurial ability 
of the successor struck me as an important Driver too. 
All of the above approaches seemed to have merit, but in one area we had already set a 
direction without fully considering the Drivers; the decision to favour insider candidates. 
We had started down the route of developing the Company’s three most senior managers 
to take over the leadership (the Leadership Candidates), taking the view that this is what 
was best for HC-Co even if they ultimately did not complete the process. Whilst I believed 
they were up to the challenge, it also reinforced the Company’s policy of always promoting 
internally which was good for both the sense of team and potentially created other 
promotion opportunities for their colleagues. 
The literature suggested this was not unusual. Even where it was recognised that 
professional management was required, (Kirby and Lee, 1996) found an insider, normally 
a family member, would be appointed regardless. In part this may be because outsiders 
typically came with an appropriation risk, whereby they demand higher rewards based on 
their acquired idiosyncratic knowledge. However, I recognised that that this may be an 
issue we needed to consider further. 
2.5.2.3 Performance Management 
The various factors identified above also had the potential to impact the performance of 
the firm. Founder-leadership succession implicitly meant change within the organisation, 
such as additional responsibilities that came with the process and which may divert key 
employees’ attention from their ongoing responsibilities. Conversely, an underperforming 
founder may be replaced by a more competent successor leading to an improvement in 
performance (Rothwell, 2011). To me, monitoring performance, and taking swift corrective 
action, seemed an obvious and important Driver, but one that had escaped the attention 
of most of the article writers. 
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2.5.2.4 Governance 
An important issue that could also impact performance for any firm was how it was 
governed, which Casillas et al. (2010) observed typically changed on founder-leadership 
succession. This not only went hand-in-hand with issues of ownership, but performance 
too. For example, prior to a founder-leadership succession occurring, Hillier & McColgan 
(2009) noted that founders typically structured their organisations in a way that 
concentrated power in them. However, whilst they enjoyed unfettered freedom to grow 
their company when they ran it, it was typically not a level of control they wanted to pass 
to their successor. This often meant a change of governance structure at the time of 
succession, which further complicated the founder-leadership succession (Hillier & 
McColgan, 2009). Whilst this could be seen as an additional burden on the successor, 
Nordqvist et al. (2013) saw a more formal governance structure as being helpful in 
managing family relationships in the absence of the founder acting as referee. Another 
shareholder issue was where equity ownership became more diluted with succession, 
leading to a divergence of interests which may also lead to stagnation if decision-making 
became more difficult (Schulze et al., 2003). 
I recognised the governance issue as one that was important to me to protect my wife and 
my future interest in the Company, but also to ensure the new employee-owners were 
treated fairly too. However, I also recognised that this could be problematic to the 
successor if they needed to be fleet-of-foot to respond to changing circumstances, but new 
governance structures got in the way. I further recognised that, whilst relations between 
the Leadership Candidates and other managers was good, I could not be sure this would 
continue once either my or my wife’s influence was less obvious. These therefore seemed 
relevant Drivers to pursue. 
2.5.2.5 Strategy 
Prior to a founder-leadership succession, strategy would typically be decided upon by the 
founder, but the question of strategy becomes particularly important at a time of change 
when the founder may be harder to access, or no longer sufficiently in touch. Miller et al's 
(2003) considered the potential consequence of different approaches, however, whilst 
they considered the risks of various successor leadership approaches, there was little 
discussion by anyone as to what further strategic risks or opportunities accompanied a 
founder-leadership succession. Further, whilst Dalpiaz et al. (2014) and  Johnson (2000) 
both considered strategy from a narrative  perspective, neither related this specifically to 
the leadership succession process. This seemed an omission to me as founder-leadership 
succession is in itself a strategic event, and its strategic implications should therefore be 
considered as a Driver. 
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2.5.3 Human-Resource Drivers 
Whilst both Tangible and Intangible-Resources Drivers were important to the success of a 
founder-leadership succession, the greatest focus was placed on Human-Resource Drivers. 
The principal ones being who had salience in regard to the leadership successor process, 
founder-successor relationships, successor development, and managing commitment. 
2.5.3.1 Stakeholder Salience 
Whilst the founder and successor were clearly stakeholders in the process, they were not 
the only one.  
2.5.3.1.1 FAMILY 
For example, one important group identified in a number of articles was the family, but I 
was not sure of the relevance of this research to the Research Question. In an organisation 
where there were no family contending to be the successor, what was the relevance of 
Drivers like sibling rivalry (Kets de Vries, 1993), or the pressure to appoint the eldest son 
(Calabrò et al., 2018) to HC-Co where there were no family Leadership Candidates? Whilst 
it was tempting to decide they were not relevant, I also recognised that the term ‘family’ 
could be looked at literally or figuratively. If stakeholders saw themselves as part of the 
‘HC-Co family’, or my wife and I saw them in a family sense, perhaps we would behave in 
ways that were analogous to the actions of family members cited in the articles. As my wife 
observed, whilst HC-Co is not a typical family firm, we often refer to it as a family, there are 
many family relationships within the Company (at any one time, between twenty-five and 
thirty percent of employees were related to at least one other employee - by blood or 
marriage), and a number of employees had worked with my wife and I for up to three 
decades. Whilst this was not relevant in the sense of family ownership, at least until the 
employee-ownership transition completed, perhaps these employee-family ties were 
working in the sense of a complex adaptive systems (Holland, 2012). Complex Adaptive 
Systems theory (CAS) argues that people with a common interest interact with people they 
see as outside their group by applying rules to decide what meaning they give to external 
messages, and how they collectively respond to them in a way that promotes their group’s 
interests. 
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Fig. 5: Competing Complex Adaptive Systems 
Adapted from (Holland, 2012) 
2.5.3.1.2 EMPLOYEES 
I had earlier discussed whether the employees were a key stakeholder in the founder-
leadership succession, and I wondered whether these smaller employee-family CAS might 
be creating an additional layer of complexity in regard to how the larger employee CAS 
made their decisions about how to react to the founder-leadership succession. Again, I did 
not know whether the family ties explored within the articles would be analogous to the 
employee-family ties, or indeed any ties that may have existed between the different 
services or classes of ownership within the Company, but I felt it could not be ruled out as 
a Driver at this stage.  
Whether we and the Leadership Candidates interacted as family or colleagues, Sharma et 
al. (2003), Dunn et al. (1999), and Cromie et al. (1995) identified the misalignment of 
personal goals as a potential Driver also. This was an issue raised earlier (Sund et al., 2015; 
De Massis et al., 2008; Motwani et al., 2006), as well as in regard to conflicting family and 
company objectives (De Tienne and Chirico, 2013). I had already identified potential 
conflicts between my wife and my objectives as the retiring founders vs the interests of the 
Company, but conflicting goals between any of the stakeholders were also clearly a 
potential Driver in regard to the founder-leadership succession. 
2.5.3.2 Founder-Successor Issues 
Whilst the founder and successor were stakeholders in their own right, there were a 
number of other founder-successor Drivers that could be problematic to a founder-
leadership succession.  
2.5.3.2.1 RELATIONSHIP 
For example, a Driver that could easily undermine the process was the relationship the 
successor had with the founder, and which Mussolino & Calabrò (2014) observed was 
typically influenced by the founder’s leadership style. Where they blocked the successor 
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from joining in key decisions, the relationship tended to be negatively impacted, whereas 
the opposite was true when their style was more benevolent and inclusive. 
2.5.3.2.2 TRANSFER OF POWER 
The quality of the transfer from founder to successor was also correlated to the quality of 
communication and trust between the parties (Cadieux, 2007). In fact, they found the 
degree of game playing and bargaining was largely influenced by how well the founder and 
successor got on, how adaptable they were, and how committed to the firm they felt 
(Lansberg & Astrachan, 1994). Where this was not the case, both pre and post-succession 
conflict was not uncommon (Davis & Harveston, 1999). The degree of preparation and 
training were also indicators of a successful relationship (Lansberg & Astrachan, 1994). 
Establishing and maintaining good relationships was therefore important, with Dyck et al. 
(2002) and Davis & Harveston (1999) identifying that founders and successors typically 
developed positive and open communications when neither party felt they had to hold 
back. Whilst I believed my wife and I had good relationships with each of the Leadership 
Candidates, I was also aware there were times their viewpoints had to be drawn out of 
them. This therefore seemed to be a Driver that needed to be worked on. 
2.5.3.2.3 SUCCESSOR STRATEGIES 
Related to the above were the strategies that successors adopted when taking over the 
lead, which were often influenced by the founder-successor relationship (Cucculelli & 
Micucci, 2008; Bennedsen et al., 2007). Depending on their confidence and competence, 
successors were found to fall into four different management strategies: 
Institutionalisation, Implosion, Imposition, and Individualisation (Gilding et al., 2015). 
Where harmony between the founder and successor existed, and a shared wish for 
continuity of the company were strong, a succession plan was likely to be effectively 
Institutionalised, e.g. successful, but where both were weak it was likely to Implode. Where 
there was strong drive for continuity, but weak harmony, a succession plan was likely to be 
Imposed, and therefore result in a lack commitment from the successor. If harmony was 
strong but continuity was weak, the firm was likely to be Individualised, e.g. sold. Given 
that HC-Co was already going down the path of employee ownership, the wish for 
continuity appeared to be strong, and therefore the key Driver would be in relationship to 
harmony between the various stakeholders as to the best way forward. 
Other solely negative strategies were identified by Miller et al's (2003), who looked at failed 
successions, but from the perspective of the relationship between the firm’s past and 
future. They identified three succession patterns, being Conservative, Wavering or 
Rebellious, and which occurred with sufficient frequency to be a threat to the significant 
majority of successions. The Conservative stereotype was typically risk averse and 
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bureaucratic, with an overdependence on the past, often leading to a loss of market share. 
Wavering successors tended to be indecisive and inconsistent, creating a confused culture, 
and which resulted in an incongruent blend of the past and future which led to eroding 
margins. Rebellious successions were less common as personality types that were likely to 
behave in this way typically preferred not to go into a family business or were not selected 
by the founder. However, when they were, they were prone to make change for change’s 
sake, creating a chaotic culture leading to cost overruns. On reflection, I considered it was 
too early to see if any of Miller et al’s traits were evident, but avoiding any negative 
successor strategies, and assisting the successor to develop positive ones was clearly an 
important Driver for any founder-leadership succession. 
Whatever strategy they adopted, at some stage power needed to be transferred, which 
also had its own challenges. For example, where the succession process was left to the 
incumbent, and he or she was typical and failed to plan for their succession, the 
competence and availability of a successor was found to be a key determinant of timing 
(Motwani et al., 2006). The new leader also needed to be ready. Where the founder 
prioritised leaving at a high point this may not be the case, and also meant an unprepared 
successor may have to manage a falling tide as well (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008). A counter 
point to this is where the founder left the company at a high point because they wanted 
their successor to have the resources to make a go of it. Such timing may therefore also be 
altruistic. 
2.5.3.2.4 TIMING 
However, waiting until the successor is ready may have other consequences too. Where 
this meant the transfer of power was delayed beyond when the founder would wish to 
leave, the firm may end up with a CEO whose heart was no longer in the game (Cucculelli 
& Micucci, 2008). Whilst this was not an obvious Driver, given the subject of this thesis, on 
further reflection I recognised that, without knowing whether the preparation of our 
successors was successful or if they would remain committed to the process, it was 
impossible to rule out a delayed succession or my wife’s and my commitment not 
remaining high. I therefore concluded this was a potential Driver. 
Another Driver I considered was in regard to how power should be transferred, with both 
Churchill & Hatten (1987) and Handler (1990) recommending this should be done 
gradually, whereby the successor’s role increases as the incumbent’s decreases. This was 
consistent with Steier (2001) who saw the succession process  as a series of distinct phases 
best undertaken in co-habitation between the incumbent and successor, which allowed 
tacit knowledge to be transferred over a period of time. 
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2.5.3.3 Successor Development 
Whilst having to navigate all the above issues, the successor also had to be prepared for 
their new role, with the process typically being similar to corporate executive succession 
(Brockhaus, 2004).  
2.5.3.3.1 CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT 
Understanding what the founder did was therefore clearly an important part of the 
successor development process, with any omissions in this regard potentially leading to a 
failure to train them adequately (Morris et al., 1997), making it harder for the successor to 
perform (Fleming, 2000). Unfortunately, whilst founders understood their roles implicitly, 
they were typically unable to explain them explicitly. This may have been because much of 
the knowledge that founders had was tacit (Nonaka and Lewin, 1994), and was therefore 
difficult to transfer. The successor’s ability to acquire their predecessor’s key knowledge 
and skills was therefore an important part of the preparation process (Cabrera-Suarez et 
al., 2001). Effectively transferring knowledge therefore appeared to be an important Driver 
to consider. 
Brockhaus (2004) and Dyck et al. (2002) saw the starting point as an assessment to identify 
which of the founder’s skills and knowledge were important to the business. However, it 
was not lost on me that, as the Lead Researcher and the insider whose skills and capabilities 
had to be investigated, this presented a Catch-22. If founders generally found it hard to be 
explicit about what they did, why would I be any different. This therefore also seemed an 
important but difficult Driver to address. 
2.5.3.3.2 EXPERIENCE 
Another possible solution was to ensure successors had a wide range of responsibilities 
and contact with key stakeholders to develop their relationships, and to better understand 
the firm’s culture and intricacies (Lansberg & Astrachan, 1994). Spending a period outside 
of the business was also found to help develop the successor’s identity, and give them a 
broader range of problem solving skills (Nelton, 1986). Brockhaus (2004) and Longenecker 
& Schoen (1978) talked about how various stages of preparation could be used to build this 
experience, progressing from induction through organisational functions, and onto 
managerial and then senior managerial roles. This was a route we were already 
undertaking with the three Leadership Candidates to test their abilities to take over the 
leadership of the Company, and was therefore already identified as a relevant Driver. 
2.5.3.3.3 TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE 
Transferring knowledge was also identified as an important Driver for developing 
successors, with Motwani et al. (2006) suggesting mentoring as an effective tool; again, 
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something we were already doing. Steffens et al. (2018) added that giving the successor 
positive feedback about their abilities led to increased ambitions, commitment and 
performance, but the opposite was true also. 
2.5.3.4 Managing Commitment 
Identifying who the stakeholders were and some of their specific issues in regard to the 
succession process was important, but it was also essential to maintain their commitment 
if the succession process was to be effective. In this regard, there were a number of general 
issues raised, as well as some specific points by stakeholder type. 
2.5.3.4.1 PROCESS COMMUNICATIONS 
A key influence on how stakeholders behaved was the effectiveness of communications 
about the founder-leadership succession. At some stage, the fact there was to be a 
leadership succession and who that new leader would be must become public knowledge 
in order for the successor to be able to lead. Based on a survey of 368 US family-owned 
SME’s, Motwani et al's (2006) found that just over half (55.5%) were in favour of 
announcing the successor more than a year in advance, although they did not address how 
this news should be communicated. Dalpiaz et al. (2014) found that this was typically done 
through the use of narratives that focused on succession strategy and the successor’s 
identity, whilst reinforcing family identity. In this regard, Daspit et al. (2016) observed that 
generalised communications were more effective than selective ones for maintaining good 
relations, whilst Michael-Tsabari & Weiss (2015) focused more on what might cause poor 
communications, which they found ambivalence and conflict aversion made worse. 
2.5.3.4.2 PERCEIVED FAIRNESS 
Another factor that affected whether individuals were satisfied with the various outcomes 
of the founder-leadership succession was whether they perceived the process to be fair 
(Restubog et al., 2010), and which impacted how they responded to a founder-leadership 
succession. In particular, individuals wanted clarity as to what their own territory would be 
after the succession; if they were not to be given the top prize of leading the organisation, 
was there appropriate compensation? Where this was not the case their reciprocal 
response to this perceived unfairness was likely to be unhelpful to the founder-leadership 
succession, such as playing games. A related point was made by Nordqvist et al's (2013), 
who saw the key to successful successions was managing the emotions of all those affected 
by it, and not just those of the founder and successor. Whatever the reason for each 
stakeholders’ perception as to the fairness of the founder-leadership succession, it did 
seem to be a potential Driver for HC-Co’s founder-leadership succession. 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
 Critical Literature Review - Page 33 of 161 
2.5.3.4.3 SATISFACTION 
Whatever other factors led to a successful founder-leadership succession, to be perceived 
as successful the key stakeholders in the process had to be satisfied. Two important 
elements in this regard included process satisfaction, and post-succession performance 
(Morris et al., 1997; Handler and Kram, 1988). Satisfaction with the succession process 
might include not only financial performance, but maintaining relationships also (Tagiuri 
and Davis, 1992), in part by following a process that was seen to be fair (previously 
discussed in section Error! Reference source not found.). In regard to satisfaction with 
post-succession performance, five factors were found to be important: the willingness of 
the incumbent to leave; the willingness of the successor to take over; succession planning; 
agreement to continue, and; acceptance of changed roles (Sharma et al., 2001). However, 
if any party was unhappy with the succession process, problems could occur. Sharma et al. 
(2001) noted that initial satisfaction was typically driven by the founder’s willingness to let 
go and the quality of the succession process used, whereas retrospective satisfaction was 
more driven by how effective the successsion was in terms of maintained profitability. The 
satisfaction of all key stakeholders was therefore clearly a Driver. 
2.5.3.4.4 FOUNDER COMMITMENT 
However, there were also some key Drivers relating to the founder. They were perhaps the 
most obvious stakeholder who needed to back the founder-leadership succession, save 
where they die or become incapacitated in office, and they were also the most complex. 
For instance, giving up their role implicitly requires them to be willing to ‘let go’ which, for 
either emotional or financial reasons, they often found hard to do (Hoang and Gimeno, 
2010; Cadieux, 2007). There were a number of issues that got in the way of this, including 
(Handler & Kram, 1988) the psychological resistance of the founder to let go, a fear of 
change, cultural resistance, and concern in regard to the successor’s abilities. However, a 
number of factors also mitigated for letting go (Handler & Kram, 1988), such as if the 
founder’s health was problematic, whether they had other interests to move to, if they saw 
themselves as separate to the firm, if they were good at delegating, or had new 
opportunities. 
2.5.3.4.5 SUCCESSOR COMMITMENT 
The successor was another key stakeholder whose commitment was essential, with 
respondents to Motwani et al's (2006) survey placing it as one of the three most important 
Drivers, along with business and interpersonal skills. As with other stakeholders, successors 
had their own needs and goals which had to be considered, and which may or may not 
coincide with the needs of the company (Stavrou, 1990; Brockhaus, 2004). In fact their 
willingness to take on the role was not simply limited to objective factors, but the quality 
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of the succession experience also (Handler, 1994). Some of the issues that influenced their 
decision included how personally fulfilling they found the prospect, the degree to which 
their personal influence counted, relational factors such as the degree of mutual respect, 
how accepting other members of the family were, and how committed they felt to the firm. 
Shepherd & Zacharakis (2000) noted that successors were more committed when they had 
sunk financial and behavioural costs, although the former could make them more risk 
adverse. 
2.5.3.4.6 EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT 
Whilst a number of articles focused on the importance of the founder, successor and other 
key stakeholders (such as the family), little attention was paid to the employees. Were they 
key stakeholders also when it comes to founder-leadership succession, with the ability to 
disrupt any succession, or was their influence limited, as the lack of discussion in the 
literature would suggest? I had already raised this issue, arguing that the willingness of 
others to follow was seen as an indispensable part of an individual’s ability to lead 
(Hollander, 1992). CAS theory supported this. For example, a CAS such as the staff  group 
of a company who make up the ‘followers’ will collectively decide what any new messages 
mean, such as a change of leader, and decide whether to accept or reject it (Holland, 2012). 
A lack of any meaningful discussion on staff commitment to any leadership transition 
therefore seemed to me to be a significant omission. 
2.6 WORKING ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of the Analysis Framework was as a means to identify and assess process order 
and Drivers that may be relevant to founder-leadership successions generally, and HC-Co’s 
specifically. The framework below therefore built on the Preliminary Analysis Framework 
by including the Drivers that were identified during the literature review, with infill colour 
showing the phases to which they primarily relate, although I anticipated that this was 
likely to change during the research phases as the Participants’ contributions were added. 
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Tangible-Resource Drivers Pre-Succession (P1) Succession (P2) Post-Succession (P3) 
CAPITAL    
Dividend Policy    
Ownership-Transition Drivers    
Risk Appetite    
Access to Debt    
Intangible-Resource Drivers    
SUCCESSION PLANNING    
Planning Failures    
Firm vs Family Objectives    
General Risks    
    
SUCCESSOR SELECTION    
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT    
GOVERNANCE    
STRATEGY    
Human-Resource Drivers    
STAKEHOLDER SALIENCE    
Founder    
Successor    
Family    
Employee    
FOUNDER-SUCCESSOR ISSUES    
Relationship    
Transfer of Power    
Successor Strategies    
Timing    
SUCCESSOR DEVELOPMENT    
Job Specification    
Capabilities Development    
Experience    
Transferring Knowledge    
MANAGING COMMITMENT    
Process Communications    
Perceived Fairness    
Satisfaction    
Founder Commitment    
Successor Commitment    
Employee Commitment    
Fig. 6: Working Analysis Framework (WAF) 
2.7 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS 
One of the key findings from the literature review was not only how complex founder-
leadership succession could be, but that family-owned SME’s typically did not have the 
resources to deal with them. With leadership successions only taking place every 20-25 
years, family-owned SME’s seldom have the experience to support the process. It was also 
less-objectively approached if it were a founder-leadership succession. Further, the small 
size of family-owned SME’s typically meant there were few candidates to choose from. 
Family issues, which often took priority over company issues, also meant succession 
planning was either pushed back or insufficiently addressed for fear of upsetting family 
members, leading to succession timing often being sub-optimal. I therefore did not find it 
surprising that many founders simply didn’t know where to start. Against this backdrop, a 
failure rate of 72% seemed understandable.
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature review identified a number of Drivers that had impacted other companies’ 
founder-leadership successions, save understanding the same in regard to my own 
Company was the focus of the Research Question, ‘what [were] the drivers of founder-
leadership succession within family-owned SME’s that may relate to HC-Co’. In the Analysis 
and Discussion section, which follows, I ran through the research I undertook with the 
Participants to understand these Drivers, however, I first had to decide what the best 
methodological approach to take was.  
I started by first considering appropriate research paradigms, before moving on to looking 
at ethical issues, then ontological meanings, epistemological implications, and considering 
theoretical perspectives, which all led me to what I felt was the most appropriate research 
methodology. However, before approaching starting this process, I felt it was important to 
remind myself the context I set out in the introduction, within which the research would 
take place. 
3.2 CONTEXT 
In summary, my wife and I were anticipating a founder-leadership succession in 
preparation for our retirement, which was to run alongside the ongoing partial employee-
ownership transition. HC-Co was a family-owned SME which put it in a high risk group, 
whereby 72% of UK based companies were expected to fail during the change from first to 
second-generation leadership (Lomax et al., 2015). The literature review indicated that this 
failure rate was connected to the complexity and rarity of such events in SME’s. I 
recognised that the choice of research approach therefore needed to accommodate this 
complexity in a way that adequately addressed the Research Question. I therefore started 
by considering research paradigms. 
3.3 RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
Research paradigms reflect different worldviews with Positivist and its variants on one side, 
and Interpretivist and its variants on the other (Teddie & Tashakkori, 2009). In the middle 
sits Pragmatism. Positivism holds that only that which can be scientifically measured is 
valid, whereas Interpretivism argues that it is beliefs, concepts and language that are more 
relevant. Pragmatism, as its names suggests, is more driven by outcomes, and will draw on 
both Positivist and Interpretivist worldviews (Morgan, 2014). Paradigms are typically based 
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on four foundations: ethics; epistemology; ontology, and; methodology (Lincoln & Guba, 
1990).  
Research 
Paradigm 
Ontology Epistemology Theoretical 
Perspective 
Methodology Data 
Positivist Single 
empirical 
reality 
Reality is 
scientifically 
measured 
Positivism 
Postpositivism 
Experimental 
research 
Surveys 
Usually 
quantitative 
Interpretivist Multiple 
created 
realities 
Reality is 
interpreted 
Critical Theory 
Social 
Constructionism 
Participatory 
Action 
Narrative 
Research 
Phenomenology 
Grounded 
Theory 
Ethnography 
Case Study 
Action Research 
Usually 
qualitative 
Mixed 
Pragmatist Single & 
multiple 
realities 
Reality is 
measured 
and 
interpreted 
Post-positivism 
& Social 
Constructionism 
as approaches 
to research 
Emphasis on 
experience 
Mixed 
Fig. 7: Research Paradigms 
Adapted from  Denzin & Lincoln (2018); Creswell, (2013); and Morgan, (2014)  
 
According to Lincoln & Guba, my choice of research paradigm would be driven by my 
beliefs, and would therefore inevitably impact on the conclusions I reached. It followed 
that I should be clear as to what these were so that any implicit biases were made explicit 
insofar as was possible. However, beliefs about what? What was the research paradigm to 
be applied to? 
In essence, the answer was the Research Question. However, I recognised that, in 
particular, I needed to focus in on what part of the Research Question the research 
paradigm needed to address, which I considered earlier in my discussion of research aims 
and objectives. In total, the Research Question related to what the Drivers were in regard 
to founder-leadership succession within family-owned SME’s, with particular regard to HC-
Co. Each part of the Research Question was clearly relevant through providing focus and 
clarity: on what the Drivers were; that it specifically related to founder succession; and that 
it was within the context of family-owned SME’s. However, one part seemed to be of the 
essence; understanding what leadership meant, after all this what was being transferred 
from the founder to the successor. When considering which theoretical perspective was 
most appropriate, being clear about what I thought leadership meant ontologically, and 
how it could be understood epistemologically, would in turn clarify how best to approach 
it methodologically.  
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3.3.1 Ethical Considerations 
However, before considering different ontological, epistemological and methodological 
perspectives, I first wanted to consider the ethical implications of this research, and what 
safeguards the chosen research methodology should include. 
The maxim to ‘do no harm’ lies at the root of many ethical guidelines (Smith, 2005), 
whereas others argue that you must also try and do some good. Supporting the do-no-
harm approach was Khanlou & Peter (2005) who suggested a number of checks should be 
considered as part of deciding whether a social research project was ethical, including: how 
socially or scientifically beneficial it was; its scientific validity; whether the participants 
were selected fairly; what was the risk-reward ratio to those affected by the research; was 
it subject to independent review; were the participants given informed consent, and; was 
respect shown to everyone involved. Whereas Kincheloe et al. (2011) took a more 
proactive approach. They argued that, for research to be ethical, it should examine ten key 
areas. These two viewpoints represented very different approaches, but I was concerned 
that adopting an ethical approach that exerted too much influence on the objectives of the 
research had the potential to become the ethical ‘tail’ wagging the research objective ‘dog’. 
Another approach was (Heron and Reason, 1997) who argued that ethics were an intrinsic 
part of some paradigms, so perhaps simply selecting the right paradigm would be sufficient 
to address ethical considerations. Whilst Positivism and Postpositivism required controls 
and balances for such approaches to be ethical, they argued that others had them included 
intrinsically; such as with Critical Theory, Social Constructionism, and participatory action 
approaches. Whilst each type of research paradigm could therefore be ethically 
constructed, and some may be more biased in this direction than others, I believed an 
ethical outcome would not be automatic. For example, whilst research paradigms that are 
done ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ the subjects will typically mean the subjects are more 
informed, their greater involvement would only have an indirect effect on the ‘no harm’ 
factors cited by Khanlou & Peter. 
The conclusion I reached was that ‘do good’ type ethical codes were as likely to confuse 
the research objectives as to protect participants from harm. Conversely, I believed that 
the ‘do-no-harm’ models of ethical guidelines offered a valuable safety net to help ensure 
the research methodology was at least designed in an ethical way. Whilst a research 
methodology that sought to do good should not be ruled out if it was complementary to 
the research objectives, my conclusions were that it should be designed to do-no-harm as 
a minimum. 
This approach was primarily implemented through the ethical review process were I 
proactively considered the research being contemplated from a number of stakeholders’ 
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perspectives, whereas the Company’s clients were excluded because I felt contemplating 
a change of leadership might cause this largely vulnerable group anxiety. I also applied this 
approach when asking potential Participants to take part by doing my best to ensure they 
did not feel pressurised, and in how I phrased questions and conducted group sessions with 
those who did take part. 
3.3.2 Ontology 
So, whilst ethics was an important safety net to protect those potentially impacted by the 
research, ontology had a more obvious link to the research paradigm chosen. It was about 
exploring whether something ‘exists’ and, if so, how (Williams, 2016). For example, if I 
believed that the Drivers of leadership were formulaic and could be quantitatively 
measured, I would be drawn towards a Positivist paradigm. Whereas if I believed 
leadership only existed in the eyes of the people considering following that person’s lead, 
and the relevant Drivers were those that impacted their perception of that leadership, I 
might be drawn to an Interpretivist type paradigm. If both, I might choose Pragmatism. 
According to Hacking (1999), perceived realities were often seen in a Positivist nature as 
the inevitable consequence of some objective qualities, e.g. leadership experience, the 
quality of their training, or a particular style. This was partially supported by Bryman (2012) 
who felt that two approaches were relevant to social research: Positivism, through 
imitating the natural sciences, and; Interpretivism, which saw the subject matter of social 
science as fundamentally different to that of the natural sciences. I could see Hacking’s 
Positivist approach evident in the natural science example of Complex Adaptive Systems 
theory (Holland, 2012), which argues that, for example, a group of employees were likely 
to form a collective opinion on any potential leader’s merits. However, the rules and 
boundaries of such systems would be formed and changed by the employees’ interactions 
with the potential leader in an Interpretivist way. The Positivist approach therefore only 
seemed partially relevant as a metaphor for human behaviour, with its essence being the 
socially-constructed nature of these interactions. 
Applying this to the Research Question, whilst leadership succession at its simplest may 
have solely involved the old and new leader whereby the former appoints and then hands 
over authority to the latter, this seemed an oversimplification. Whilst I could see who the 
leader was in a Positivist way by whose name-plate was on the door, it did not mean that 
people would be prepared to follow their lead. At its essence, I recognised that I saw 
leadership as a social process affecting and being influenced by not only the principal 
players, but all those affected by that leadership (Hollander, 1992). Engaging with these 
stakeholders was therefore a critical part of leadership. Seeing leadership as a social 
process was consistent with Hacking (1999), who agreed that such ‘realities’ were socially 
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constructed. This did not just apply to judgements of success or failure, but upon what 
basis those judgments were made. My conclusion was therefore that leadership, if it were 
not to be an empty title, was a social construction between the leader and those who chose 
to follow their lead, or not, which ruled out Positivist paradigms. To my mind, whilst 
Positivist models may have been helpful for their metaphorical value, Interpretivism, and 
specifically Social Constructionism offered a better ontological viewpoint for the social 
context in which leadership existed. 
Social Constructionism is an Interpretivist viewpoint (Williams, 2016), which was  
supported by Barge and Oliver (2003) who cited the importance of language in constructing 
reality. Cunliffe & Eriksen (2011) argued that this was not a formal process or negotiation 
but happened within everyday conversations. 
Finally, I considered whether Pragmatism offered a superior ontological approach by 
combining the best of Positivism and Interpretivism. In some ways it was tempting but, at 
an ontological level, this felt antagonistic to me. Whilst Positivist qualities such as 
qualifications and years of experience were factors that may be considered as part of the 
socially constructed viewpoint that the various stakeholders took of a leader, they had no 
intrinsic meaning on their own. One group may see a particular qualification in a positive 
light, and another negative, and either may change their viewpoint over time. This was true 
of all the Drivers identified in the literature review where there was no objective measure 
as to whether they applied or not, but more a subjective, socially-constructed view of their 
relevance. In the case of the Research Question, I therefore felt that Pragmatism added 
nothing of value, whilst potentially causing confusion, and therefore disregarded it. 
Having settled on an Interpretivist ontological approach, I moved on to consider the best 
way to understand leadership and the Research Question from this perspective.  
3.3.3 Epistemology 
Epistemology is about knowledge, what is relevant to the matter being studied, and how 
we can obtain it (Williams, 2016). In this regard, there were two ways I could approach 
understanding the Drivers of leadership succession: empirical observation, and reason. 
Empirical observation relies on our five senses to gather data, whereas reasoning is a 
function of thinking, and may either be inductive, deductive or abductive.  
Turning to empirical observation, I had effectively ruled this out through my choice of 
Interpretivist ontology. Empirical knowledge is typically derived from numerical data that 
indicates the subject’s physical attributes, a Positivist construct. From an epistemological 
perspective, taking a socially-constructed ontological approach meant there was no 
Positivist type independent reality from which to generate empirical data and knowledge 
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from. What mattered were the socially constructed meanings that the stakeholders gave 
to the issue, both individually and collectively. The data I had to work with was therefore 
the descriptions of how those meanings were constructed from which I could apply 
reasoning to generate explanations and hypotheses relevant to the Research Question. 
Reason as a method of gathering data therefore seemed more appropriate. 
Creswell (2013) argued that the best way to generate this type of knowledge was through 
inductive methods, such as analysing written material that may reveal the thinking of the 
writer, interviews and observing. Nonaka & Lewin (2013) agreed that socially-constructed 
research subjects, such as understanding what leadership succession meant to people, 
indicated that reasoning was the only method to generate knowledge from the data, with 
inductive and deductive methods typically being used or, when new concepts were 
required, abductive reasoning (Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011). However, having concluded 
that leadership, in the sense of the Research Question, was an Interpretivist ontology, it 
did not necessarily mean that all types of reasoning would be helpful. 
For example, I found it hard to see how deductive approaches were likely to add value. If 
the CAS metaphor held true for how meaning was socially constructed, then the viewpoints 
taken by stakeholders on the leadership of HC-Co were subject to the rules and boundaries 
of the relevant CAS. If I were not a member of that particular CAS, say the employees at 
one of the Company’s services, I would not know what boundary rules were being applied 
to any signals being received from a leadership candidate and, even if I were, such rules 
were likely to be implicit rather than explicit (Holland, 2012). It followed that I was unlikely 
to be able to apply deduction to understand what was going on.  
Inductive reasoning might be more helpful, where I could draw conclusions as to probable 
causes of a particular viewpoint, but which fell short of the certainty of deduction. For 
example, if employee enthusiasm for a particular Leadership Candidate increased, I may 
be able to induct it was because of some actions they had taken. However, as Haig (2008) 
argues, where we are left to guess what is behind a particular action, such as the thinking 
of a CAS to which we don’t have direct access, our only option is abductive reasoning. 
Whilst it would be preferable to have sufficient evidence to make a certain deduction, or a 
probable induction, my conclusion was that most of the time I was only likely to be able to 
apply abductive reasoning as to the possible causes of an action or opinion.  
3.3.4 Theoretical Perspectives 
In regard to theoretical perspectives, there were five major approaches to consider: 
Positivism; Postpositivism; Critical Theory; Social Constructionism, and; Participatory 
Action (Kamberelis et al. in Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). 
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 Positivism Postpositivism Critical Theory Constructionism Participatory 
Ethics Extrinsic / 
deceptive 
Extrinsic / 
deceptive 
Intrinsic / moral 
tilt to revelation 
Intrinsic / 
process tilt to 
revelation 
Intrinsic / 
process tilt to 
revelation 
Ontology Naive realism Critical realism Historical 
realism 
Relativism Participative 
reality 
Epistemology Dualist / 
objectivist 
Modified 
dualist / 
objectivist 
Transactional / 
subjectivist; 
value mediated 
Transactional / 
subjectivist; co 
created 
Critical 
subjectivity 
Methodology Experimental 
/ 
manipulative 
Modified 
experimental / 
manipulative 
Dialogic / 
dialectical 
Hermeneutical / 
dialectical 
Political 
participation 
in 
collaborative 
action inquiry 
Fig. 8: Theoretical Perspectives 
Adapted from Heron & Reason (1997) 
Positivism was based on the notion of a single reality that was predictable and knowable 
through study (Guba and Lincoln, 2005), whereas Postpositivism argued for a single reality, 
but which could never be fully understood. Both of these seemed incompatible with the 
socially-constructed viewpoint of leadership I had chosen, which could therefore conceive 
of a number of different realities. 
Critical Theory offered a different perspective, arguing that the struggle for power lay at 
the heart of much human interaction (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). In so much as leadership 
typically gave power over others, Critical Theory may offer some insights into these 
relationships, but did not seem to provide for a socially-constructed approach to 
leadership. 
On the other hand, Social Constructionism did seem more compatible. This held that 
realities were mentally constructed based on experience and interaction with a group, 
allowing for multiple realities to exist (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). However, this fell short too 
in that the Research Question was asking about what Drivers impact leadership succession, 
but in particular regard to HC-Co. There was implicitly an action element that required 
interaction with those people who would be giving meaning to an event that had not yet 
completed. 
Participatory approaches, which accepted that meaning was created by the group in order 
to create one reality between them and could be learned about through active 
engagement with the group (Chevalier and Buckles, 2013), seemed a better fit. The 
founder-leadership succession was being contemplated and prepared for as this research 
was being done. Therefore, the meanings that would help answer the Research Question 
were being changed and formed in real time, rather than as a past event to be studied. 
Whilst both Critical Theory and Social Constructionism might offer insights into the 
Research Question, it was only a participatory approach, with its active engagement with 
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the group, that provided for understanding the fluid and socially-constructed nature of the 
ongoing founder-leadership succession. However, I could also see challenges.  
To understand the meanings these groups were giving, and how they went about 
constructing those meanings meant being able to access their thinking but, in the sense 
that these groups are CAS, they had boundary rules that kept certain people out, and 
allowed others in (Holland, 2012). It seemed doubtful to me that these CAS would simply 
change their access rules to allow me in just because I was doing some research. I therefore 
considered this issue further below. 
3.3.5 Research Strategies 
I next considered which strategies might be most helpful, with Creswell (2013) suggesting 
five: Narrative Research, Phenomenological Research, Grounded Theory, Ethnographic 
Research, and Case Study to see if any of these could help me to understand the Research 
Question. However, the subject being investigated was the Drivers that would impact HC-
Co’s founder-leadership succession, and in particular what they meant to those who had 
influence over the leadership succession. If I simply wanted to understand what the key 
stakeholders’ views were of the Drivers in regard to some past succession, the simplest 
approach might be to select these people as subjects for the research and use one or more 
of the approaches above. However, the research related to an event that was in the process 
of happening, and to which the socially constructed meanings were still emerging. Further, 
at its heart, leadership succession was a change process, with most modern change 
thinkers arguing that the people most affected by the process should be at the heart of it 
(Cooperrider et al., 2008; Zigarmi et al., 2008; Kotter, 2007). This was consistent with my 
conclusions on theoretical perspectives, and I therefore decided it was important to find a 
method that undertook the research with the key stakeholders, rather than on them, but 
which I had already identified was not without its challenges. 
One method was Participatory Action Research (PAR), which Reason and Bradbury (2008) 
describe as a, ‘participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical 
knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes’. Given that I was not just trying to 
understand leadership succession in an abstract way, but in relation to the founder-
leadership succession that HC-Co was preparing for, this made PAR particularly relevant. 
Further, by connecting theory and technique to solve an organisational challenge 
(Chevalier & Buckles, 2013), this approach seemed well suited to addressing the Research 
Question through being able to draw on any helpful theory, but in a pragmatic way. 
Epistemologically, PAR was also able to accommodate the reasoning approach to 
understanding the socially constructed ontological perspective I had adopted.  
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It was also well suited ethically to meeting Khanlou & Peter (2005) checks: the research 
was socially beneficial as it was seeking to understand factors that influenced HC-Co’s 
future survival; PAR was recognised as a scientifically valid research method; there were 
means to ensure participants were selected fairly; the risk reward ratio seemed in balance 
as everyone concerned would benefit from the Company’s future survival; it was subject 
to the University of Liverpool’s oversight (although any method chosen would have been); 
informed consent was part of the process, and; it was respectful to everyone involved by 
including them, or their colleagues, as researchers. PAR was therefore the methodology I 
adopted for this research. 
3.4 PARTICIPATORY ACTION RESEARCH 
By working with participants, PAR focuses on the social contexts of an issue in order to 
deliver collaborative, pragmatic outcomes through a combination of both action and 
research (Coghlan, 2011; Koshy, 2005) . This was the essence of what the Research 
Question was about; understanding the Drivers of founder-leadership succession so that 
HC-Co stood the best chance of being one of the 28% who survived (Lomax et al., 2015). 
Through its iterative process, PAR also combined reflexivity on practice and theory with 
experimentation within the social context that organisational challenges are typically 
found (Chevalier & Buckles, 2013). In regard to HC-Co, there was considerable theory 
summarised in the literature review that could be applied to the organisational challenge 
of understanding the Drivers of success or failure of founder-leadership succession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: PAR Process  
Adapted from Chevalier and Buckles (2013) 
In the context of this research, I was aware the duration of the research was likely to be 
less than the duration of the founder-leadership succession. I could therefore move 
towards understanding the challenge of the Company surviving the founder-leadership 
succession, but I also had to be clear that was beyond the scope of this research which 
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focused on more foundational issues, i.e. what the Drivers of founder-leadership 
succession were, rather than mitigating them. In this regard, the key reflection would be 
on which Drivers were relevant to founder-leadership succession, and how they might 
apply to HC-Co. 
3.4.1 Participant Researcher Selection 
The key element of PAR was to form a team of participant researchers who had to be 
selected fairly in order for the research to be ethical and accepted by the non-Participant 
employees, and started with the principles of stakeholder salience (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Those considered to have salience would have either power over the process, a legitimate 
interest in its outcome, and/or an urgent interest in the matter. 
To this end, the Company operated at three locations and had two broad categorisations 
of employee: staff who delivered services, and; managers who facilitated the delivery of 
those services. I also felt there was an important sub-group, being those who aspired to be 
part of the leadership succession, the Leadership Candidates. In view of the risk of the 
findings of the Participants being rejected by non-Participant employees, I felt the broader 
the mix of insider Participants the better. I therefore recruited a representative employee 
and manager from each of the organisation’s three services, along with the three 
Leadership Candidates who were being trained to explore their potential to take over the 
leadership of the Company. 
I next considered the people who the Company provided a service to, which included both 
clients who received care and support directly, but also their families. Whilst they would 
no doubt have had an interest in the process, I did not consider they had sufficient salience 
in terms of power, legitimacy and urgency to meet the inclusion criteria. I was also 
concerned their inclusion might have been counterproductive if uncertainty over the 
future leadership of HC-Co was to cause anxiety in a group of people who were very 
dependent on the Company.  
Some external stakeholders potentially had either an influence on, or a perspective that 
may have been beneficial to the succession process, such as key suppliers or regulators, 
but I felt the potential adverse consequences of their involvement outweighed these 
benefits. Such adverse consequences might have included a loss of confidence in HC-Co 
due to an uncertainty over future leadership (Anderson et al., 2003), and which may have 
been hard to mitigate until the credentials of those future leaders had been established. 
However, I felt there were two exceptions; HC-Co’s bank manager and accountant/auditor, 
whom HC-Co were legally obliged to keep informed of such debates anyway. Both were 
also likely to have direct knowledge of other companies who had gone through a similar 
process and may therefore have relevant perspectives to offer. They also had intimate 
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knowledge of HC-Co and could therefore apply this perspective in a potentially useful way. 
Further, rather than being concerned by the process, because of their risk-adverse and 
expert perspective I considered the bank were likely to take comfort from the fact that HC-
Co was facing up to a risk which the bank would already be aware existed. 
The final Participant was my wife who owned HC-Co with me. As one of the retiring leaders, 
I felt it was important that her perspective was included, and who also willingly agreed to 
take part.  
Insider/Outsider Role Sex Age Years with Co 
Insider Carer Female 40’s 18 
Insider Carer Female 40’s 6 
Insider Carer Female 20’s 3 
Insider Ass. Mng. Female 20’s 6 
Insider Ass. Mng. Female 20’s 6 
Insider Ass. Mng. Female 30’s 6 
Insider Manager/LC Female 50’s 25 
Insider Manager/LC Female 50’s 10 
Insider Manager/LC Female 30’s 9 
Outsider Banker Male 30’s 2 
Outsider Accountant Male 50’s 20+ 
Insider Owner Female 50’s 25 
Insider Owner/Lead 
Researcher 
Male 50’s 32 
Fig. 10: Participant Data 
Note: 96% of the Company’s employees are female, which is not unusual for the care 
industry. 
3.4.2 Ethical Implications of PAR 
I touched on ethical matters when considering the research paradigms, and one of the 
great benefits of PAR was that it was inclusive and naturally keeps the Participants 
informed. However, there were other issues I felt needed to be addressed (Creswell, 2014). 
Each Participant received a detailed briefing on what the research was hoping to achieve, 
and signed a consent form to confirm their wish to be involved. However, these documents 
only showed an intent, which had to be put into practice, with the following being the key 
ethical risks I had to manage: 
There were multiple power imbalances that existed between the 
Participants and myself: I was the joint owner of the company; I was also the 
Lead Researcher; there were differing educational levels; I had access to 
information which, for reasons of confidentiality, I could not share with 
everyone, and; I largely controlled the pace and structure of the research. 
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There was a risk of an information imbalance between the Participants; for 
example, I might share more information with those I saw more often, i.e. 
the mangers vs front-line staff. Apart from the fact that such imbalances may 
create a risk of bias through leading individual Participants’ thinking, it would 
also have been inequitable. 
There was a risk that Participants may benefit, or be harmed, by being 
involved in the process. Whilst I had a lot to do with employees at 
management level, I was less involved with those working at the front line. 
The involvement front-line staff had with me was bound to update my 
opinion of their abilities, which might therefore help or hinder their 
promotion prospects. 
There was also a risk that my pre-knowledge of the Participants may act as 
a filter to their contributions, introducing a further level of bias. 
Finally, because I had a vested interest in a successful outcome to the 
leadership succession, I may have been tempted to only share information 
that I felt supported that process (James, 2006). 
My conclusion was that I should actively consider these and other ethical considerations 
with the other Participants as preparation for, and reflection after each iteration of the PAR 
cycle. An example of this was in regard to whether my wife and I were the best people to 
select our successor. 
3.5 RESEARCH METHODS 
Having chosen the research methodology, I then considered how to apply it by selecting a 
research approach that included: identifying the study population; deciding what sampling 
methods would be most appropriate, and; how I would collect, process and analyse the 
resultant data. 
3.5.1 Research Approach 
3.5.1.1 Study Population 
The study population were those people I considered were most likely to be able to assist 
with addressing the Research Question (Creswell, 2014), and from whom the Participants 
were selected. Whilst the literature review had identified a number of Drivers that had 
typically affected other companies’ founder-leadership successions, these Participants 
were the people who were likely to have insights as to how they may affect HC-Co. I also 
recognised that, once we started the research, we may find areas where specific 
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knowledge resided with people who were within the study population, but who were not 
yet a Participant. For example, whilst I had chosen not to include any regulators for the 
risks this may bring, if the value of clarifying a particular Driver exceeded the perceived risk, 
I might choose to invite them to become a Participant. It was also possible that the salience 
of existing Participants may reduce, for instance if they were to leave or an event meant 
the CAS they represented no longer considered them to be a member. In these 
circumstances, I anticipated that additional Participants may need to be recruited also. 
3.5.1.2 Sampling Strategy 
A sampling strategy is required when the number of people who could contribute to the 
study is too large to be pragmatic which, as already discussed above and in section 3.4.1 
on Participant selection, was the case. I therefore had to decide on a sampling strategy. In 
fact, PAR came with its own sampling strategy through its selection of Participants to 
represent the wider population affected but, before presuming this was sufficient, I wanted 
to consider what other options might be helpful. In this regard, Patton (2015) identified a 
number of approaches, including: 
Maximum variation – By selecting a range of Participants based on their 
salience and defined by different relationships to the Company (i.e. owners, 
professionals, staff, managers & Leadership Candidates), PAR is compatible 
with this approach. However, I had ruled out some groups, such as clients 
and regulators, because they also had risks associated with their 
involvement, and so this fell short of maximum variation. 
Homogeneous – By applying stakeholder salience, I had chosen a sampling 
strategy that was homogeneous in this regard. 
Typical cases – There were no typical cases to sample, save through some of 
the articles reviewed in the literature review. However, the Research 
Question was specific in regard to HC-Co which had experienced no previous 
leadership successions. 
Key informant – My choice of Participants was also consistent with this 
through selecting people who had the most salience to the Research 
Question and were therefore most likely to have key information to 
contribute. 
Complete target group – Consulting all stakeholders in the Research 
Question would have meant sacrificing quality for quantity, i.e. relying on 
questionnaires rather than interviews. 
Quota – I had also applied this approach by selecting a quota of Participants 
from amongst the staff group, managers and Leadership Candidates. 
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Purposeful random – I felt the number of potential Participants was too 
small for this to be practical. 
Time-location – There was a time element to the sampling, although not 
deliberate, as a Participant left during the process and therefore had to be 
replaced, but there was a more deliberate strategy to recruit Participants 
from the Company’s three locations. 
My conclusion was that my initial selection process for the Participants represented a 
reasonable sampling strategy. However, in the same way that there were a great number 
of potential Participants, I also felt a sampling strategy was needed to decide which of the 
Drivers identified in the literature review should be considered. There were also probably 
going to be additional Drivers identified by the Participants when they made their 
contributions. Creswell (2014) recommended purposeful sampling as a way to approach 
this, which I applied in two ways: 
I wanted to get the Participants’ thoughts on Drivers before sharing the 
results of the literature review as I felt to do so would make them less likely 
to contribute new ideas, which was therefore the focus of the first PAR 
iteration. In accordance with Creswell's (2014) recommendation, this was 
done in a largely unstructured way to facilitate the widest range of 
responses, which were then narrowed down in subsequent research 
iterations. 
I also did not want to potentially waste the time we would have together 
focusing on Drivers that either obviously applied to HC-Co, or clearly did not. 
I could see that subsequent research would have to address how to mitigate 
or take advantage of those Drivers that did apply to HC-Co, but the focus of 
this research was to single out those that the Participants felt might. I 
therefore used my reflections on the literature review to shortlist issues to 
review with the Participants in the second iteration, with subsequent 
iterations being based on the outcomes of these first two. 
Whilst the above approach seemed rigorous, it was not without its problems; most of the 
Participants where happy to contribute, but there was some reluctance at times. For 
example, the first iterations were by way of one-on-one video conferences which I never 
was able to persuade one Participant to actively engage in because they found the process 
too uncomfortable. Further, the third iteration was by way of a focus group which I asked 
the professionals and my wife not to join in as I felt others might be less likely to contribute. 
However, in the end only one staff Participant took part and showed signs that they were 
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less than comfortable talking in front of managers. I discuss these issues in more detail in 
section 6.4.1. 
3.5.1.3 Key Concepts and Measurements 
Patton (2015) notes that concepts and measurements are mental models that direct what 
we look at. They can therefore be helpful to direct us towards the relevant but can also 
mean we focus away from potentially important insights if not chosen carefully. As part of 
the literature review I drew on the various articles to form a WAF  which identified some 
key concepts and Drivers that may be relevant to the Research Question. As this model was 
based on a detailed examination of the available academic literature, I felt it was a 
reasonable basis to draw concepts from. In line with the Interpretivist epistemological 
approach, measurement of these concepts would be by way of the conversations I was to 
have with the Participants as to how relevant they felt they were to the Research Question. 
3.5.1.4 Data Objectives and Collection 
The Interpretivist approach I was taking, combined with the PAR methodology meant that 
I was looking for qualitative data, which I anticipated would include my conversations with, 
and observations of the Participants (Patton, 2015). The objective of the research was to 
address the Research Question, and therefore the objective for the data collection was to 
gather the information that helped me to understand what the Participants’ contributions 
were to answering this. In so doing, I attempted to follow Patton’s (2015) recommendation 
to be empathic, neutral and mindful: 
Being empathic involved me trying to understand the subjective experience 
of each Participant which, having spent many years working alongside many 
of them, I realised I may already have some insights into, but which might 
also lead me to jump to conclusions. I recognised that, in as far as is possible, 
I needed to park any pre-understanding I had and listen with an open mind. 
I further recognised that being an inside researcher would make it hard for 
me to remain neutral on subjects I felt strongly about, but also recognised 
that, if I was not to influence the contributions made, I had to avoid the 
temptation to argue my corner. 
I also had to remain mindful, to focus in on the essence of what the 
Participant was saying and any hidden messages or body language that may 
better help me understand their contribution. 
In regard to how I planned to collect this data, Bryman (2012) suggested a number of 
methods including: interviews; focus groups; questionnaires; emerging questions, and; 
structured observations. Whilst questionnaires were useful for approaching large numbers 
of people, I felt they were not useful to this research as they did not easily allow for 
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exploring emergent themes or clarifying what the Participant specifically meant. However, 
both interviews and focus groups did allow for this, and seemed better suited to the 
number of Participants I was working with. I also felt that conducting these interviews and 
focus groups in a way that allowed me to observe and better interact with the Participants 
was also likely to yield richer data on which to base my analysis.  
Further sources of data were suggested by Creswell (2014), including observations, 
documents, and audio-visual material as sources of suitable data. Observations made 
sense, as per Patton’s recommendation to be mindful, but I could not think that there were 
likely to be any primary documents or audio-visual material that already existed. The 
concept of founder-leadership succession only really emerged as part of this research, 
although I recognised this would generate secondary documents and audio-visual material  
that would then be the main source of information for analysis. However, I was aware there 
may be primary documents that may be helpful to clarify ancillary points that were made 
by the Participants to test for consistency, to indicate a change in their thinking, or perhaps 
evidence that their responses were influenced by what they thought I wanted to hear. 
The point of bias was also raised by Riessman (2008) who  cautioned that the questions 
and methods of the interview could significantly influence the contribution of the 
Participants. One recommendation to address this was Patton’s (2015) who suggested that, 
in order to get the richest possible data, unscripted and individual interviews were likely to 
be the most productive. However, whilst this was likely to reveal the Participants’ own 
views, I felt it did not necessarily eliminate the risk of bias, and nor was it likely to elicit 
their views on the Drivers revealed in the literature review, or each-others’ contributions. 
Another view was Bryman (2012), who recommended semi-structured interviews so as to 
address key points, but to also allow sufficient flexibility to explore any new issues the 
Participant might wish to raise, which I was more sympathetic to. 
Another issue I had to consider was whether these interviews should be individual or 
collective. A key part of the Research Question was to understand how the Participants’ 
views were socially constructed, which might best be explored in focus groups. However, I 
recognised that one of the risks of focus groups, especially when established hierarchies 
were involved such as HC-Co’s management structure, junior voices may be lost. My 
conclusion was that a mixed approach was likely to be most productive: individual 
conversations to capture individuals’ contributions, and; focus groups to see how these 
ideas evolved collectively.  
For the first iteration, my plan was to draw out each individual’s insights into the Research 
Question, but without the distortion that introducing concepts from the literature review 
would bring. However, without any questions, as recommended by Patton, I felt the 
interviews were likely to be unproductive and I therefore decided to follow Bryman’s semi-
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structured approach. Whilst I appreciated this introduced a risk of some bias, I asked each 
Participant the same six broad questions to get the conversations going. 
Having had the opportunity to gather the Participants’ unvarnished views, I decided the 
second iteration should build on the responses to the first iteration whilst also feeding in 
the Drivers identified in the literature review . This was again done as individual interviews 
to get the personal, rather than collective, opinion of each Participant. I was aware that it 
was possible, or even likely that some of the Participants would have been discussing the 
first-iteration questions and their responses to them, and which would no doubt influence 
their responses to the second-iteration questions, but I felt it best to save seeking collective 
opinions to the third iteration. 
As noted above, a key outcome of the research was to understand how the Participants 
socially constructed meanings in regard to the Research Question collectively. The third 
iteration was therefore a focus group. However, I did not include all the Participants as I 
felt there was a risk of some voices not being heard. I therefore asked the two professional 
Participants not to take part, and who, by not being part of any of the Company’s CAS, were 
likely to form their opinions independently anyway. I also asked my wife not to take part 
for similar reasons, leaving the Leadership Candidates, managers, and staff Participants to 
take part in the focus groups. 
The final issue I had to decide was how to conduct the interviews. The disparate locations 
of the Participants over four different sites meant arranging face-to-face meetings was 
likely to be difficult. I also felt that meeting some face-to-face and others remotely also 
introduced a potential source of bias. I further recognised that providing a confidential 
location was important if the Participants were to feel able to contribute fully without the 
distraction of other people being aware of what they were doing, which was likely to be 
the case if the interviews were in HC-Co’s homes. I therefore felt that video-conferencing 
was the best compromise for the one-on-one interviews. Whilst it would not give as rich 
data as meeting face-to-face, it would provide far greater flexibility for scheduling 
interviews where both myself and the Participants could be in places that were confidential 
and comfortable, and also provided a reasonable amount of consistency for all the 
Participants. By recording the video-conferences, I also had a useful medium to not only 
transcribe the conversations, but also extract further rich data by being able to review my 
own and other Participants’ intonations and body language. 
However, for the focus group, I was concerned that video-conferencing may not be the 
best medium. Whilst this may be effective for one-to-one interviews, I felt some 
Participants, who were not familiar with the technology, may be reluctant to contribute 
where the means of recording the meeting was more obvious than a webcam. Further, on 
a one-to-one basis, any discomfort was likely to be easier to notice and manage then when 
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a number of Participants were together. I therefore concluded that audio recording was a 
better solution for the focus group. 
There was a total of three iterations, set out in the table below, showing which Participants 
by type took part in each iteration (numbers in brackets indicate maximum possible 
numbers). Each interview took between forty and eighty-five minutes, with the focus group 
lasting for ninety-three minutes. 
Iteration Type Owners Profs LC’s Mngrs Staff 
First Interviews 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 3 (3)  2 (3) 
Second Interviews 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 
Third Focus Group 0 (1) 0 (2) 3 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 
Fig. 11: PAR Iterations Participation 
Prior to each iteration, I prepared a list of questions to be asked to ensure consistency. 
Each iteration had planning, action, observation, and reflection phases. For the initial 
iteration the planning was done by me, the action was with the Participants through asking 
and answering the first-phase questions, followed by my observation of the results we 
obtained. The reflection for the first iteration was done partially by me when deciding what 
questions to ask for the second-iteration, but also with the Participants as these questions 
focused on some of their answers from the first iteration. The same format held true for 
the third iteration, save there was no subsequent iteration for further reflection. With the 
value of hindsight, this was one area where I felt I could have improved the application of 
the PAR process in. 
3.5.1.4.1 DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS 
The data to be processed was the conversations from the three iterations, and all the 
Participants kindly agreed to these being recorded. These were subsequently transcribed 
and offered to each Participant to verify their accuracy; only one of the Participants 
suggested a small change be made to one of the transcripts. I then coded each according 
to the themes set out in the WAF to support the observation and reflection PAR stages. 
Before the above data could be analysed, I recognised that it needed to be simplified and 
condensed into a format that made analysis and drawing conclusions easier (Miles and 
Huberman, 2014), with their model, below, complementing the PAR process.  
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Fig. 12: Qualitative Data Analysis 
Adapted from Miles and Huberman (2014) 
The data collection was by way of the recordings and transcripts, with the data display and 
analysis being achieved by two methods. A table for each Participant’s transcription was 
prepared that analysed each paragraph by WAF themes, emergent themes and 
observations.  
 
Issue WAF Theme 1 WAF Theme 2 Emergent Participants 
Commitment Playing Games Reciprocity Communication LC1, M3 
Fig. 13: Theme Analysis Spreadsheet Example 
These were then fed into a spreadsheet for analysis of these themes by Participant type 
and volume of observations, to which I then applied a grounded-theory-type approach by 
exploring the data in order to tease out the social construction processes that were likely 
to be happening. The analysis of each iteration’s data then contributed to the next 
iteration´s questions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2018). This process was repeated for each 
iteration, with the conclusions then being written up and refined during the process of 
writing this thesis. 
ACTION ITEM OBSERVATION REFLECTION PLANNING 
Interview Text WAF Emergent Themes & 
Insights 
Future Questions 
“I think the clients 
could do with 
knowing, they should 
all know. I don't think 
it should be kept 
secret.” 
Multiphase Issue-Key 
Stakeholder 
Commitment 
Clients are seen as a 
key stakeholder. 
It is important they 
know about the 
leadership transition. 
Does the Participant 
fear that the 
transition process 
may be kept 
inappropriately 
secret? 
Why are clients key 
stakeholders? 
Why is it important 
they know about 
the process? 
Could any harm 
come from them 
knowing? 
What are your 
concerns about the 
Data Collection 
ACTION 
Data Display 
OBSERVATION 
Data Condensation 
OBSERVATION & 
REFLECTION 
Conclusions: Drawing/ 
Verifying 
REFLECTION & PLANNING 
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possibility of it 
being kept a secret? 
“I think as a starting 
point, six months to a 
year is a good frame 
to know if you're 
succeeding or that 
you need more time 
for certain areas.” 
Single-phase Issues-
Planning 
The original plan may 
need modifying. 
Timing is uncertain. 
Progress may be 
asymmetric.  
How will we know if 
we are succeeding? 
How can we make a 
judgement as to 
how much more 
time is required? 
Fig. 14: Transcription Table Example 
One issue that became clear during the categorisation process was that attributing a 
quotation to one theme or another required judgement (Patton, 2015). Where there was 
ambiguity, I considered the questions and conversation immediately preceding the quote 
to decide which the most appropriate category was. Another issue was that, when 
speaking, Participants’ meaning was often clear, but the sentences were not necessarily 
grammatically correct, and often included repetition whilst they paused to clarify their 
thinking. Where this was obvious, I tidied the sentences to improve readability. 
3.5.2 Research Limitations 
Having chosen PAR as the research approach I would take, I recognised it was not without 
its limitations, and I therefore considered how I would manage these. 
3.5.2.1 Insider Bias and Role Duality 
One feature of PAR is that it often involves the researcher undertaking research on their 
own organisation (Chevalier and Buckles, 2013), as was the case in regard to this thesis. I 
was both the lead researcher and part owner of HC-Co and this brought with it some unique 
challenges. According to Coghlan & Brannick (2010), these included preunderstanding, role 
duality as a leader and researcher leading to confusion, and issues around access. 
I had preunderstanding about HC-Co and the people who worked in it. As such, I knew 
where to look for certain information, but was also likely to have pre-formed views on most 
issues, which may have clouded my objectivity and led to bias. For example, I was the 
designer of the Company’s employee-ownership programme, which had been a precursor 
to the founder-leadership succession. It was something I had therefore thought a great 
deal about, and had formed a number of provisional opinions on, i.e. who might the best 
candidates be, what were their strengths and weaknesses, how might these be addressed, 
how might others react, what I could do to influence those reactions etc. Most Participants, 
save for my wife, would be just starting, whereas I was already firing on all cylinders. 
In order to counter the bias that may come with preunderstanding, Coghlan & Brannick 
(2010) recommend proactively looking at familiar issues from new angles, working 
collaboratively with others to explore the possibility of bias, and to reflect in the third 
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person when looking back at the research. McNiff (2013) supported this approach by 
recommending researchers develop an outsider’s perspective. I anticipated that working 
with the Participants might help counter this, along with discussing the various issues that 
came up with my wife more informally; we are quite good at challenging each other’s 
thinking in a constructive way. However, I also recognised that she was likely to be subject 
to similar preunderstanding to myself. Coghlan & Brannick also recommend a first, second- 
and third-person approach to understand and manage these conflicts (Ibid), and I 
anticipated relying on my supervisor to reflect on possible issues of preunderstanding 
might also be helpful. In one sense I also recognised that the issue of preunderstanding 
may be made worse as part of my role as the lead researcher was constructing the 
questions for each iteration, and my preunderstanding may therefore bias my selection of 
questions to support my own views. I therefore recognised the importance of mentally 
stepping back, and looking at the whole picture in the third person McNiff (2013), including 
at myself, to try and counter this preunderstanding. 
My role duality might also have led to bias through the conflict that this created: as a 
researcher I wanted to understand the Drivers of success and failure whereas, as a 
manager, I wanted to address them. This was evident in the fact that I created the Executive 
Team for the Leadership Candidates as a way to develop their skills towards taking over 
the leadership ahead of conducting the research as part of this thesis. As such, I was already 
addressing some Drivers of founder-leadership succession before the PAR cycles began, 
which ran the risk of my being pulled in various directions: to finish the process I had started 
in developing the Leadership Candidates; to give the other Participants time to fully 
contribute without my prejudging their contributions based on this experience, and; to 
modify the Leadership Candidates’ development process in light of the findings of the PAR 
process. In a perfect world it might have been better to undertake this research first, and 
then start to recruit and develop successors, but the reality was different. I anticipated this 
tension would continue as the research uncovered new issues that would need to be 
managed, and that I would therefore have to make decisions on as to when the research 
should end, and the action begin. In some sense, PAR provided a solution to this through 
its iterative reflecting, planning, action, and observation phases which allowed for further 
research, and so I anticipated this dilemma was more focused on the initial stage of 
defining what the problem was to be solved. 
Finally, my position in the company meant I was likely to have superior access to some 
information, but inferior access to others. For example, I had easy access to all types of 
confidential information as the owner and had access to whatever hard data I wanted. 
However, given the Social Constructionist ontology adopted, it was how people thought 
that was most important, and employees in particular may have been reluctant to share 
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their thoughts candidly with me. As thoughts are a subjective experience I could therefore 
only induct or abduct whether this was happening. Perhaps if I were solely a researcher 
they may have been happy to trust in the confidentiality of the process, but as the senior 
manager in the Company it would be understandable if they were considering my likely 
reaction to any information shared before doing so, and framing it accordingly (Kaplan, 
2008). Jick (1979) recommended triangulating Participants’ input against other data 
sources to check for consistency, and there were two ways I planned to do this. One was 
to try and look at issues from different angles and over different periods of time with the 
Participants to see if their views remained constant. The other was to see if there were 
other data points I could triangulate their expressed views against, such as actions taken 
before or since their expressed view to check for consistency. 
In regard to role duality, the first, second and third-person approach (Coghlan, 2001) 
offered a potential solution but also raised ethical issues. For example, I could ask one of 
my research colleagues to conduct research that I felt might otherwise be biased if I did it 
personally if people modified their answers in line with what they thought I wanted to hear. 
However, if they didn’t know I was the final recipient of the information, it might be 
ethically questionable, although might also not be effective if they suspected I was the final 
recipient as they still might modify their answers. The conclusion I reached was that I had 
to conduct research personally and consider issues of completeness on a case-by-case 
basis, using triangulation and other methods to test for bias, and adjust my conclusions 
accordingly. 
3.5.2.2 Pluralism, Politics and Ethics 
Another key limitation, and strength also, was that its participatory nature meant there 
would often be conflicting viewpoints that needed to be reconciled (Lawson et al., 2015). 
For example, some Participants may have been sympathetic to an outsider successor, 
whereas others might have prefer an insider (Brockhaus, 2004), which gave rise to the 
possibility that some Participants might be political in their contributions (Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2010). Such pluralism also exposed me to an ethical risk of citing only research 
that supported my favoured outcome. In a number of ways, these very issues were not just 
limited to PAR, but were already recognised Drivers of founder-leadership succession, such 
as stakeholders playing games to achieve their ends (Blumentritt et al., 2012). I recognised 
I had to be alert to these issues, and considered the same remedies for insider bias and 
role-duality were likely to be helpful here, such as taking a third-party perspective (McNiff, 
2013), and checking my viewpoint with genuine outsiders, such as my supervisor (Coghlan 
and Brannick, 2010). 
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3.5.2.3 Groupthink 
A final risk I recognised was that any group working together was at risk of groupthink 
(Mayo-Wilson et al., 2012), whereby a need for consensus drove them towards false 
conclusions. In particular, I recognised that any views that were associated with myself or 
my wife might receive more sympathetic attention than other ideas. I planned to address 
this by challenging my fellow Participants when I felt this might be happening as part of our 
conversations and be on the lookout for it when reflecting on their contributions 
afterwards. 
3.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the Research Methodology section was to build on the literature review to 
form a basis for the subsequent Analysis & Discussion. My conclusions were that an 
Interpretivist paradigm was best suited to addressing the Research Question given that the 
ontological approach I selected was that what leadership meant, which was a fundamental 
part of the Research Question, was a socially constructed phenomenon. As such, I further 
concluded that the most suitable epistemological approach was through inductive and 
abductive reasoning to explore how stakeholders formed these socially constructed 
meanings. The research strategy I adopted was PAR which enabled me to work with 
representatives of a number of stakeholder groups in a way that minimised the harm to 
any group, but which ultimately meant excluding our vulnerable clients and their families 
from the research. I also had to consider the implications of being an insider researcher. 
Finally, I selected data collection and analysis strategies that allowed me to compare and 
contrast the Participants’ contributions to each other, including planning for how I would 
counter insider-bias and role-duality issues, and the themes identified in the  literature 
review summarised in the WAF. 
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4 FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the literature review I considered what academic literature might aid my understanding 
of the Research Question, and which enabled me to generate the WAF as a basis to analyse 
my research. I also reflected on what methodology would best help me approach my own 
research. Building on this foundation, it was now time to work with the Participants to 
address the Research Question, ‘what [were] the drivers of founder-leadership succession 
within family-owned SME’s that may relate to HC-Co’. 
4.2 PAR ITERATION PLAN 
I wanted to understand how relevant the Participants felt the Drivers identified in the  
literature review were to HC-Co, but I first wanted to explore with them what they 
personally saw as the Drivers of founder-leadership succession. The first iteration therefore 
used six ‘conversation starter’ questions  that invited them to consider founder-leadership 
succession from different angles (Coghlan & Brannick, 2010). I specifically did not focus on 
any of the Drivers identified in the literature review as I did not want to lead them, but 
instead asked questions that invited them to focus on different concepts connected with 
founder-leadership succession: what does leadership mean; what are the key objectives of 
an founder-leadership succession; what could go wrong; does it create opportunities; what 
makes a good successor, and; which stakeholders should we consider? Iteration-one used 
video conferencing for one-on-one conversations with each of the Participants, save I was 
unable to arrange a conversation with one of the staff Participants. For security reasons 
within their firms, the two professionals were unable to share the video part of the call. 
Having captured the Participants’ own thoughts on what the Drivers of founder-leadership 
succession were, I introduced some Drivers from the literature review in the second 
iteration that I felt would benefit from examination with the Participants, as well as 
exploring some of those that the Participants had introduced in the first iteration further. 
The key objective was to find how relevant the Participants felt each was as a Driver for 
HC-Co’s founder-leadership succession. This generated seventeen questions, although two 
of these were not put to the professional Participants as they would have had no 
knowledge of the issues: teamwork problems, and; workload. Iteration-two again used 
video conferencing, and I was again unable to arrange a conversation with one staff 
Participant. 
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The third iteration built on the first two, but by way of a focus group. I specifically asked 
my wife and the professional Participants not to join in as I felt that their status may 
compromise the other Participants’ ability to contribute, and so invited just the Leadership 
Candidate, manager and staff Participants. One manager and two staff Participants were 
unable to attend. My conclusion after the focus group was that being selective as to which 
Participants did and did not attend had not effectively dealt with my participation 
concerns, and which I address further in the Conclusions chapter. The objective of the third 
iteration was to address the remaining issues where I still had questions. 
I again applied PAR to each of the iterations through reflecting on which questions were 
most appropriate, planning how to put them to the Participants, and then acting on these 
plans. The observing and further reflection followed by way of the Transcription Table and 
Theme Analysis Spreadsheet.  
The majority of the iteration one conversations happened between 10th and 24th January 
2017, although one was delayed until 8th September 2017, the second iteration 
conversations happened between 10th and 16th August 2018*, and; the third iteration focus 
group happened on 17th September 2018. Whilst this extended timescale was not initially 
planned for, it did have the advantage of allowing the Participants an extended period of 
time upon which to base their comments, and also gave time for some of the issues to 
mature. For example, the issue of workload was raised in iteration one, and which led to 
the action of the Leadership Candidate´s workload being changed. The Participants were 
able to see and comment on the changes this had brought about in iteration two. 
Note: There was a seventeen-month gap between iteration-one and two, primarily 
because of communication issues between myself and my first supervisor. 
4.3 MANAGING THE ITERATIONS 
Once I had formed a plan for what I hoped to achieve in each iteration, including draft 
questions, I emailed each of the Participants to ask when they would be available. In the 
first two iterations, this was for one-to-one video calls, and a face-to-face focus group for 
the third iteration. 
For the first iteration, everyone responded quickly, save for one where we never managed 
to arrange a mutually convenient date. My judgement was that the problem in setting a 
date was in part due to the Participant’s nervousness, which I hoped to be able to 
overcome in time for the second iteration; in vain as it happened. Whilst not ideal, I was 
able to get detailed contributions from the other two Participants in her class of Participant 
(Staff Participants), and I did not therefore see this as a significant omission in terms of the 
quality of the research. 
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When it came time for the second iteration, one of the Participants had left HC-Co. I did 
invite her to participate but, when she did not respond, I felt I should respect her right to 
move on. However, I did feel this left a partial imbalance in regard to the remaining 
Participants, and I therefore recruited a further Participant of similar standing to take her 
place. All of the video conferences went well save for one where the Participant found the 
format uncomfortable, and therefore the conversation was put on hold with the questions 
then emailed to the Participant to respond when they were able. 
In fact, this Participant never did respond. My impression was that she felt uncomfortable 
on a number of levels, including interacting with me directly, that she found the subject 
matter difficult, and she was afraid of saying the wrong thing. I tried to put her at ease on 
several occasions but was not equal to the task. Whilst it would have been useful to have 
her input, I did receive input from Participants with similar backgrounds, and therefore felt 
the research remained valid without her contribution. However, I also wondered whether 
a different approach might have been more effective in regard to the Staff Participants. 
Save for the two questions marked with an asterisk, which were not relevant to the two 
external Participants, I put all of the questions to each of the Participants, regardless of 
their responses in iteration-one. This did mean that some Participants addressed the same 
issues twice where they had raised it in Iteration-one, but I recognised their thinking may 
have developed and therefore wanted to give them the opportunity to update their 
contribution. 
For iteration three, an email was sent to invite the nine Participants who were to be invited 
(three each of Leadership Candidates, Management Participants and Staff Participants), 
but three were unable to attend: two Staff Participants and one MP. I did explore other 
dates which revealed other potential diary clashes, but I was also left with the impression 
that two of the Staff Participants felt uncomfortable about the format of giving their view 
in front of Management Participants and Leadership Candidates. When the forum 
discussion happened, I felt I had made the right decision in asking the Professional 
Participants and OP to stand aside, but perhaps should have gone further in view of the 
Staff Participants reluctance, which I discussed further in section 6.2. 
The forum meeting was held in a summer house at one of the homes, with the questions 
being read out by me, but also projected onto a screen as I had observed that many of the 
Participants in the earlier conversations had not understood the questions when first 
asked. This may have been because my choice of words had been poor, but I also 
recognised may have been because they needed more time. I therefore reflected that, by 
projecting the questions as well as reading them, the additional time this provided to take 
the question in before answering might be helpful. This proved to be partially correct as 
clarification was only requested on one of the five questions. 
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In the first two iterations, each conversation was recorded with the Participants’ prior 
permission and with a reminder at the start of each session for later reflection. Each of the 
one-to-one video conferences included sound and video, save for the two professional 
Participants where the video function was not available to them. In the focus group I 
recorded only sound. 
4.4 PARTICIPANT CODES 
I initially wrote up my analysis without giving any form of identity code to each Participant´s 
comments as I wanted to maintain their confidentiality. However, I realised that this 
prevented drawing more nuanced conclusions, such as where particular classes of 
Participants were focusing on a Driver which others were not. I therefore considered using 
Participant codes. For each class of Participant, save for one (my wife), there was more 
than one Participant, and therefore this approach still left some ambiguity as to who said 
what. However, the reality was that, whilst using Participant codes provided more insight 
into the data, they also compromised the level of confidentiality that the Participants had 
been led to expect. I therefore wrote to each of the Participants setting out what I wanted 
to do, and why, and each kindly gave their consent. 
Participant Class Code 
Staff SP 
Manager MP 
Leadership Candidate LC 
Professional PP 
Owner OP 
Fig. 15: Participant Codes 
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4.5 FINDINGS BY DRIVER TYPE 
As with earlier chapters, I summarised my findings and analysis of the conversations by 
Resource-Based Driver areas (Barney, 1991). 
Tangible-Resource Drivers 
Capital 
Intangible-Resource Drivers 
Succession Planning 
Successor Selection 
Performance Management 
Governance 
Strategy 
Human-Resource Drivers 
Stakeholder Salience  
Founder-Successor Issues 
Successor Development 
Managing Commitment 
Fig. 16: Resource-Based Driver Areas 
4.5.1 Tangible-Resource Drivers 
4.5.1.1 Capital 
Issues of capital within the literature were typically as a consequence of other events, such 
as whether there was an accompanying ownership transition (De Massis et al., 2008), 
increased costs (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007), loss of clients (De Massis et al., 2008), 
reduced access to debt  (Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999), or supplier issues (Anderson et al., 
2003). 
In HC-Co’s case, we were going through a partial ownership transition, but in such a way 
that there was no change to the capital structure; the employees were earning their share 
through working harder and smarter. There were increased costs, such as in developing 
the Leadership Candidates, and would be future legal costs, but these were also relatively 
known quantities, and whilst they were Drivers, I did not feel they would benefit from 
exploration with the Participants. However, this was not the case if we were to lose clients, 
access to debt, or supplier credit, but I took the view that these were primarily relationship 
issues, and therefore addressed them under the section on Human-Resource Drivers. 
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4.5.2 Intangible-Resource Drivers 
4.5.2.1 Succession Planning 
4.5.2.1.1 PLANNING FAILURES, FIRM VS FAMILY OBJECTIVES & GENERAL RISKS 
Failing to plan, conflicts between firm and family objectives, and risks were frequent 
themes in the literature, but I was not surprised that they were not raised by the 
Participants. After all, this whole thesis could be broadly seen as an exercise in how to plan 
our own leadership succession, and there were no family to consider. However, successor 
selection was a different matter. 
4.5.2.2 Successor Selection 
Selection of the future leader or leaders also received many comments from the 
Participants and within the literature review.  
4.5.2.2.1 SELECTION CRITERIA 
In regard to what the selection should be based on, the Participants suggested a mix of 
capabilities and characteristics. 
 “...you want someone to actually have the vision to be the managing director, …to 
actually drive it from the operational side, ...someone with the finance skill, …a 
managing director [who] effectively runs the business and makes sure that that 
they keep pushing the strategy.” PP 
“Quick thinking. Resolving problems. Just really acting fast …, walk the walk but 
talk the talk as well, get things sorted.” MP 
“…strong administrative skills, …a good leader, …a strong character, which I think 
all three of us are in our own ways, and …work together, and I think we do work 
together very well.” LC 
Amongst others, they saw the successor as needing vision, decision making and problem-
solving skills, combined with leadership qualities. A further observation by a Participant, 
which came from a different angle, was in regard to gravitas; the quality that leads others 
to take you seriously, which would be important for any successor. This was therefore 
added to the growing list of desirable successor attributes. 
“I think one thing that [the owners] bring… to the Company is… gravitas. [Its] 
something that's quite hard to define but it's definitely… a gap that needs to be… 
filled” OP 
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The Participants had a good idea of what the successor should look like in terms of qualities 
and capabilities and considered this did not need further investigation with the Participants 
as a Driver. 
4.5.2.2.2 SELECTION DECISION 
However, what had not come up was who should make the selection choice, which both 
Ward (2004) and De Massis et al. (2008) had highlighted could be problematic if done by 
the founder. I therefore explored this in the second iteration. When this issue was put to 
them in the second iteration, the Participants were supportive that my wife and I should 
make the decision. 
“…I know you both well enough to think… you'd make that decision. I don't think 
you would make a bad decision. I don't think you would certainly make a decision 
based on emotions or how long you've known me or anyone else.” LC 
“I can't see the decision ever sitting outside of yourself and [your wife’s] door, 
Nick. I don't necessarily think a panel-based approach would be best for your 
business. I think, ultimately, the way that you approach situations and tasks… is 
more than independent in that regard.” PP 
“I would say that you are good at making choices and you don't make choices light-
heartedly… You know, you seem to have a plan.” SP 
On the face of it, there seemed to be strong support for my wife and me making the 
decisions in regard to who our successors should be. I believed the Participants were being 
sincere in their comments, but I recognised ‘speaking truth to power’ was not easy. I was 
also aware that the insider Participants’ opinion might be influenced by the fact that 
everyone seemed happy with the direction of the founder-leadership succession 
personally, and any change in how decisions were made might change that direction. It 
could also open up the possibility of an outsider being selected with the considerable 
consequences that might bring for lost promotion opportunities and cultural clashes. I 
therefore felt this was a Driver that should be considered further in the third iteration. 
I therefore asked the Participants whether they felt able to disagree with my wife and me, 
and their response was conditional. 
“I think it just depends on what it was. [For example]  if we knew that [the] investment 
was [not] sound, … then we would obviously say to you no. I wouldn't have a problem 
with that.” LC 
“I'll go home and I'll think about it for two days and scratch and itch and think oh no 
can't tell Nick that because I don't think I have that skill set.” LC 
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“So going back to someone who, like you…, [was doing] a doctorate … I wouldn't feel 
I could go back and say [anything]…, thinking that you must know what you're doing, 
kind of. Trusting that you know what you're doing.” MP 
“…we lack that confidence. We highly rely on you and we highly rely on your 
succession plan... But yes, we do have in the back of our mind that you know what 
you're doing.” LC 
Both managers and Leadership Candidates seemed happy to challenge my wife on me in 
regard to subjects were they felt confident, but not in areas where they felt they lacked 
knowledge, such as appointing the successor. This therefore remained a significant Driver 
to monitor. 
4.5.2.2.3 INSIDER VS OUTSIDER 
Another issue that had been hinted at in the first iteration was whether an outsider was 
acceptable. I was not surprised that there was a general presumption that the successor 
would be an insider as we were actively developing the Leadership Candidates to this end, 
but there was also a comment that an outsider might be a problem. 
“I think for my manager I don't think she could deal with an outsider (laughter) I 
hope she's not listening out here.” MP 
“There's always opportunities and then, I suppose, for example if I moved to head 
of home they'd be the chance for someone else to become assistant.” MP  
Carroll (1984) noted that outsider leadership candidates were not always welcome due to 
their tendency to disrupt, and would also get in the way of the promotion opportunities 
that would accompany an insider being appointed to the leadership role. I also wondered 
if it was a CAS type ‘signal’ (Holland, 2012) not to appoint an outsider. This therefore 
seemed an important Driver in need of further exploration with the Participants. 
However, when we started to discuss the question of outsider successors in the second 
iteration, the responses surprised me. The key message that was coming from all the 
internal Participants was effectively, ‘of course the Leadership Candidates were going to 
be trained and promoted to be the new leaders; it’s what we do’. HC-Co had a policy of 
promoting internally wherever possible, with twelve of the current fourteen managers all 
‘coming through the ranks’. The Participants were all clearly presuming this would hold 
true for the future leadership roles too. 
“But we've… always been quite keen to promote in-house, so then to get someone 
in, to then train that person, to get them out again.” MP 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
 Findings - Page 67 of 161 
“…I think giving all three the possibility and chance, and I don't see why any of 
them would fail and wouldn't be able to do the roles that they've been assigned 
to do. I think that's important cause… it's always been an ethos that we have in-
house promotions...” MP 
The Participants also saw HC-Co as having a strong culture which outsiders might struggle 
to catch up with. 
“I think we strongly have developed a style in [HC-Co] that we have an ethos of 
working, we have a very clear message, and sometimes, people from outside 
might find it very difficult to work with that. They would like to change it. Whereas, 
this style is now embedded in us.” LC 
However, others also seemed to feel threatened by the idea of an outsider. 
“If someone was to come into the company that hadn't been here for, say a 
maximum of a year to get used to people, get used to clients, get used to the 
business, I think for staff, management and clients, it wouldn't feel comfortable 
because you don't know how that person is.” SP 
“I think there's a lot of risks with an outsider, aren't there? As to whether they're 
gonna have their own vision of how [HC-Co] should look and that would be 
different to yours and [your wife’s]… values and ideas. I think that would 
potentially have been quite a big risk.” SP 
This seemed to be an example of where the Company’s culture was exaggerating the power 
of an outsider as a Driver, but in a negative way, and which I therefore wanted to explore 
further.  
The Participants’ view in the third iteration was that, in part, the opportunity for promotion 
was recognised as an issue, but not solely for reasons of self-interest. It was seen as being 
good management as, by giving people the opportunity to progress, they would be more 
motivated, it would attract ambitious new employees, and which would in turn fuel the 
progress of the Company as a whole. 
“I just think promoting internally offers… other staff [the opportunity] to go up the 
ladder, if they're able to do the job.” LC  
“I think you always should look internally first.” LC 
However, culture was clearly part of the reason too. The Participants recognised there 
were circumstances where an outsider successor would be sensible, such as when there 
was no suitable insider successor, but they did identify a number of problems with going 
this route. Primarily, in order for people to accept an outsider, they would want to see that 
the Company had been true to its principle of trying to promote an insider, and that people 
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understood and agreed with the reasons this was not possible. However, there was also a 
sense that an outsider could not simply walk in and take over the next day. HC-Co was seen 
as having a strong and positive culture that any outsider successor would need to 
understand first, which would take time, before being in a position to be accepted and 
lead. 
“if I didn't feel comfortable doing the job… then having someone come in to do 
what you and [your wife] do then I wouldn't have a problem with it.” LC 
“…we've always been having [internally promoted] managers, and it would be 
something new. But it wouldn't be... a big issue. It would be a process that we'd 
have to understand and plan it well, train, and so on. LC 
“I don't think it's about them being tolerated it just takes them a bit longer to build 
a relationship with everyone because you don't know them.” MP 
“I think you'd have to sit everyone down and tell everyone why you were bringing 
in an outside candidate. I think if you just got somebody and put them [in place] 
...everyone's backs would be up a bit.” LC 
4.5.2.3 Performance Management 
In regard to performance management, which Rothwell (2015) had focused on, a couple of 
issues came up, but not to such an extent that they seemed to be Drivers that required 
further investigation. 
4.5.2.3.1 TASK COMPLETION 
For example, the fact that only one comment was made in regard to task completion might 
suggest that this was not of major concern to the Participants, and nor was it raised as an 
issue in the literature review.  
“Making sure that all tasks that are started are finished.” MP 
4.5.2.3.2 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
However, an issue that the Participants saw as more important, but not to a great extent, 
was following policies and procedures, which was not picked up on in the literature review.  
“Just to make sure everything is followed properly and do what the procedures 
say.” MP 
“CQC, obviously, you know we'll continue to run the homes as they should be, 
making sure all procedures and policies and everything are up to date, and that 
we're following all regulations, like you do now.” LC 
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4.5.2.4 Governance 
An issue that did not come up in the first iteration was governance (Hillier & McColgan, 
2009), which did not surprise me as this fell firmly in mine and my wife’s current domains. 
I therefore raised it as an issue in the second iteration, and in particular how it typically 
changed at the time of a founder-leadership succession. 
The general response was that, yes, governance was changing but, as with other issues, the 
presumption was that there would be a fair plan to address any changes.  
“I think at the moment; we're still doing the best thing. I think with employee 
ownership, and even with the employee reps, you're telling the employee reps 
what your concerns are, and they have those meetings so they're aware of what 
to reply back to the staff, and it's always trying to find different ways to increase 
the company at the end of the day.“ SP 
“I think everything will be thought through, it will have its own time to happen, 
and it will be considered. I don't think that would be a huge risk to us...” LC 
One Participant raised the prospect that any conflicts may not be solely internal. 
“Actually, you may want to now take more money out the business to finance your 
lifestyle that maybe in direct conflict with that of the arrangements that have been 
left with third parties such as banks. I've certainly seen that be a conflict as well. 
Loans having to be renegotiated and restructured as a result of that to keep all 
parties happy really, which is a test in itself.” PP 
Whilst this has been raised as a governance issue, it seemed to me it was more of a 
commitment issue, and I therefore explored it further in that section. 
4.5.2.5 Strategy 
Strategy was another issue that did not come up in the first iteration but, it seemed to me, 
was a potentially important Driver given that the leader’s chief responsibility in any 
company was delivering that organisation’s strategy. I therefore explored this further in 
iteration two. 
The responses were along similar lines to the governance issue; people recognised it 
existed, but understood it was part of the plan. From my wife and outsider Participants, 
there was also a recognition of the importance of this as an issue. 
“I think that is a fundamental of succession. It's got to start far sooner than what 
you probably think it should do. I think that's a big slipping point for many 
companies that I've dealt with and deal with today. It's still not a conversation that 
is had maybe as open and honestly with other shareholders or members of the 
management team that they should do…” PP 
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“The strategy is something that should be under constant review. It should be 
something that's probably considered by the directors at least annually.“ PP 
“I'm not surprised on that. I think… you've particularly recognised that it is an 
important function and probably the most important skill that you have brought 
to the company, your ability to think strategically. And so, we talk of that handing 
over tasks and handing over knowledge, handing over that ability to think 
strategically or initially recognising the importance that somebody needs to think 
strategically is vital.” OP 
There was also a recognition of its importance amongst internal Participants, although 
there was some confusion as to the precise meaning of strategy. 
“It's something that you've got people to work with you. You make plan, you 
develop different positions, you develop different strategies, you plan how things 
would look like, you get people on board. Yeah, it is important.” LC 
“I think having the correct strategy, yes. …you… have to have some sort of strategy 
to get someone prepared for a role. If there is no strategy, and you just throw 
them in the deep end, that's potential to hurt our company.” SP 
“…it's gonna be the CEO's job to make sure that everything is being implemented, 
make sure that every service is running properly with the right plans, and also to 
grow the company.” LC 
4.5.3 Human-Resource Drivers 
In regard to human resource drivers, the starting point was to understand who had salience 
over the process, and what had to happen in order to prepare them for, and ensure they 
remained committed to the succession process. 
4.5.3.1 Stakeholder Salience 
The issue of stakeholder salience, who had it, and who did not, was a recurring theme in 
the literature review, and which also came up in the first iteration with the Participants. 
4.5.3.1.1 EMPLOYEE SALIENCE 
Another issue I wanted to consider further was staff salience. This was identified by a 
number of the Participants in the first iteration, but not in the literature, and I therefore 
wanted to explore this further in the second iteration.  
Their importance seemed obvious to me as they were better informed and better 
connected than our clients, and were used to sharing their opinions and having them 
listened to. It was not hard for me to imagine that, if they had genuine concerns in regard 
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to a new leader, they could make their lives very difficult; although the opposite was also 
true. On the whole, the Participants agreed with me. 
“They are a key Driver because if staff absolutely refused to listen to somebody 
who has been appointed… then there's a problem that can't be brushed under the 
carpet.” OP 
“…unless you've got complete staff buy-in across the board…all it takes again is for 
a disgruntled member of staff to make a whistle-blowing call, or… a complaint 
etc...” PP 
However, most Participants also thought it unlikely they would use their salience to work 
against the succession because of their degree of involvement with the process, and that 
founder-leadership succession options were explored with everyone before decisions were 
made. 
“I think they are key to it. Especially now we're doing employee ownership, where 
we involve the staff. I think if the staff were more involved in the running of the 
home, you get better results.” LC 
“You can always have people that think, "Well, I don't think this is going to be a 
good idea," and they have a negative attitude of things. But I think the majority 
have a positive attitude and agree with how things are progressing. I think that 
outweighs the bad.” MP 
However, this issue of whether the employees would use their salience and under what 
circumstances seemed a potentially important Driver, which I therefore explored further 
in the third iteration. 
Most of the Participants were of the opinion that the staff were key stakeholders able to 
significantly influence the founder-leadership succession. To date they had been largely 
supportive, but it seemed to me to be important to understand what issues might influence 
them to withdraw their support to understand how important a Driver this was. 
4.5.3.1.2 CLIENT SALIENCE 
Similarly, clients had not been identified in the literature as key stakeholders. A number of 
Participants had underlined in iteration-one the importance of our clients, but the 
literature review had not identified them as being key stakeholders either. Clearly HC-Co 
had a moral duty to its clients, but did this mean they were key stakeholders?  
Some felt their significance was solely as an interested party to be consulted and kept 
informed. 
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“If they came back and said… they felt that they couldn't trust whoever you were 
having or they had a real problem, I think that would be quite [an] isolated view 
of maybe one client... I don't think that they would be a key stakeholder in that 
decision.” MP 
Others felt they could cause problems to the process by leaving, but that their power was 
limited. 
“I don't think they're powerless, but if they had opinion, family members… could 
make the decision that, “I don't want my… relatives to be living in one of your 
homes or have your home care service [because] I don't agree”. I don't think either 
they're powerless or the fact that they have full say.” MP 
Whereas others felt they would not have to leave to cause problems as they could impact 
our reputation by complaining to regulators, or the press, thereby deterring potential 
clients. 
“…they can have a huge impact... because they're fundamentally your marketing. 
…it's not just the individuals staying with yourself, it's the family unit that surround 
that. …word of mouth, reputation is obviously fundamental to a business such as 
yours.” PP 
Whilst identifying who was and was not a key stakeholder in the process, another area 
identified in the literature was communications. 
4.5.3.2 Founder-Successor Issues 
Whilst the relationship between the founder and successor was focused on in the 
literature, the Participants highlighted a number of Drivers that were either touched on 
lightly in the literature, or not at all. 
4.5.3.2.1 LETTING GO 
A key aspect of this, which was hinted at by the Participants in the first iteration, was 
whether I, or my wife, might become back-seat drivers, which I therefore wanted to 
explore in iteration two. Whilst none of the Participants felt this was an issue, citing a 
number of reasons why they believed this, I was concerned as to whether they might be 
saying what they felt I wanted to hear. 
“At the moment, how I see it is that I need you to step in and I need you to be 
guiding and holding our hand.” LC 
“I still think you should always be in the loop… you're still someone that I could 
still turn to…” SP 
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Some Participants thought we would be there until such time as the new leadership team 
were ready, and then step back. 
“I think the way that you've structured it is textbook in… exposing people and 
developing people in sort of bite sized chunks. Rather than… them the 
overwhelming responsibilities of running the company flat out on their own. 
You're exposing them to different areas and therefore they're developing their 
skillsets to the point where they feel confident enough to take it and run with it.” 
PP 
Others cited our current way of interacting with the management team as evidence that 
we would fully step back when the time was right. 
“I've only known it with you guys taking more of a back seat and giving more of 
the responsibility to the managerial team.” MP 
“I think knowing you two, probably not. Because you're quite perceptive on the 
fact that you've got to let go to make it work. Other people, yes. Because they'll 
have very firm views on how it should go forward. I think you'll probably let people 
make their mistakes and then perhaps guide them afterwards where they can 
improve, rather than try and jump in and constantly change them.” PP 
As the time for stepping back would be after the research for this thesis was finished, there 
was little point exploring it further with the Participants, and I therefore marked it as a 
Driver to monitor as the leadership succession progressed. 
4.5.3.2.2 DELEGATING 
However, a more immediate issue was whether we were able to effectively delegate 
(Handler & Kram, 1988), which was seen as a key part of developing our successor. The 
literature review observed that founders were often perfectionists who find it hard to 
delegate tasks if they believed they would not be completed to their own high standards. 
The feedback from the Participants was mixed. 
My wife recognised that, in certain circumstances, she found it hard to delegate when it 
meant standards would drop. 
“I recognize that it's a risk… accounts, management accounts, are done in a very 
specific way, and very exact… I don't want it ever to be different to that. I think… 
the way to make sure that that is not an issue is to bring on people very much… in 
the same mould.” OP 
However, her concern was generally not reflected in the feedback from other Participants 
in regard to either of us. 
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“From the experience and from what I did in the past, I think you have been very 
good in that, and you identify roles very well. They are very carefully thought 
through, usually. It's always backed up with evidence and with people's strengths 
and abilities. I don't see this being an issue in the future.” LC 
“No, I think what we're doing at the moment is… still a safety net. I think you're 
allowing… things to fall into place. If it is wrong, you're offering guidance and 
saying, "Actually, this is how I would do it, but I'm excited to see how the end 
result's going to be for you," if that makes sense.” SP 
“Going back, I would have said yes, but not so much now because I think you are 
delegating. You do critique, which… will ultimately bring us up to your standards… 
Because, when you're critiquing, we're learning.“ LC 
“… I know it's your company, so you're gonna want some perfection, but… you've 
never given me a task, if I haven't carried it out, said, "Right, well you're not doing 
that anymore." You've shown me a way to grow in it, or helped me to grow in it, 
so I wouldn't say that, that's happened to me personally, nor to anyone else I work 
with here.” MP 
“I don't think it is. 'Cause you're always telling me about delegating,… and I think 
you would let people move forward with it. But again, but maybe just a watchful 
eye that everybody's doing what they should be doing, depending on what the 
tasks are.” LC 
This therefore seemed an issue to monitor rather than investigate further with the 
Participants. 
4.5.3.2.3 WORKLOAD 
A number of Participants raised concerns over the personal confidence of the Leadership 
Candidates because of workload and questioned whether they now had too much to do. 
“I know it is a benefit to have people coming from different levels [but] maybe the 
task load might be a little bit too much on everybody involved...” MP 
 “...if they coming in as the new management are they going to be able to bring 
up the next layer of management?” PP 
“[In regard to replacing the owners, the] managers have already more than full 
time jobs… So, I think we've got to be very aware of the time constraints that they 
have as well because… there comes a stage where if people are just doing more… 
things that, other things are going to slip off the radar.” OP 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
 Findings - Page 75 of 161 
A further issue relating to workload was whether there was a lack of perspective because 
the Leadership Candidates were too involved in day-to-day responsibilities. 
“... [the owners are] able sometimes to give a different perspective because [they] 
are one step removed. [The managers] can sometimes be too close to a problem. 
[The owners] can see a way through it whereas because [they] were one step 
removed, sometimes it's easier for [them] to instantly see a solution.” OP 
My wife and I reflected on these comments, which were issues we had been ruminating on 
already, and which led to a change of responsibilities amongst the Leadership Candidate’s. 
When the issue of workload came up in the second iteration I therefore expected that the 
Participants’ views may have changed, which was largely what I found. 
“… I think… at the time when we did the first round of questions… [we] had… the 
Leadership Candidates… in full time roles heading up a division each. So… anything 
else that we were asking them to do fell in extra time.” OP 
“My thinking is slightly different now, because my workload has been taken away 
from me, and I can focus on different stuff.” LC 
However, other Participants thought there might still be an issue. 
“I still think it could be an issue, because of… the workload here. I think 
[Leadership Candidate name] struggles to do her other roles because of having to 
do the stuff here.” SP 
As a Driver of founder-leadership succession, it seemed to me that the issue of workload 
was largely addressed, and what remained was that one Leadership Candidate needed to 
brush up on her time-management skills. This issue was therefore not raised in the final 
iteration. 
4.5.3.2.4 INTIMIDATION 
Whilst people therefore thought we could delegate, there was one word of warning on 
another Driver from a professional Participants who raised the possibility of my experience 
and logical approach intimidating others, which I pick up on in the discussion chapter. 
“…you're a very experienced and logical director of the company. Some people 
may find that somewhat intimidating… but your personality type, I wouldn't say 
[you’re] somebody that is overbearing in that regard…” PP 
4.5.3.2.5 OVER DEPENDENCE 
There had also been indications that the insider Participants were putting great faith in my 
wife’s and my planning towards the founder-leadership succession, but also that they may 
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be reluctant to challenge us. I therefore wanted to explore in the third iteration if this was 
indicative of an over-dependence on us too. 
Some of the Participants felt they would be ready and willing to speak up if they disagreed 
with a viewpoint we stated. This was my personal experience from various management 
meetings, but this also tended to be in regard to subject matters they had some expertise 
in, i.e. the running of their services, which was supported.  
“Yeah. I would, if I didn't agree completely, yeah I feel I would. Definitely.” MP 
“I think it just depends on what it was. …if we had any... something that we were 
invested in, and… you wanted a pay raise, [and] we knew that investment was 
sound,… we would obviously say to you no. I wouldn't have a problem with that.” 
LC 
“We've been working long enough for the company that you can actually read our 
body language, well enough to say, "well actually [name], you know, she's not 
comfortable with that and now we'll investigate further." LC 
However, I therefore felt uncertain they would on matters they felt less confident of their 
knowledge in, such as the founder-leadership succession. The Participants’ feedback 
supported this, partially because I had researched the subject and came up with the plan, 
but also because I was studying for a doctorate. 
“…going back to someone who [was studying] a doctorate, which [is] something 
that would blow my mind,… I wouldn't feel I couldn’t go back and say… thinking 
that you must know what you're doing... Trusting that you know what you're 
doing. You do know what you're doing.” MP 
“We highly rely on you and we highly rely on your succession plan... we analyse 
[and] we obviously have our own discussions… [in] our executive meetings. But 
yes, we do have in the back of our mind that you know what you're doing.” LC 
“We solely still rely on you and [your wife] for… going forward. Well not going 
forward, but at the moment we still do rely solely on you and [your wife] and your 
plan.” MP 
This seemed an important Driver to me as the key focus of the thesis was on transferring 
power from myself as the founder to whomever my successor would be, which would be 
hard to achieve if he or she remained dependent on me. 
4.5.3.2.6 TRANSFER OF POWER 
The issue of over dependence also had implications for the transfer of power, which was 
brought up in the first iteration and the literature review. Churchill and Hatten (1987) and 
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Handler (1990) favoured a gradual transition, whilst (Cadieux, 2007) focused on the 
importance of good communications between founder and successor. The Participants 
agreed. 
“It's a smooth transition. It's not quick and abrupt and rough. It's taking its time 
and so that you know everything, and you've executed it.” SP  
“I think to really make sure that everything is being handed over correctly.” MP 
“I feel even longer would be better. I think as a starting point, six months to a year 
is a good frame to know if you're succeeding or that you need more time for 
certain areas.” SP 
“To decide today and then step back, perhaps do a rerun to make sure you and 
[your wife] are happy with how its run, and just to make sure everything is really 
in place and the ones that are leading know exactly what they are dealing with.” 
MP 
Two further Drivers not raised by the Participants were what strategies the successor 
should follow, and the timing of the succession. The Participants had underlined the 
importance of a smooth transition, but it seemed to me that how to achieve this remained 
a Driver that needed to be addressed. 
4.5.3.3 Successor Development 
The importance of correctly developing any successor was recognised in both the literature 
and by the Participants too. 
4.5.3.3.1 CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT 
For example, whilst founders typically have problems saying what they do, the Participants 
were more forthcoming, including identifying the need for selection criteria, and the 
importance of preparation too. 
“Not just abruptly going into a new position. It's going into it slowly, so you're 
taking piece by piece. It's not just plopped in front of you and you've got to get on 
with it. It's a slow transition.” SP  
“They need… training, [they] can't just be… thrown in at the deep end...” MP 
The means of developing the successor was also picked up. 
4.5.3.3.2 EXPERIENCE 
Related to capabilities was whether the successor had appropriate experience. 
Longenecker & Schoen (1978) addressed the issue of inducting successors into the 
company as part of a long-term plan to prepare them to take over, but this was not an issue 
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picked up on by the Participants. However, as we were actively developing the Leadership 
Candidates experience towards taking over the leadership of the Company, I felt this was 
not an area that would benefit from further exploration with the Participants at this stage. 
However, how to transfer knowledge was focused on. 
4.5.3.3.3 TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE 
As a means to ensure that experience translated into appropriate capabilities and skills, 
Motwani et al.'s (2006) focused on mentoring, which was a method also focused on by the 
Participants. 
“I suppose that you… will still have to have input… you'll still be around…, it's not 
like you'd be passing it on and then we’d never be seen.” MP 
“…they're probably going to need a lot of training, a lot of guidance.” MP 
“I suppose the coaching side of it, making sure that we're… coached…” LC 
They also focused more specifically on transferring knowledge. 
“...skills from the point of your understanding the needs of our clients and the 
people that we work with and then also being able to move a business forward as 
well I suppose.” SP 
 “...they all need good computer skills, the all need good literacy skills, and they 
all need a basic level of financial skills.” OP 
However, their focus was on transferring knowledge about explicit skills and capabilities, 
whereas the question of transferring tacit knowledge (Cabrera-Suarez et al., 2001) was not. 
Given the importance of the successor being ready to take over and the possible 
consequences of them not being ready, I felt this area warranted further exploration with 
the Participants in the next iteration, when there was a general recognition that this was 
important. 
“If you see someone making the same mistake that you've made before and you 
know how to deal with it, then imparting the knowledge that you know how to 
deal with this, and they don't have to make the same mistake that you did.“ MP 
“…that would be a natural assumption to make, that the founder would be passing 
on their knowledge to their successors in any shape and form that they possibly 
could do.” PP 
There was also acknowledgment that it was happening. 
“I think you definitely are achieving this… I think the other side to this is, the 
successor asking for the experience, asking for the advice, asking for that 
knowledge.” LC 
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4.5.3.3.4 TEAMWORK 
Teamwork was focused on by six of the Participants. For example, comments referring to 
the future leadership team suggested to me there may be concerns as to their ability to 
work together. 
“So long as… everybody is 100% in the process and gives 100% and… as long as 
the business is still making a profit… then we can see that it's working, and people 
are happy with it as well and feel supported in the roles...” MP 
“They have to see through differences… they've all got different work ethics, but 
they all need to… plough through and make it work.” MP 
“And then I suppose [the] management team, just making sure that they have… 
the right team around them, whether it's inside or out support.” SP 
“I suppose for your side it will be all the executives being on board, all working as 
a team, they've all got to… liaise with one another…, have good working 
relationships with one another to make it work.” MP 
A further two issues raised were consistent with risk types identified by De Massis et al 
(2008): not reaching consensus, and; a lack of trust or commitment.  
“What might go wrong is not working as a team. Things like not communicating. 
Not being honest. Not that anyone lies but people acknowledging their strengths 
and weaknesses.” SP 
“Three, three of them getting on board, so if one of them, you know, you don't 
want one person to be carrying the other two, you know, they all have to realise 
that, as a team, it's a lot more to take it on and work together…” MP 
Considering these were the type of issues raised by Sharma et al. (2003) that could lead to 
the failure of HC-Co, I concluded they needed to be taken seriously as Drivers and explored 
further in the second iteration. 
At this time, the Leadership Candidates spoke of starting the leadership transition process 
well, but then having some difficulties before returning to a strong sense of team again. 
They put this intermediate period down to a lack of role clarity combined with strong 
personalities learning to work together, but felt that any disagreements always remained 
within reasonable bounds. 
“I think if it comes to teamwork on a higher level, you have a number of very 
strong individuals and every one of them knows something better than the other.” 
LC 
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“At the beginning we worked really, really well… It's just coming back. But I think 
there was a lack of clarity.” LC 
“No, we weren't… gelling very well at one point. There was a lot of backlash. I think 
now we're moving forward. I think the hardest thing… is knowing exactly what 
your job role is, and exactly what you're supposed to be doing.” LC 
However, from the perspective of the other Participants, any disagreements were not 
obvious. 
“Yeah, definitely. [A] prime example [is] the fun shops. They worked marvellous 
together. It was a really good success. They really made it work, and I think that 
showed the staff, "Oh wow, they can come together." Although they're from 
different sectors, they have worked together. Yeah, I definitely think they portray 
it like they're working really well together.” SP 
“It's better to talk to people face-to-face. I do think in terms of them doing things 
together, they are doing well. There's more communication. There's a lot more… 
with them getting together physically is good.” MP 
The above comments indicated to me that this was an issue to monitor rather than 
investigate further. 
4.5.3.4 Managing Commitment 
In this regard, there were a number a number of aspects to this. 
4.5.3.4.1 PROCESS COMMUNICATIONS 
There were a number of areas relating to communication that the Participants could have 
picked up on, such as communications between team players or key stakeholders in regard 
to operational issues. They instead focused on a specific area of stakeholder 
communication; keeping people advised of the founder-leadership succession on an 
ongoing basis, an issue also picked up by Motwani et al's (2006). 
 “We need to consider all the other staff members, and support they are going 
to…, give, and any promotion and extra workload that they might get, but also we 
need to consider the residents and their families…” MP 
 “...we need to consider the residents and their families…, it won't obviously affect 
them directly but anything that happens does affect them as a whole, so it needs 
to be done...” MP 
“A lot of your image is based on reputation, word of mouth recommendation, so 
ensuring that the residents and, I suppose, potential future residents and their 
families are aware of the changes that are going on...” PP 
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“We need to obviously consider all the stakeholders…, our staff, our clients, our 
clients' families, and any external stakeholders, obviously the bank, primarily the 
bank I guess, the accountants as well.” OP 
The groups they selected largely mirrored who the Participants considered to be key 
stakeholders (clients, families and staff), but the issue of timing picked up in the literature 
review also seemed important. I therefore planned to explore this Driver further with the 
Participants in the second iteration, and particularly who should be told what and when. 
The discussion focused on two groups: clients and staff. The consensus was that both 
groups should be kept informed but that far more consultation should happen with the 
staff, who were in a substantially better position to give informed opinions. Whereas, 
whilst everybody felt that our clients should be kept informed, they also recognised that to 
share too-much information too-quickly could be concerning to them if it led to 
uncertainty. This was similar to the conclusion I reached earlier when a Participant had 
pointed out clients would find out about the founder-leadership succession anyway. 
“I think families should be kept informed of what's going on. I don't know about 
everything that goes on, but definitely about the way the home runs.” LC 
“I think they have varying needs. …you might give out the same piece of… but it 
might… be relayed in a slightly different way depending on if it was staff or 
clients...” SP 
4.5.3.4.2 PERCEIVED FAIRNESS 
From the literature review there were three key aspects to perceived fairness, whether the 
stakeholders had clarity as to their roles, whether they found them to be acceptable, and 
how they would react if they didn’t, each of which were discussed with the Participants. 
.1 Role Clarity 
The Participants felt it was important for people to have their own territory, not only for 
reasons of satisfaction, but to prevent conflict also. 
“… making sure that we've got somebody to take over a specific role and doing 
that ahead of time… because I'm very mindful that we do… always sort of leave 
things to the last minutes. So just making sure we're planning ahead, and 
everybody's kept in the loop.” LC 
Although only commented on by one Participant, roles had been an issue discussed 
extensively with the Leadership Candidates, and this comment indicated to me that it 
remained a Driver.  
.2 Role Acceptance 
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Role acceptance also seemed to resonate with one Participant in particular, who made a 
number of separate comments that there needed to be clarity as to who was doing what.  
“… everybody needs, depending on how many leaders there are, …to know where 
they're going. Like what their focus is or what their goals are.” SP 
“[The successor needs to know] what the goals look like… who does that involve, 
so …everybody knows. And… breaking things down into smaller goals so you each 
feel like you're achieving....” SP 
On reflection, I did wonder if these two comments were primarily driven by a perceived 
need for clear goals, or as a suggested remedy for this same Participant’s concerns in regard 
to trust. Either way, the importance of goals was supported in the literature review, and 
therefore reflected in the succession plan. 
.3 Playing Games 
However, if a stakeholder did not feel they were not being properly recognised, some of 
the literature suggested that playing games could be a consequence (Michael-Tsabari and 
Weiss, 2015; Blumentritt et al., 2012), but few related to non-family successions. This was 
not brought up by the Participants in the first iterations, and I therefore wanted to explore 
in the second iteration whether the family examples in the literature might be indicative of 
Drivers for HC-Co. 
A number of the Participants thought the behaviour of family members in other family-
owned companies could be expected by people working for non-family-owned companies 
too. 
“Absolutely. …[A] family is just a subset of people with a close relationship. 
Colleagues can be the same, friends can be the same. I think, in this context, yes 
there's a lot of research on family owned companies and families maybe will be 
harsher on each other than other groups of peers, but I don't think it's exclusive 
at all.” OP 
After some initial confusion over the meaning of family members (a significant minority of 
HC-Co staff members were related in some way to another), all the internal Participants 
felt that games were not being played. 
“No, I don't think so. I haven't noticed that in this company, no. In terms of that, 
what you just said. No.” LC 
“I don't think the family issue comes into it with that. We're all supporting each 
other.” SP 
Another Participant drew attention to the fact that there was far more history with family 
members who worked together, having known each other from birth and regularly seeing 
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each other in and outside of work. Their conclusion was that this extra ‘baggage’ meant 
that the examples in the literature review were probably only of limited relevance, 
although another felt they saw frequent evidence of games-playing in another non-family 
company known to them, suggesting the research may have relevance. 
“So, I wouldn't say to… necessarily disregard it, but I wouldn't have thought that… 
the different dynamics that come with family businesses… necessarily… apply to 
your business. ...the psychological relationships that you may have with different 
family members are completely different to those that you would have with 
employees and the management team.” PP 
“I would say… the games are still there. The level of the game and how you want 
to play it and whether you are a political game player… or whether you just like to 
actually get on with a job. So yes. The games are there. So, you can expect them 
of some sort because you're dealing with people.” PP 
In regard to playing games, I had always thought of our Company as being more apolitical 
than most but recognised that the view from the top was not always the clearest in this 
regard. If people were playing games to achieve their ends, they would clearly want to hide 
their means from us. When the literature review revealed some of the games that family 
members in other companies played, I felt it was an important Driver to explore for two 
reasons: to consider whether the experiences of family employees in other companies 
were relevant to HC-Co, which had no employees related to myself or my wife, and;  if this 
experience was relevant, were similar games being played in the Company or was there 
the potential for them in future. I therefore explored this in the third iteration. 
A number of the Participants felt playing games was unlikely in the future as they saw not 
doing so as being part of the Company culture. 
“…I strongly believe this is part of our company's culture. I think for the last couple 
of… years… you kind of faded off, and we feel… we are able to communicate… 
between us, make decisions, we present them to you, and they are very clear.” LC 
“I think that's true. Especially considering the service we provide. We have to be 
open and transparent and caring and you [wouldn’t] be very successful being in it 
just for themselves because we're not just providing any old service. It's for 
people.” MP 
However, they also felt that this did not mean there was an absence of conflict, but that it 
was focused on promoting the Company rather than personal interests. 
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“We actually argue quite a lot. We bring issues that bother me, or [person 1], or 
[person 2], and we work on them and we find a solution. And very often… as a 
part of our meeting… we discovered how… we deal with that.” LC 
4.5.3.4.3 SATISFACTION 
Related to perceived fairness was satisfaction, with Handler (1989) and (Morris et al., 1997) 
focusing on process satisfaction and post-succession performance, whilst  Tagiuri and Davis 
(1992) believed the perception of fairness was paramount. The Participants’ views were 
more pragmatic. 
“… everybody needs to know where they're going.” SP 
“… you just need to be up front and perhaps a newsletter, email, and tell them 
exactly things are moving, gradually, like do it over every three months.” MP 
Whereas others were more outcome focused. 
 “...the Company continues to hit financial targets, its occupancy is high, hours are 
growing on homecare, staff are happy, staff retention’s good, client feedback is 
good. Basically, they're all KPI's that we monitor are good and positive.” OP 
4.5.3.4.4 FOUNDER COMMITMENT 
One key person whose commitment was essential was the founder, without which a 
succession was unlikely to happen (Handler and Kram, 1988). The Participants picked up 
on this from a number of different aspects. 
.1 Process Commitment 
In iteration one, they identified the importance of the founder being committed to the 
succession process. 
“I suppose you need to be comfortable with the process, it's your company.  You 
have to have a lot of belief in it I suppose.” MP 
“Making sure you and [your wife] are ok with it...” LC 
“...unless they have the buy in… and the confidence of the existing owners then 
any introduction of new ideas… are never really going to be fully embedded or 
taken on board…” PP 
However, the number of comments was considerably less than for some of the other 
issues, and I therefore felt this justified further consideration in iteration two to explore 
why. 
Interestingly, they struggled to get to grips with the question about my wife’s and my 
commitment, even after further explanation by me.  
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“... I'm struggling to answer it because I think you two take a complete step back 
and not worry what's going on. Am I on the right tracks here?” LC 
“Yeah, so, I think I understand what you mean. So, the leaderships for the 
company, so you're the founder…“ MP 
“So, the question around… how committed you are in terms of ensuring that this 
company's, well the succession plan is in place. Is that the place?” PP 
My conclusion was that the question could have been better drafted, but it was also 
somewhat of a non-issue and confused the Participants because they felt our commitment 
was so obvious. I could also see how the question might have come across as a request for 
reassurance that my wife and I were still important.  
“…I think it is important that you and [your wife] are part of the process.” LC 
“…I… think you'll still be important to the process. The whole process, even before 
we were talking about the leadership and the directors changing, you guys 
stepping back, you were still quite involved.” MP 
After further clarification they then seemed to be presuming there must be a deeper 
meaning to the question that had to be unearthed. I concluded that their responses to 
what, with hindsight, I considered was a poorly chosen question created more smoke than 
light. 
However, whilst there seemed to be clarity in regard to our commitment, there was less 
so in regard to what it would take for us to let go, which was highlighted as a particular risk 
in the literature (Hoang and Gimeno, 2010; Cadieux, 2007). 
I therefore needed to explore this but, before I could, I felt I had to understand my own 
thinking on this matter as the founder in regard to HC-Co’s succession. I recognised that, 
for me, letting go meant having a ‘safe pair of hands’ to pass the leadership too but, as a 
Driver, this was rather vague. I recognised I was at risk of failing to set objective success 
criteria (De Massis et al., 2008), and therefore wanted to explore this issue with the 
Participants in the next iteration. 
.2 Safe Pair of Hands  
However, I recognised that this was a difficult issue to explore with the Participants 
because it specifically referred to my wife and me. It also involved asking the Participants 
to respond in a way that they could have been seen as critical of us, which they may be 
reluctant to do. I was therefore concerned it may be difficult to uncover their true views 
on the matter, although the professional Participants were more forthcoming. 
 “...when you're trying to run a multi-million-pound organization and you're the 
sole person who has control over the bank account and the running of 
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the [company] you can give people titles and positions that sound senior and in 
power, actually the reality is how much influence and control do they actually 
have…” PP 
“the main stumbling blocks I see in most organizations are where you have a very 
autocratic leadership style and the control element is not relinquished by the 
individual at the top of the company…” PP 
Whilst the professionals were able to identify how we might stand in the way, conversely, 
all of the Participants had a clear idea as to what a safe pair of hands looked like, which 
was largely similar but with some exceptions. Pretty much everyone focused on the need 
for the successor to have adequate knowledge and experience, and a number also focused 
on personality traits. 
“To me, the safe pair of hands… would be the person that shows confidence, is a 
good thinker, is a person who listens, is a person who can analyse, and look from 
all different aspects. It’s also a person who is reliable.” LC 
“I would want to be comfortable in the knowledge that this person has… had a 
similar level of experience to that of yourself, knows the industry, has spent time 
in the business getting to know the people, getting to know the residents, and has 
a level of knowledge and expertise that is befitting that of somebody who run a 
business the size of yours.” PP 
Another factor bought up was how people felt about the successor, and particularly in 
regard to trust. 
“So, the first thing would be trust, you have to trust them, definitely.” MP 
“First and foremost, I think it’s somebody who has the trust of not only the senior 
management, but also employees below them as well.” PP 
A couple of Participants also focused on the need for the person to be able to look forward 
and think strategically. 
“Someone that can take… a practical view and someone that’s got the overall 
forward-looking ability as to where the business is going.” PP 
“I think where it becomes more difficult is… in [the] wider area of strategic 
thinking, of planning, and almost I see the biggest stumbling block is people having 
the confidence to dip their toe in the water…” OP 
Whilst the founder’s commitment was important, for the succession to be a success, there 
also had to be someone prepared to take over the leadership role. 
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4.5.3.4.5 SUCCESSOR COMMITMENT 
There were only two comments in this regard, which was perhaps because, as with owner 
commitment, Participants were seeing this as a given. Each of the Participants, save for the 
professionals, worked with the Leadership Candidates and may have formed an opinion as 
to their commitment that meant further comment was unnecessary. However, rather than 
assume, I felt it would be sensible to test this assumption in the next phase. As with the 
founder and successor, the requirement for the commitment of all stakeholders was 
recognised by the Participants. 
“...they’ve got to be passionate, full-on committed, and really… 100% focused.” MP 
“I think they obviously have to be committed and I think anyone who takes on the 
role would be committed to the role.” MP 
4.5.3.4.6 EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT 
For example, there was a general consensus that the commitment of the staff was 
essential. 
“…all of the staff because… a lot of them don't like change and,… due to the nature 
of people that come into care,… they probably need a bit more understanding or 
a bit more support trying to get them to understand what it is we're trying or even 
how we're trying to move forward.” SP 
“… as for the girls, they need to discuss that with their families and make sure it's 
not going to overrule their personal life,… I know your family always come first, 
[but] sometimes you have to put your work first.” MP 
 “I think the biggest thing is making sure that the staff feel confident in whatever 
succession plan comes up or is decided upon because ultimately they feel their 
jobs are at risk then a) they won't be performing and b) they could well be looking 
for other jobs.” OP 
In regard to a possible loss of staff commitment, one Leadership Candidate felt that a lack 
of confidence in the leadership was the most likely reason that staff might become 
disruptive to the founder-leadership succession.  
 “…for example, [if] I make a serious mistake [that] would… lead… to a bad 
reputation…, that will then definitely burn… the confidence they have put [in] 
me.” LC 
However, there were also on specific issues raised that I feared could impact on employee 
commitment. 
.1 Dividends 
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One of the Participants raised, in jest, the issue of my wife and I continuing to take money 
from the Company when we were no longer working.  
“At the moment, no, I don't think there's any issues with that. …it depends how 
much money you want to fund your lifestyle while we're working hard... I don't 
think it would be a challenge...“ [Emphasis added] MP 
I therefore brought this up in the  focus group to see if this was a widely held concern, and 
which brought out another thought-provoking comment from one of the Participants. 
“'[Because] I don't think any of the staff would quite understand what would be 
the difference anyway. I'm being completely honest. I know they know about 
employee ownership... they've been taught on the certificates they've got, but I… 
don't think they all 100% get it still.” MP 
On the whole, the Participants felt this was an issue that was easily managed, principally 
because all the staff would be receiving payments as employees and shareholders 
themselves. If they understood why they were receiving dividends, it was not too much of 
a stretch for them to understand why we might continue to also. Any risk of them 
conflating the two payments would therefore be minimised. They also felt that the amount 
of any payments to us would also not be an issue as it would be pro rata to shareholding. 
They saw the real issue as being one of education. 
“…if it's not explained to everyone… that will be an issue of not understanding the 
process and not understanding what happens after. If we take it that way, yes. But 
I truly believe that if the whole process is clear and transparent… I don't think this 
should be a major issue. It's a natural way of running a business. And it is fair.” LC 
“I think it's… like royalties. If someone writes a song… they obviously get paid for 
the song for the rest of their lives. Like you've started a company, you have put all 
your time and effort into it, this has been your life's work…“ MP 
The Participants also focused on three additional stakeholders whose commitment was 
essential. 
4.5.3.4.7 CLIENT COMMITMENT 
They focused on our clients, their families or both also. The nature of our business was such 
that the families of our clients often acted in loco parentis as the clients, due to reasons of 
age or capacity, often tended to defer to them. Some of the comments also focused on the 
high level of trust and dependence that existed between our clients and families on one 
part, and the Company on the other.  
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“the same goes for you know clients and their families, you know, they've got to 
(unclear) you know they're actually entrusting the care of their family members to 
a Company that's stable and is going to be there next week.” OP 
Other comments addressed the inevitability of the clients finding out because of their close 
interaction with carers. 
“Obviously the clients because, although they're out there… the girls… will say 
stuff to the clients and that can also make them slightly unsure I think.” SP 
Whilst the above comment addressed the impossibility of keeping the leadership transition 
a secret, the comments below asked whether it was right to. 
“I think the clients could do with knowing, they should all know. I don't think it 
should be kept secret.” MP 
“I mean residents and their families; I suppose that's one. They need to be 
involved.” MP 
4.5.3.4.8 BANK COMMITMENT 
A number of Participants also focused on the bank as a key stakeholder whose commitment 
was essential, with one also focusing on other suppliers too, although showing less 
conviction than for employees and clients.  
“The banks, maybe, I don't know.” LC 
 “So that would be the parties such as ... the bank, your accountant, your 
suppliers…” PP 
“...the main stakeholder being the bank. I think it's important that they see a 
continuity in the way that the Company's run.” OP 
4.5.3.4.9 OUTSIDER CONFIDENCE 
A further issue raised by three of the Participants was loss of outsider confidence. 
“You know, sort of remembering not to, you know it's someone's company, so you 
don't want a bad name, so you've got to keep professional, keep to the sort of 
standards you and [your wife] have.” MP 
“When there's a change of management at the top, I suppose, if banks are lending, 
yeah, they become very nervous.” PP 
“[If the owners] start fading away from the picture then I think there will, the 
danger is that there is, a gap will be perceived.” OP 
These all related to the confidence of third parties as important Drivers of founder-
leadership succession.  
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4.6 FINDINGS CONCLUSIONS 
Many of the conversations with the Participants were led by the Drivers identified in the 
literature review which I felt would be beneficial to explore with them, and which revealed 
a number of insights that had not occurred to me. For example,  a possible over-
dependence on me and issues in regard to teamwork. However, they also identified a 
number of new Drivers not focused on in the literature, such as the importance of 
employees as stakeholders. I reflected on these in more detail in the discussions chapter 
below. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
 
Tangible-Resource Drivers  Pre-Succession Succession Post-Succession 
Capital     
Dividend Policy Action Monitor 
Ownership-Transition Drivers  Monitor 
Risk Appetite Action Monitor 
Access to Debt Action Monitor 
Intangible-Resource Drivers    
Succession Planning    
Planning Failures Action Monitor 
Firm vs Family Objectives  Monitor 
General Risks  Action Monitor 
Successor Selection     
Selection Criteria  Action   
Selection Decision  Monitor   
Insider vs Outsider Successor  Monitor 
Performance Management     
Task Completion  Monitor 
Policies & Procedures  Monitor 
Key Performance Indicators  Action Monitor 
    
Governance  Action Monitor 
     
Strategy  Action Monitor 
Human-Resource Drivers     
Stakeholder Salience     
Founder Salience  Monitor 
Successor Salience  Monitor 
Family Salience  Monitor 
Employee Salience  Monitor 
Client Salience  Monitor 
Outsider Salience  Monitor 
Founder-Successor Issues     
Relationship   Monitor  
Letting Go  Action Monitor 
Delegating  Monitor  
Workload  Monitor  
Intimidation  Action Monitor 
Over Dependence  Action Monitor 
Successor Strategies  Action Monitor 
Transfer of Power  Action  
Successor Development     
Capabilities Development  Action Monitor 
Experience  Action Monitor 
Transferring Knowledge  Action Monitor 
Teamwork  Action Monitor 
Managing Commitment     
Process Communications  Action Monitor 
Perceived Fairness  Monitor 
Satisfaction  Monitor 
Founder Commitment  Action Monitor 
Successor Commitment  Action Monitor 
Family Commitment  Not Relevant 
Employee Commitment  Monitor 
Client Commitment  Action Monitor 
Outsider Commitment  Action Monitor 
Fig. 17: HC-Co Culturally-Mitigated Working Analysis Framework 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
I broke the discussion section into five parts: reflecting on the updated Working Analysis 
Framework and how each Driver related to HC-Co; considering the role corporate culture 
seemed to be playing in how these Drivers expressed themselves; how my own findings 
related to the literature; actions arising; participant contributions, and; what I had learned 
from it as an action researcher. 
5.2 WAF DRIVERS 
My thoughts on the relevance of the Drivers evolved into the HC-Co Culturally-Mitigated 
Working Analysis Framework, as did my use of the Resource-Based View (Barney, 1991) in 
structuring the WAF. My initial thoughts had been that it provided a useful model to 
differentiate the Problem Statement that this research was seeking to address and help 
categorise the results. However, the prime responsibility of leadership is to manage these 
resources, and which are inevitably impacted by the leadership-succession process. To my 
mind, choosing the Resource-Based View proved to be particularly relevant through 
maintaining a focus throughout on the importance of continuing to manage all resources - 
tangible, intangible and human - to maintain our competitive advantage, failing which HC-
Co risked becoming one of the 72% who did not survive the leadership-succession process 
(Lomax et al., 2015). I have discussed below the detailed interplay that was apparent 
between the various Drivers in regard to the Company’s different types of resources. 
5.2.1 Tangible-Resource Drivers 
5.2.1.1 Capital 
The Participants did not overly focus on capital Drivers, whereas the literature identified a 
number. These included the financial implications of an ownership transition (De Massis et 
al., 2008) which typically happens at the same time as a leadership transition, associated 
costs with either process (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007), or loss of income or increased 
supplier costs due to confidence issues (Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999; Anderson et al., 
2003). However, one Participant did raise the question of how employees might react if my 
wife and I continued to take a dividend after we had handed over the leadership. 
I was aware from both the literature and our own founder-leadership succession that there 
was often an accompanying ownership succession. In our case, there was no significant 
implication for capital as the employees were earning their half share of the Company by 
increasing profits. We would need to incur legal and accounting costs to put the necessary 
structure in place to facilitate partial employee ownership, but these were not significant. 
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There was therefore no material accompanying debt, either for the employees or the 
Company, to buy us out of this share.  
5.2.1.1.1 OWNERSHIP-TRANSITION DRIVERS 
Whilst the Participants did not focus on other potential ownership-transition Drivers, the 
literature identified the potential for problems in other areas. For example, Sund et al. 
(2015) identified increased detbt as a Driver, but which our method of transitioning to 
partial-employee ownership avoided; we were giving the employees the opportunity to 
earn their share through working harder and smarter. However, there was a risk that if we 
started slipping against the earn-out target, which would delay the ownership transition, 
employees may lose a measure of confidence in the Leadership Candidates if they held 
them to be responsible, which would therefore impact the leadership-succession process 
too. This was therefore a Driver that required monitoring, and which may have implications 
for stakeholder commitment (see Human-Resource Drivers, below). 
5.2.1.1.2 RISK APPETITE AND ACCESS TO DEBT 
Risk appetite was another issue not focused on by the Participants but which was identified 
in the literature. Miller et al. (2003) highlighted that new leaders tended to be more 
variable in their approach to risk which could impact the company’s capital. They found 
successors could be inconsistent in their approach to risk, could take a very conservative 
approach, or take unnecessary risks just to be different to their predecessor, any of which 
could impact on the company’s profitability and the confidence of key external 
stakeholders. For example, banks were unlikely to extend credit to a new leader who 
appeared not to be taking an appropriate approach to risk (Molly et al., 2010). Whilst I 
recognised that these were potentially serious Drivers for HC-Co, I also recognised that 
exploring them with the Participants at this stage was unlikely to be helpful; I felt it was 
too early in the leadership-development cycle to judge what the Leadership Candidates’ 
risk appetites were, or the reaction of key stakeholders to them taking over. However, we 
did note that, in order for key stakeholders to form a view about our successors’ appetite 
for risk, they first needed to know them, which was not the case for the bank and 
accountant, although they were far better known than my wife and I to other outsiders 
such as suppliers and regulators. We therefore instigated a process by which the 
Leadership Candidates would interact with key outsider stakeholders they were not 
already familiar with, and then monitor the situation, which I discussed further, below (see 
Outsider Commitment). 
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5.2.2 Intangible-Resource Drivers 
The intangible resource drivers identified in the literature focused on five principal areas: 
succession planning; selection; performance management; governance, and; strategy. 
5.2.2.1 Succession Planning 
In order for there to be a succession, this need to be planned. Three areas were addressed 
in the WAF framework; planning failures, firm vs family objectives, and general risks. 
5.2.2.1.1 PLANNING FAILURES 
The Participants did not focus on succession planning, which is what the literature found 
also. Bruce & Picard (2006) noted there was an almost universal failure to plan by 
companies, which Motwani et al. (2006) noted was moderated by company size, principally 
because founders were unfamiliar with the process (Schlepphorst and Moog, 2014), and 
found it to be very complex. However, I did not feel this was why the Participants were not 
focusing on it, more that they felt we had it covered by vitue of the fact that I was writing 
this thesis.  In fact, when specifically questioned on whether they felt able to challenge me 
on issues relating to the leaderhsip or ownership succession, there was a general 
acceptance they did not, and which raised the issue as to whether they were over-
dependent on me and my wife in this regard (discussed below). I also recognised that their 
failure to challenge me combined with the work I was doing on this thesis was might lead 
me to a similar conclusion. However, the focus of the thesis was on the Drivers of 
leadership succession which, whilst being a necessary part of the planning process, is not 
sufficient in itself. Whilst this thesis also considers how these Drivers may apply to HC-Co, 
it stops short of considering how they should be mitigated. As such, whilst this thesis goes 
a long way towards creating a succession plan, it is not complete, and further action was 
therefore required in this regard. 
5.2.2.1.2 FIRM VS FAMILY OBJECTIVES 
Similarly, the Participants did not raise any conflicts between family and firm objectives. 
Holt & Popp (2013) highlighted that this was a risk in family firms and, whilst we did not 
have any family members other than my wife and me, I recognised that our objectives were 
not necessarily the same as the Company’s, or the new employee shareholders once the 
employee-ownership transitions completed; I discussed the potentially-conflicting 
dividend preferences above (see Dividend Policy). There was also the issue of governance 
systems (see Governance, below) whereby we may want to put in systems in place that 
protected us but were not necessarily in the interests of the new shareholders or leader. 
The Participants saw our transition to employee ownership as evidence that we had found 
a fair formula to address these issues which, whilst I recognised this may be the case, I also 
saw it as further evidence of possible over dependence (see Founder-Successor Issues, 
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below). My conclusion was, that whilst I had tried to be fair in designing the employee-
ownership process and we were still working on the governance structure, there was a risk 
of self-interest bias (Van Dijk et al., 2004), and which may go unchallenged if the employees 
continued to feel over-dependent or intimidated (see Founder-Successor Issues, below). 
My conclusion was that this was an important Driver to monitor as there was a risk of 
introducing systems that were not initially challenged but could lead to discontent later. 
5.2.2.1.3 GENERAL RISKS 
Whilst the Participants raised a number of issues that could be considered as risk-type 
Drivers, these tended to be specific to WAF Driver areas, and were therefore addressed in 
those sections. However, the literature raised other risks, such as losing key personnel 
(Rothwell, 2011a) and issues of bias (James, 2006). I also recognised that there were likely 
to be other general risks identified as part of the succession process that only became 
apparent at particular stages of that process, and the decision was therefore made to set 
up a risks-register to monitor these. 
5.2.2.2 Successor Selection 
There were three parts to successor selection in the WAF also; selection criteria, selection 
decision, and whether they should be an insider or outsider. 
5.2.2.2.1 SELECTION CRITERIA 
In regard to selection criteria, the Participants were very forthcoming, suggesting a mix of 
capabilities and characteristics. The literature supported this approach but also addressed 
questions of how candidates should be assessed. For example, Brockhaus (2004) and Dyck 
et al. (2002) highlighted the importance of a needs’ assessment, Brockhaus (2004) adding 
that both hard and soft skills should be assessed, and Nordqvist et al. (2013) focusing on 
the importance of them being entrepreneurial.In some ways we had already bypassed the 
Participants and academics’ recommendations by developing the Leadership Candidate 
without first assessing them against any other selection criteria other than they were the 
three most senior managers, and we had a tradition of promoting internally. In some ways 
the issue of selection criteria had therefore been bypassed, but I still recognised the 
importance of taking these into account. Whilst it was too late to apply such criteria as part 
of a selection process, I recognised such criteria could be an important support to how the 
Leadership Candidates were developed, and this was therefore marked for further action. 
5.2.2.2.2 SELECTION DECISION 
Whilst the selection criteria had been somewhat bypassed by our having already moved 
forward with the Leadership Candidates, this was only partially true of the selection 
decision. We had drawn up a team of three candidates who we hoped and expected would 
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work together as part of a leadership team, but ultimately there would only be one CEO. 
This issue did not come up in the first iteration, but both Ward (2004) and De Massis et al. 
(2008) had highlighted a number of risks when the decision is made by the founder, and I 
therefore explored it in the second iteration. What I found was that there was initially 
unanimous support for my wife and me making the final decision, but further probing 
revealed evidence of over-dependence in this area also (discussed further in Founder-
Successor Issues, below). Whilst it was reassuring to know that both insider and outsider 
Participants had confidence in our decision-making in this regard, I also recognised that 
there was a risk of our making a poor decision if we fell into any of the traps identified in 
the literature, such as failing to follow objective criteria (De Massis et al., 2008) or 
appointing the candidate most like ourselves (Levinson, 1971), and marked this as a Driver 
to monitor. 
5.2.2.2.3 INSIDER VS OUTSIDER SUCCESSOR 
As discussed above, we had already made the decision to start down the insider route and, 
only if that did not work out, would we consider external candidates. It was therefore not 
surprising that the Participants did not raise this as an issue, save to caution against going 
the outsider route. The literature made various arguments for and against outsiders, with 
Kirby and Lee (1996) raising the interesting possibility of an outsider being used on a 
temporary basis whilst an insider candidate was made ready. Whilst I noted that this may 
be a helfpful halfway house if my wife and I felt we had to move on before one or all of the 
Leadership Candidates were ready, the Participant’s comment made me wonder if there 
was a bias against all outsiders that would be hard to overcome, regardless of 
circumstances. I therefore explored this further in the focus group where a cultural 
dimension seemed to be at play, and which I discussed further under the Role of Culture, 
below. However, I also recognised that there were sound business reasons for promoting 
internally in that it helped to lift employee engagement by blurring the ‘them and us’ line 
between staff and management, which people would therefore see as more pervious than 
in many companies. This was therefore also a Driver to monitor. 
5.2.2.3 Performance Management 
Performance management received little attention from the Participants beyond 
underlining the importance of task completion and following policies and procedures, 
which would need to be monitored. It was also only focused on by Rothwell (2011), who 
noted that a firm’s performance can be affected by a number of issues during a leadership 
succession. This seemed to me to be a potentially major risk with key personnel focusing 
on the succession as well as their day job, outsiders inevitably revaluating their confidence 
in HC-Co, whether from the perspective of client or supplier, and was therefore an 
important issue to address. My conclusion was that one governance system, our KPI’s, 
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needed to be updated to meet the needs of the leadership succession, a system that was 
currently over-complicated and therefore largely ignored by the management team. The 
decision was therefore made to introduce a new KPI system that was fit for purpose, and 
then to ensure it was monitored. 
5.2.2.4 Governance 
Governance was not focused on in the first iteration by the Participants, but the literature 
review noted that the founder typically wanted no restrictions, whereas they did not want 
their successor to have the same freedom (Casillas et al., 2010). I recognised this was true 
for HC-Co too, partially because of the employee-ownership transition where a change of 
governance was implicit, but I also recognised that I would wish to have structures that 
allowed me to keep an eye on my investment after I had left (see Performance 
Management, above). This was therefore discussed in iteration-two, which again revealed 
a high degree of confidence in the plan my wife and I had formed for the founder-
leadership succession and employee-ownership transition, but which I felt also might 
reflect an over-dependence on us. It was therefore decided to set up a working group to 
look at the area of governance specifically to ensure it met the needs of all stakeholders in 
a way that did not constrain future growth; a risk identified by Casillas et al. (2010) as a 
particular risk. However, I also recognised that, if this group was to be effective, timing was 
important. If it were to happen at a time when the participants of that group still felt over-
dependence it was unlikely to be as productive as when they had more confidence in their 
own ability, and this was therefore marked as a Driver for action prior to the transfer of 
power, but otherwise put on hold until the Leadership Candidates and other employees’ 
confidence had grown to be able to challenge my wife and me in all areas. 
5.2.2.5 Strategy 
Another area that was not focused on by the Participants or the literature was strategy, 
but it seemed to me that the change of leader was a strategic event in itself, given that the 
CEO was responsible for delivering on a company’s strategy. I therefore raised this as an 
issue in the second iteration. The responses of the Participants demonstrated that this was 
a development issue to ensure the Leadership Candidates understood strategy as a 
concept and were able to think and act strategically; it was a process currently led by me 
and, whilst strategic issues were discussed at management board meetings, no one other 
than me and my wife really had a working knowledge of the subject. I concluded that 
strategic thinking therefore needed to be addressed as one of the Leadership Candidates’ 
key capabilities, which I appreciated would in part be supported by their higher-level 
management studies, but also through taking advantage of action-learning opportunities 
as they presented themselves. This was a Driver that was therefore marked for initial 
action, and then monitoring to ensure strategic issues were being addressed effectively. 
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5.2.3 Human-Resource Drivers 
Human-resource Drivers related to such issues as who had salience over the leadership-
succession process, but also more specific Drivers such as what impacted the founder-
successor relationship, developing the successors’ capabilities, and managing the 
commitment of all the stakeholders so that the process could complete successfully. 
5.2.3.1 Stakeholder Salience 
The Participants highlighted a number of stakeholders they felt had salience over the 
succession process, including the founder and successor in passing, with greater focus on 
employees, clients, and outsiders. However, the focus of much of the literature, whilst 
covering the founder and successor, was on the family. There was therefore a great 
divergence between the two. 
5.2.3.1.1 FOUNDER SALIENCE 
The Participants mentioned the importance of keeping me and my wife happy, but almost 
as an afterthought, whereas a great deal of the literature focused on the founder and his 
or her ability to frustrate any succession (Mussolino & Calabrò, 2014; and Cadieux, 2007). 
This was another example of where I was not surprised at the lack of focus by the 
Participants on whether we were important or not as it seemed to be a given and, with 
hindsight, I felt my further enquiries in this regard in the second iteration may have come 
across as a ‘cry for recognition’. However, I recognised that the stakeholder salience theory 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) focused on three pillars; power, legitimacy, and urgency. We clearly 
had power in that we were the current owners of the Company and the most senior 
executives, beyond any power that comes from founder status. As the current leaders, we 
also had a legitimate interest in what came next. However, I recognised that the urgency 
with which we viewed the succession process may vary over time. The literature cited a 
number of reasons why, including how effective the relationship was with the successor 
(Mussolino & Calabrò, 2014; and Davis & Harveston, 1999), how committed we felt to the 
Company (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008), and whether there were issues outside of the 
Company pulling us away. I recognised that our own salience may vary and therefore 
needed to be monitored, and which had implications for our own commitment to the 
process (discussed further in Stakeholder Commitment, below). 
5.2.3.1.2 SUCCESSOR SALIENCE 
What was true for the founder was also largely true for the successor, both in terms of the 
attention the Participants paid to their salience (they saw it as a given), and the detail of 
their salience. Successors had power in terms of their ability to withhold their support or 
withdraw, legitimacy as the designate successor, and their own urgency may also vary over 
time. The degree of their salience also had to be monitored. 
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5.2.3.1.3 FAMILY SALIENCE 
However, the question of family salience was far more ambiguous. This was not picked up 
on by the Participants but was a major focus of much of the literature, where there was a 
general presumption that the successor would typically be a family member. This was not 
the case for HC-Co, and therefore my question was to what extent family salience was 
relevant or analogous for the salience of others. In the strictest sense, the only family 
members in the process were myself and my wife, whose salience is considered above. 
Whilst approximately 30% of staff were related by blood or marriage to other staff 
members, this was a different familial relationship to that envisaged by the literature, 
which I discussed in the literature review. My conclusion was that there were no obvious 
family stakeholders to be considered, save that employees may act in a family-type way 
given the extended length of service of many of them (more than 15% had worked for the 
Company for more than ten years, with 6% approaching the thirty-year mark), and I felt 
this was therefore a Driver to monitor also.  
5.2.3.1.4 EMPLOYEE SALIENCE 
When it came to employee salience, there was a similar divide between the Participants 
and the literature; the Participants felt they had salience, whereas their salience was 
largely unrecognised in the literature. My own initial thoughts were whether this was an 
example of a moral duty the Company had which fell short of being a Driver, or whether 
the employees would be able to prevent or significantly influence the founder-leadership 
succession. My own instinct was that they probably had the power to influence the process 
in a similar way and to a similar extent to that which an owner’s family members typically 
had in such a process, which the literature had suggested was considerable (Lansberg and 
Astrachan, 1994; Horton, 1982). The Participants reinforced their own view, in the second 
iteration, that the employees had salience. The leadership success was of legitimate 
interest to them through both the impact it may have on the security of their employment 
and the impact this may have on the employee-ownership succession. They had power in 
the sense that they could undermine any successor. However, they probably had little 
urgency given that the succession had little direct impact in the way it did for the founder 
and successor. This was therefore another driver to monitor. 
5.2.3.1.5 CLIENT SALIENCE 
The Participants also held the view that the clients had salience, a view that I was initially 
sceptical of. The literature had little to say on the subject, save that dissatisfied client may 
leave (Sund et al., 2015). My own view was that, given that the consequences for our clients 
of moving was greater than for most businesses due to the adverse effect this could have 
on their health, their power in terms of stakeholder salience was diminished. I felt this 
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vulnerability meant HC-Co had a higher moral duty than most companies to their clients, 
but that they fell short of being key stakeholders as their influence was almost certainly 
insufficient to prevent a founder-leadership succession. However, the Participants 
persuaded me otherwise in the second iteration. The questions of urgency and legitimacy 
were not of the essence to my mind, it was whether they had the power to change the 
succession process. In this regard, a professional Participant made the point that they did 
not need to leave in order to exert their influence, which I recognised was unlikely to 
happen in significant numbers unless things were going significantly wrong, but they could 
complain to the authorities. As such, they had an indirect power over our reputation which, 
if significantly harmed, could impact the succession, and was therefore a further Driver that 
needed to be monitored. 
5.2.3.1.6 OUTSIDER SALIENCE 
The Participants also identified outsiders with salience but, whereas they were clear as to 
why employees or clients may have salience, their contributions in this regard were more 
by way of completing a list; the bank, regulators, suppliers etc. The literature’s focus on 
these outsiders was similarly brief, and was more focused on the impact that a loss of their 
confidence may have (Sund et al., 2015). From my perspective, any outsider who either 
had a commercial relationship with the Company or a genuine interest in it, such as with 
the local community, has a legitimate interest in the outcome of the leadership succession. 
However, their power and the urgency with which they may view matters would vary. For 
example, our regulator had the power to shut us down and had demonstrated with other 
healthcare companies that they would do this as a matter of urgency if the circumstances 
demanded. Similarly, but with less power, were the bank who could withraw financial 
support if they lost confidence, but who could be replaced if we were able to gain the trust 
of another bank. Their degee of urgency was also likely to be proportional to their 
perception of the risk they were exposed to. Other external stakeholders, such as  
suppliers, would be similar to the bank in that they could withdraw their services, and may 
choose to do so quickly if they feared not being paid, but were again typically easier to 
replace. In the same way that clients could impact our reputation, so could the local 
community. To my mind, they all therefore had salience and therefore needed to be 
monitored to ensure any efforts we made to keep them committed to the succession (see 
Managing Commitment, below) was proportional to their level of support for the 
succession. However, there were two stakeholders, the founder and successor, who the 
literature had focused on in particular. 
5.2.3.2 Founder-Successor Issues 
Both the Participants and the literature focused on such Drivers as transfer of power and 
timing, but there was also a divergence of focus. 
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The literature review addressed founder-successor issues in section Error! Reference 
source not found., highlighting some of the problems there can be with communications 
(Cadieux, 2007), poor choice of successor strategies (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008; Bennedsen 
et al., 2007), and transfer of power issues (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008); each of which we 
hoped were being addressed by our evolving Leadership Candidate development process. 
The Participants also felt these issues were being addressed, although I recognised it was 
too early for the Leadership Candidates to have developed their successor strategies, and 
therefore familiarising them with some of the literature might be a helpful preventative 
action to take by way of a warning. However, the research phase also highlighted an issue 
not brought up in the literature; the risk of over-dependence on my wife and me. Until this 
issue was understood and addressed, I felt it would not be safe for us to step back, and 
risked the Leadership Candidates becoming demotivated if they could not see a way 
through, and I therefore felt taking some action to address this was essential. My 
conclusion was that the same remedy for helping them to develop their own successor 
strategies and transfer power by doing things gradually was likely to address the over-
dependence Driver too. However, I also considered this was not a Driver to be 
underestimated given the differences in our experience and training. In the same way we 
had started a risks register to capture and monitor risks, we also planned to start a skills 
and capabilities register to monitor how the Leadership Candidates were progressing, using 
the four stages of Situational Leadership (Hersey et al., 2008), to include when they had 
taken over responsibility for individual tasks. 
5.2.3.2.1 RELATIONSHIP 
For example, the Participants did not focus on the relationship between the founder and 
successor, whereas the literature highlighted that a successor could be effectively blocked 
if the founder’s leadership style was exclusive and non-benevolent (Mussolino & Calabrò, 
2014). I recognised the importance of a good relationship with the successor but did not 
focus on it with the Participants as I felt there was evidence we had already established 
this. However, our letting go and relinquishing control was another matter. 
5.2.3.2.2 LETTING GO 
At the time of the iterations, the internal Participants were appreciative of our support, 
and the professional Participants thought our approach to the leadership succession was 
well founded. However, the literature raised a note of caution. For emotional and financial 
reasons, both Hoang and Gimeno (2010) and Cadieux (2007) observed that founders often 
found it hard to hand over control, and I recognised that there was the potential for that 
to apply to me and my wife too. However, whilst I recognised that the relationship with the 
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successor was part of this, it seemed to me to be more encompassing than that, and I 
therefore considered this further under Founder Commitment, below. 
5.2.3.2.3 DELEGATING 
However, what was unquestionably a founder-successor issue was how well my wife and I 
delegated. This was not an issue raised by the Participants in the first iteration, but it was 
a Driver raised in the literature where Handler & Kram (1988) had observed that founders 
were typically perfectionists who feared tasks would not be completed to their own high 
standards. I recognised that this was a hard Driver for me to judge, and I therefore brought 
it up with the internal Participants in the second iteration. On the whole, they felt we 
delegated well which did partially surprise me. Whilst I recognised the perfectionist trend 
in both myself and my wife, I was typically happy to delegate and then comment if and 
when things were not done as I would have liked them to be. However, I initially considered 
that my wife was far less eager to hand over her responsibilities, and we had a number of 
conversations on this topic. 
On reflection, I concluded this perception by us may have arisen because we often had 
conversations about the effectiveness with which various tasks were done as a foundation 
to reinforcing good practice, or coaching on where we felt things could be done better, but 
I also recognised there was another issue at play. My wife’s role was largely financial, and 
the areas she was holding back on delegating were those that she felt she needed to do to 
keep her finger on the pulse of what was going on. She was clearly not at a stage where 
she was ready to let go herself, which also did not surprise me; we were going through a 
process to bring on the Leadership Candidates, and which was not yet completed. 
However, this did lead me to the conclusion that we probably were reasonably effective at 
delegating and, where we were not, was because we were not yet at the stage of the 
process where it was appropriate to do so. I also recognised that some of the tasks she was 
holding back on she may never want to let go of as a form of governance control, such as 
reconciling the bank account, which Casillas et al. (2010) noted was not untypical in a 
leadership succession. This was therefore, to my mind, a Driver that required monitoring. 
5.2.3.2.4 WORKLOAD 
In fact, perhaps we had been too good at delegating as one issue brought up by the 
Participants, but not in the literature, was workload. A number of Participants raised 
concerns in the first iteration that the Leadership Candidates may be struggling with the 
additional responsibilities the succession process had brought them on top of their normal 
responsibilities. It was also recognised that this may lead to a lack of perspective, partially 
through their being overworked, but also because they could not get sufficient distance 
from the day-to-day running of the Company to see things from a wider perspective. These 
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concerns led us to revise their roles, with one giving up her registered manager position to 
become designate CEO, another reducing her hours spent as registered manager, and the 
third restructuring how she managed her responsibilities. With one exception, the 
feedback in iteration-two was that this had been effective. Where it had not been effective 
was because the Leadership Candidate concerned was too ready to jump in to help other 
people and was therefore more of an issue for coaching than further role changes. As a 
Driver, I therefore marked it as one to monitor. 
5.2.3.2.5 INTIMIDATION 
A further Driver raised by one outsider Participant was whether I could be intimidating. 
This was not specifically raised in the literature, Mussolino & Calabrò (2014) had identified 
the founders leadership style as having a potentially negative impact on the successor. The 
Participant’s comment related to whether my logic and experience may be intimidating, 
and this resonated with comments made by other internal Participants that the fact I was 
studying for a doctorate meant they would be more reluctant to challenge me. I had also 
had various comments that I sometimes used words that were not familiar to my audience, 
and which could therefore lead them to disengage. Particularly in view of the over-
dependence Driver, discussed below, I felt intimidation was a Driver I had to manage if it 
was not to get in the way of a successful leadership transition, and I therefore marked this 
for further action and then monitoring. 
5.2.3.2.6 OVER DEPENDENCE 
The issue of over dependence was not raised in the literature, but it became apparent from 
a number of conversations with the internal Participants that this was a risk. Where they 
had a level of expertise, all the Participants felt able to challenge both me and my wife, but 
they saw the ownership and leadership successions as different. These were areas they had 
no expertise in and where I had very much taken the lead, and whilst they generally had 
confidence in what we were doing, they openly admitted they were unequal to effectively 
challenging me or my wife in this regard. I felt this Driver was therefore a major threat to 
the leadership-succession process as not only were my wife and I not infallible, change 
processes are most effective when the stakeholders help to form the plan (Zigarmi et al., 
2008), which therefore required their active understanding and involvement. In part, I 
recognised sharing this thesis would help in this regard as it would share much of my 
learning with the key stakeholders, but I also recognised that their greater involvement 
may trigger a defensive reaction from my wife and me (Kaplan, 2008). This was therefore 
a Driver that required further action, but which I also recognised may awaken other Drivers 
that would need mitigating. 
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5.2.3.2.7 SUCCESSOR STRATEGIES 
Successor strategies were not raised by the Participants, but were focused on in the 
literature as important and, whilst this could be viewed as a successor-development type 
driver, was often connected to the founder (Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008; Bennedsen et al., 
2007). For instance,  Gilding et al. (2015) identified four different strategies based on the 
harmony that existed between the founder and successor, whilst Miller et al's (2003) noted 
three strategies which were typically a reaction to the founder of changing nothing, 
changing everything or wavering between the two. Whilst I recognised these risks and had 
seen them when people had been promoted to other positions, it seemed to me to be an 
issue of competence and confidence, combined with a clear direction. This therefore 
underlined the importance of getting the successor-development process right, which is 
discussed below (see Successor Development). 
5.2.3.2.8 TRANSFER OF POWER 
Presuming we overcame all of the above, at some stage there would have to be a transfer 
of power from the founder to the successor, and the Participants typically focused on 
ensuring it was smooth. The literature picked up on other issues, such as noting the quality 
of communications and trust between the founder and successor was important (Cadieux, 
2007), discussed above (see Relationship), as was commitment and preparation (Lansberg 
& Astrachan, 1994), discussed below. However, whilst these Drivers were obviously 
important, save where the founder was no longer able to act , a transfer of power was 
unlikely to happen until such time as the founder and successor were committed to it 
(Motwani et al., 2006). Whilst there were a number of Drivers that contributed to this, and 
therefore needed action to ensure they were managed, to my mind the key Driver was one 
of commitment, which is discussed in Stakeholder Commitment below, as is developing the 
successor’s capabilities. 
5.2.3.3 Successor Development 
We had started the successor-development process with the Leadership Candidates prior 
to this research, and it was therefore not surprising that the Participants had strong views 
on the subject, covering capabilities, experience, transfer of knowledge, and leadership 
style. Most were also covered in the literature. 
5.2.3.3.1 CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT 
The Participants contributions were more general in nature, identifying that the Leadership 
Candidates would need training, rather than being specific as to what, and adding that 
mentoring would be a good method. The literature was more specific. 
The mirror issue to a company needs assessment was a capabilities assessment (Morris et 
al., 1997), to identify the gaps in the Leadership Candidates’ capabilities and experience. 
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We did this over a number of retreats and was focused on with the Participants in iteration-
one, with transferring knowledge also being discussed in iteration-two. There was no great 
divergence of thinking, although some clear calls to action. 
We had already started to look at how we could improve our mentoring to support how 
we were going to transfer the necessary knowledge to the Leadership Candidates. This was 
underlined as a Driver in the literature review (Cabrera-Suarez et al. 2001), with the 
founders often finding it hard to be explicit as to what knowledge they needed to transfer 
(Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014), which proved to be true for me also; as discussed below (see 
Transferring Knowledge). Recognising this was likely to be an issue, in the retreats my wife 
and I held with the Leadership Candidates, we also worked  to identify what the key 
responsibilities we had were, who would take them over, and how this would be done. We 
identified Action Learning (Garavan et al., 2015) as a potentially useful method to achieve 
this transfer of knowledge by looking for real-world opportunities for the Leadership 
Candidates to take part in, which we were to monitor by following the four stages of 
Situational Leadership (Cadieux, 2007); directing, coaching, supporting and delegating. 
However, what we found was that, largely because we worked remotely from the 
Leadership Candidates, the Situational Leadership model did not work particularly well as 
a lot of our responsibilities were complex, and therefore better-done face to face. The 
Leadership Candidates themselves were also having difficulties anticipated in the model 
but were reticent to bring this expected lack of confidence or competence to our attention, 
which led to inertia. We therefore collectively reflected on how we could achieve better 
results. 
Our conclusion was to in part use technology to support the process, the Leadership 
Candidates were to undertake further management education, and also to be less 
ambitious as to pace.  
We adopted a task management system that included discussion boards which meant 
we no longer had to wait for other people to be working at the same time, or in the 
same place to progress matters. In some ways this was not as effective as face-to-
face communications as we were unable to read the person’s body language, but in 
other ways it proved far superior. Because people were able to give greater 
consideration to their responses, the quality of their thinking and inputs improved 
considerably, but it also allowed me to expose my thinking in far greater detail by 
discussing real-world examples. It was through these discussions that we started to 
reinforce our identity as a leadership CAS of five people (my wife, the three 
Leadership Candidates and me), and started to update the vision my wife and I had 
painted as to how the Company should be. It also proved an effective way for some 
of my wife’s and my tacit knowledge to start transferring over. 
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We also recognised that a key part of my abilities was the formal training I had 
undertaken which, combined with my greater experience, allowed me to often look 
at things more clearly, and in a different way. We felt the Leadership Candidates 
relative lack of formal training was therefore likely to be a contributory factor in terms 
of the confidence with which they approached their new responsibilities, but also 
their competence as their principal source of information was a founder who was 
struggling to be explicit as to what he did (Schlepphorst & Moog, 2014). All three of 
the Leadership Candidates therefore signed up for professional management 
courses, with the designate CEO committing to undertake an MBA. 
The last change we made was to start with smaller action-learning examples 
approached in a different way. The longer-term nature of this updated knowledge-
transfer plan meant it was too early to draw any firm conclusions at the time of 
writing this thesis, but there was one area the CEO designate was struggling with. In 
many ways, it was easier for the other two Leadership Candidates who, by heading 
their respective divisions, were taking on a logical and less ambitious progression. 
However, for the CEO designate, many of her responsibilities were new to her and 
more complex than she had undertaken before. Seeing them as a list combined with 
action-learning initiatives when the opportunities presented themselves did little to 
give her clarity or confidence. We recognised that part of the problem was that my 
wife and I worked remotely and were tending to go on auto-pilot when a job needed 
doing, depriving her of learning opportunities or a clear structure. After reflecting on 
this with the three Leadership Candidates, we therefore made one further change, 
which was for my wife and me to act as a three-person team with the Leadership 
Candidate who was the CEO designate. My wife and I played non-executive roles, 
with this Leadership Candidate acting as the executive director putting our jointly-
formed plans into action. We met with her online at the beginning of most work days 
to set and reflect on objectives, and applied the Situational Leadership approach of 
initially directing her and then, as her competence and confidence grew, coaching 
and supporting her, until she was ready to take on the whole task herself. This 
approach was consistent with Churchill & Hatten (1987), and Handler’s (1990) 
recommendation to transfer responsibilities gradually.  
This was therefore a Driver we were already focusing on a great deal and planned to 
continue to do so. 
5.2.3.3.2 EXPERIENCE 
It may be that the Company’s focus on testing the Leadership Candidates for their 
leadership potential, either as individuals or collectively, may have led the Participants to 
presume that the question of experience was being covered. However, whatever the 
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Participants’ reasons for not focusing on it, the literature had with Longenecker & Schoen 
(1978) amongst others recommending that successors undertook a number of roles. Whilst 
I did not direct the Participants’ attention to this, I was aware that the Leadership 
Candidate who had been appointed as designate CEO had been in part because they had 
such wide experience within the Company, on both operational and administrative roles. 
This was therefore advice we were already taking and was proving effective, although we 
had more challenges with the next Driver. 
5.2.3.3.3 TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE 
The Participants focused on the importance of transferring knowledge to the successor, 
such as by mentoring, with Cabrera-Suarez et al. (2001) noting this relied on the founder 
being able to identify what they did, which they often found difficult (Schlepphorst & 
Moog, 2014). We were no different, and found identifying the tacit knowledge we had 
(Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009) and how we should transfer it a frustrating process. 
What became apparent through trial and error was that I had a very clear vision of what 
was right and wrong in the way things should be done, which made it very easy for me to 
quickly say if something was consistent with it or not. Unfortunately, I found it very hard 
to paint that vision in a way that others could easily see. Interestingly, my wife could see 
the vision quite clearly, which gave me a clue as to why others may be slower to perceive 
it; we had been working together for twenty-five years and living together for thirty-four 
years. We had therefore had many conversations in which not only had I been able to paint 
my vision in detail, but she had in reality been the artist too through modifying my thinking 
over time. We had effectively been a CAS of two people and were now trying to expand it 
to a CAS of five by including the Leadership Candidates. The issue therefore became not so 
much of how I got the Leadership Candidates to see my vision, but how we collectively 
could paint a vision of how the Company should look in the future that was congruent and 
pleasing to all, particularly our future clients. I also recognised that time was a key factor 
in this. 
This realisation modified my expectations in two ways. One was that I should not expect to 
be able to quickly convey to the Leadership Candidates what we did, not so much in terms 
of tasks, but how we went about making decisions. Painting a vision of what we were trying 
to create was important, but this understanding was a social construction that would take 
time to get across. I therefore started to have daily conversations with the designate CEO, 
not to make decisions for her, but to draw out with her what I felt the factors were and 
their relative importance. This helped to paint a richer vision for her which she could then 
better apply to other decisions. 
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The social constructive aspect to this process led to my second observation. Gilding et al. 
(2015), discussed above (see Successor Strategies), identified that successors often 
slavishly followed what had gone before, totally rebelled against the founder’s style, or 
oscillated between the two. I wondered if this was in part because they did not have a clear 
vision of how the future should look, but also recognised that my own vision of the future 
was upgraded by circumstances, including the many conversations with my wife. Whilst 
new threats and opportunities would also be factors, I recognised that my conversations 
with the designate CEO would not only update her ‘vision’, but my own and my wife’s also. 
Whilst had already recognised that this is something we may push back against (see Over 
Dependence), we actually had to welcome it if we were ever going to be able to retire. Not 
only would the designate CEO’s and other contributions typically improve the quality of 
the vision, unless it was clear in their own minds, they would never be able to move 
towards it on their own. We therefore had to go through a process of sharing our own 
vision, before allowing it to be modified, and then finally entrusting it to others. The was 
therefore a key Driver that required ongoing action. 
5.2.3.3.4 TEAMWORK 
Once the successor had acquired the founder’s knowledge, they had to apply it, and to do 
this effectively they needed to be a good team player. This was an issue that received a 
number of comments from the Participants in the first iteration, and I therefore followed 
it up in the second. In particular, there seemed to be questions as to how well the 
Leadership Candidates were getting on. Whilst teamwork was not a Driver specifically 
focused on in the literature, it had anticipated that stakeholders may play games 
(Blumentritt et al., 2012) if they did not get what they want. Perhaps one or more 
Leadership Candidates were doing the same, which was a concern I had. I was never certain 
whether it was because of ‘sibling rivalry’ (Kets de Vries, 1993), conflict (De Tienne and 
Chirico, 2013), or mismatched goals (Sharma et al., 2003; Dunn et al., 1999; and Cromie et 
al., 1995), but I was occasionally concerned that issues within the executive team were 
sometimes taking longer to resolve than we had anticipated. There was no evidence that 
any of them were actively playing games (Blumentritt et al., 2012) to promote their own 
interests, but I did get a sense that their own challenges were sometimes more obvious to 
themselves than those of their colleagues. 
When asked, the Leadership Candidates recognised that there had been some settling 
issues, but these had not been obvious to other Participants. My view was that they were 
doing as well as could be expected, given the stage of the succession process, but we also 
agreed to have this as an ongoing discussion point which led to a number of changes. One 
example was to ensure that each of the Leadership Candidates had time working alongside 
each other so they could better appreciate each-other’s challenges, and which led to a 
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further improvement in team morale and an uplift in performance. This therefore 
remained a Driver requiring action. 
5.2.3.4 Managing Commitment 
A key area, if the succession was to complete, was the commitment of the various 
stakeholders, of which the literature and discussions with the Participants had identified a 
number, discussed below. There were also a number of Drivers that applied to all 
stakeholders. 
5.2.3.4.1 PROCESS COMMUNICATIONS 
I had addressed communication as its own issue but  later viewed it as being part of 
managing commitment, and was a Driver focused on by both the Participants and the 
literature. The Participants’ main focus was on who should be kept informed, such as 
employees and clients, whereas the literature discussed timing (Motwani et al., 2006) as 
well as who the audience should be (Daspit et al., 2016), and what the message might 
contain (Dalpiaz et al., 2014). However, what also became apparent was the need for 
repetition, discussed below (see Employee Commitment). What was not addressed by 
either was what specifically should be disclosed and to whom, and this is discussed further 
in the specific Commitment sections, below. I also recognised that the quality of our 
communications would impact the perception of fairness with which the process was being 
carried out. 
5.2.3.4.2 PERCEIVED FAIRNESS 
Both the Participants and the literature saw perceived fairness as being made up of three 
areas: role clarity; role acceptance (Restubog et al., 2010), and; playing games (Blumentritt 
et al., 2012). Nordqvist et al's (2013) also observed that family stakeholders could also react 
emotionally if they thought the process was unfair. In fact I wondered if a number of the 
Participants’ comments were recommendations to prevent game playing and enhance 
teamwork (see Teamwork, above). The literature had also identified that a failure to be 
clear, for fear of upsetting people, was a common failing of founders (Miller et al., 2003). I 
could possibly recognise this in myself in that I had accepted that one of the Leadership 
Candidates try for the CEO role, even though I recognised she may not ultimately be up to 
the challenge. My reasoning was that, because she was older, it would be easier for her to 
accept the Candidate with the most promise if she had been given the opportunity first and 
concluded herself that it was not for her, which she did. However, I also recognised that I 
try to be open and transparent in all things, and the feedback from the Participants on a 
number of issues, such as successor selection and future dividends, was that they saw my 
wife and I as being fair. Whilst I recognised that this continued to be an important Driver, I 
felt it was one to monitor for the time being. 
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5.2.3.4.3 SATISFACTION 
Another issue raised in the literature review was the importance of satisfaction with both 
the process and outcome of the founder-leadership succession (Sharma et al., 2001) to 
ongoing commitment, but was not raised by the Participants, save as an inferred 
consequence of perceived fairness. I thereofre concluded that this was a Driver to monitor, 
and moved on to consider the commitment of individual stakeholders.  
5.2.3.4.4 FOUNDER COMMITMENT 
One that required me to take a third-party view of myself and my wife was founder 
commitment. This was not picked up on by the Participants but was the focus of a number 
of articles (Hoang and Gimeno, 2010; Cadieux, 2007). 
I wondered if the lack of comment from the Participants may have been because they saw 
our commitment as a given. My wife and I started both the ownership and leadership 
transitions, and also chose the latter as the subject of this thesis. However, perhaps it was 
because they did not want to appear critical of us; Miller et al. (2003) observed that there 
could be an unquestioning loyalty to founders. I was therefore concerned that the limited 
number of comments might also mean that either the Participants were not thinking 
critically about this issue or were supressing any concerns they had. A further comment 
also inferred there may be a temporal element to this support through the reference to 
‘new ideas’. The implicit point seemed to be that the owners not only had to be committed 
at the start of the process, but on an ongoing basis too. There was also the implicit 
presumption that the existing owners would continue to wield power which, as the 
employee-ownership plan anticipated only giving half the Company to the employees, was 
not an unreasonable presumption. 
The idea of founder commitment having a temporal element was an interesting one to 
explore. Were there limits in time, perhaps connected to ongoing executive responsibility 
or ownership, or would the nature of the commitment change? For example, would this 
ongoing commitment happen in all areas, or just those which impacted on the founders’ 
financial or other interests? I recognised that there was a danger of conflating the issues 
of the founder-leadership succession with the employee-ownership transition, but in a 
number of ways they were connected, and which made them difficult to consider in 
isolation. Further, the potential conflict of interest this observation highlighted also had 
implications that I felt needed further consideration.  
As an owner, I was of course delighted that others felt my relevance would not disappear 
immediately but, putting on my Lead Researcher’s hat, I felt this was also an issue that 
should be explored more deeply. Founder commitment (Hoang and Gimeno, 2010; 
Cadieux, 2007) was identified as a foundational issue in founder-leadership successions, 
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and a Participant had highlighted a temporal dimension to this commitment that I felt 
should be understood better. However, as a founding owner also, I recognised my interest 
might be perceived to be self-serving, which both risked biasing any responses and harming 
the employee-ownership transition. If, by my questions, I was perceived to be encouraging 
the Participants to prioritise our ongoing commitment they might see this as against the 
spirit of employee ownership. However, it could also be argued that ensuring our, and any 
other key stakeholders’, ongoing commitment was just common sense. My conclusion was 
that this was a theme that should be explored but, to mitigate the risk of harming the 
parallel employee-ownership process, I felt any questions should be preceded by a 
discussion of the risks and clarifying my intentions. I also recognised that focusing on the 
question of the duration and circumstance of all stakeholders’ commitment, before 
breaking it down to individual stakeholders, might help to put the whole issue into context. 
Whether this strategy was effective, I do not know. 
Letting go was also an issue I had presumed was unlikely to relate to my wife and me as we 
had started the employee-ownership transition and founder-leadership succession 
processes. However, the fact there were specific comments about this issue, albeit from 
outside Participants, would suggest that it was potentially more than a theoretical risk. In 
fact, I had also raised this as a possibility when discussing founder commitment in that, in 
order to let go, I would have to be happy there was a safe pair of hands to pass the baton 
to. As the founder of the Company, I realised my own thoughts, as an owner rather than 
Lead Researcher, were relevant to how strong the ‘letting go’ Driver was, which I therefore 
summarised here: 
In regard to being able to ‘let go’, I concluded this was not black and white. 
The fact that we started the employee-ownership transition and founder-
leadership succession processes implied we would like to be in a position to 
let go, but of what and under what conditions remained unanswered. The 
‘of what’ was flexible to my mind and was relative to the abilities of 
whomever took over. The key objective was to free up time to enjoy our 
retirement, but I don’t think we ever envisaged letting go completely. We 
also wanted to be sufficiently free of ties to be able to travel extensively but, 
in this day and age of advanced communications, working as a ‘nomad’ was 
far more possible than ever before. Our ‘back of the envelope’ plan was that 
in three to five years we would have shed all executive responsibilities and 
would otherwise turn up for four management meetings a year and be there 
as a resource. The ‘under what conditions’ was vaguer, and I recognised that 
I was hoping one of the by-products of this thesis would be to answer this 
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question in more detail. For the time being the answer was, ‘when there was 
a safe pair of hands to pass control to’. 
I also recognised a psychological resistance in me as I had taken great pride 
and satisfaction in the Company. However, I suspected this pride-and-
satisfaction need would be met by a successful founder-leadership 
succession combined with the employee-ownership transition. I also 
considered whether a fear of change would get in the way but didn’t think it 
would. So long as I could see a reason for it, change did not concern me; in 
fact, I recognised I quite enjoyed the challenge it brought. I felt my greatest 
block to letting go would be meeting the safe-pair-of-hands test. Whilst this 
was an issue at the time of writing, I also recognised that I had a high degree 
of confidence that it was a solvable challenge. We had a lot of talent in the 
Company along with capable people who aspired to succeed us. My instinct 
was that we just needed the right plan to turn them into that safe pair of 
hands. To this end, a testing and development process for the Leadership 
Candidates was ongoing, each of whom had been made a director, and with 
one of them identified as CEO designate. The other two were taking 
responsibility for the two divisions; residential care, and domiciliary care. 
I also considered whether there were factors encouraging us to let go 
(Hoang and Gimeno, 2010; Cadieux, 2007; Handler & Kram, 1988). My health 
had generally been very good, as was my wife’s, but she had experienced 
very serious health challenges in the past. Whilst there were no pressing 
health issues that made a founder-leadership succession urgent, her 
experience had made us both very conscious of work-life balance issues. In 
regard to whether we had other interests to fill any vacuum created by giving 
up our executive responsibilities with HC-Co, any other business interests 
we had were purely as investors; neither of us aspired to taking on new long-
term business commitments. However, we were never short of ideas as to 
what to do with our time from either a leisure perspective, or with shorter-
term business projects, and so very much welcomed the opportunity to step 
back from the Company.   
I also didn’t feel there was an issue with my conflating my identity with that 
of the Company (Hoang and Gimeno, 2010). It did not carry my name, it was 
not something I spoke about to any degree socially and, whilst clients would 
have been aware of us in the background, our management style had always 
been to be supporting from behind rather than leading from the front. 
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The final issue identified in the literature review was whether an inability to 
delegate would get in the way (Handler, 1994). My natural inclination had 
always been to delegate when I could, although I also recognised I was 
intolerant of it not being done to a ´high-enough´ standard. Whilst my wife 
could delegate, she was less of a natural, and shared or possibly exceeded 
my intolerance for work that did not meet her standards. This was therefore 
another possible impediment to our being able to let go. 
My conclusion was that in order to let go I had to address was what a safe pair of hands 
meant objectively, and how we could get one or more of the Leadership Candidates to that 
standard. 
5.2.3.4.5 SUCCESSOR COMMITMENT 
I suspect that the Participants were also taking the Leadership Candidates’ commitment 
for granted, as there were only two comments. The literature was more forthcoming as to 
why they may not be. For example, Stavrou (1990) and Brockhaus (2004) recognised that 
a misalignment of goals could be an issue, Handler (1994) raised that a poor succession 
experience was likely to impact their commitment, and with Shepherd & Zacharakis (2000) 
noting that sunk financial and behavioural costs helped with commitments. 
Whilst none of the Leadership Candidates had any financial sunk costs, as the employee-
ownership transition was based on an earn-out formula, they had invested a great deal of 
time in developing their capabilities. There also seemed to be a good alignment of goals, 
save that two of the three Candidates had at one time aspired to be the CEO. The key 
variable therefore seemed to be the quality of the succession experience. I recognised that, 
in part, this related to my own leadership style and how inclusive it was, but also to what 
degree they had clarity and were able to meet the development goals so that they were 
ready. This was therefore another Driver were a number of other Drivers fed into it, and 
would therefore require ongoing action to ensure they all aligned to everyone’s 
satisfaction.  
5.2.3.4.6 FAMILY COMMITMENT 
Family was identified in the literature as being important, but was not picked up on by the 
Participants, which was not surprising as there were no family members whose 
commitment was required (Brockhaus, 2004). This was therefore discarded as being 
irrelevant to HC-Co. However, employee commitment was another matter. 
5.2.3.4.7 EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT 
Whilst they were not highlighted in the literature as being key stakeholders, it seemed 
obvious to both me and the Participants that they were, after all for a leader to be 
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successful they need people prepared to follow them (Hollander, 1992). I therefore wanted 
to understand this more in the subsequent iterations, and particularly whether there were 
any factors that may get in the way of their commitment. 
The Participants initially felt that the staff were on board with the proposed changes, and 
therefore no action was required, however, I remained concerned. My wife, the three 
Leadership Candidates and I were having quarterly retreats to reflect on how things were 
going and update our plans, some of which would be visible to the staff, but others were 
more subtle. For example, target deadlines might change which, if not communicated to 
the staff group as a whole, could lead to concerns when apparent deadlines were missed. 
The importance of process communications was discussed above, and I was concerned that 
the employees may feel out of touch from time-to-time. The Company held an annual 
‘partners’ meeting when an overall update was given, but I realised that this was a long 
timescale in the context of the founder-leadership succession. We therefore introduced an 
update into our quarterly meeting with the employee representatives, and the Leadership 
Candidates also took their own initiative, which was an encouraging sign of their own 
development. This was the introduction of quarterly ‘fun shops’ whereby staff from each 
of the three services came together to not only hear how the founder-leadership 
succession and employee-ownership transition were going, but to help to shape it also. 
However, there was another issue I felt was potentially more corrosive to employee 
commitment; our continuing to take dividends. This was an issue raised in the literature 
review by Davis and Harveston (1999) who highlighted that ownership successions typically 
create for the first time both active and passive shareholders, and who typically have 
conflicting goals. Whilst dividend policy is a factor of ownership rather than leadership 
succession, I recognised that it had the potential to impact both as there was a potential 
for stakeholders to conflate the two processes, particularly as they were happening at the 
same time. Whilst a Participant used humour in the second iteration to query whether our 
future drawings would be considered to be fair, another Participant used the analogy of 
record royalties in the forum as a method to explain why our continuing to take dividends 
was warranted. However, I also recognised that, whilst it explained why we would continue 
to take a dividend, it did not address potential conflicts in regard to the amount of those 
dividends. This was therefore a Driver I felt that required action to address these concerns, 
and then monitoring to ensure that the solution remained effective. 
5.2.3.4.8 CLIENT COMMITMENT 
Client commitment was commented on by the Participants and discussed in the literature. 
Ours was not a business where they could easily change to another supplier, particularly 
for our residential clients, where a move would typically lead to adverse health 
consequences (Glasby et al., 2019; Jolley et al., 2011). I had already considered when 
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deciding who the Participants should be what effect keeping the clients too informed might 
have. They were, on the whole, both vulnerable and dependent, and to tell them too much 
might leave them feeling unsettled. However, it was also inevitable they would hear 
something as the employees were aware of the process and would naturally discuss it with 
the clients. Our conclusion was to not make specific announcements until the successor 
had proved themselves beyond doubt, which could otherwise be very unsettling if they did 
not then succeed, but nor to keep it a secret. For example, my wife and I would openly 
discuss that the process was going on with clients and their families, and then be 
responsive to their level of interest, whilst also encouraging the management team to do 
the same. This was therefore a Driver for passive action at this stage but would later 
become more active. 
5.2.3.4.9 OUTSIDER COMMITMENT 
A further risk identified in the literature, and shared by the Participants, was the 
importance of outsider confidence, such as the bank and suppliers.  
The Participants felt that the bank was of a different order of magnitude to other suppliers, 
as a loss of confidence by them would force HC-Co to refinance or possibly go into 
insolvency if this were not possible. This was an issue picked up on by (Ward, 2011) who 
noted that a bank’s appetite for supporting a company was correlated to its confidence in 
the leadership, and which could go up or down as a result of an founder-leadership 
succession. The bank was different in another way also, in that we had a duty to keep them 
informed. As our relationship director was also one of the Participants, he already had 
great insight into what we were doing, but I recognised that keeping him abreast of the 
plans and progress that would flow from this thesis, after which his direct involvement 
would have ended, was also important. The Participants also raised that my wife and I were 
the only people to deal with the bank, which led to a discussion at the next Management 
Board meeting, where it was agreed that the Leadership Candidates should spend time 
with key stakeholders they didn’t normally see to avoid surprises if there was an issue of 
confidence, and give us time to address such issues. This was therefore a Driver that was 
being actioned and would continue to be, but I was also aware that there was a factor that 
was influencing a number of Drivers; company culture. 
5.3 THE ROLE OF CULTURE 
The literature review did not focus on culture as a factor in leadership successions, but it 
became apparent through the iterations that leadership-succession Drivers were having a 
greater or lesser impact than might be expected. When reflecting on why this might be, I 
wondered whether there was a cultural aspect at play that was moderating how the 
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various Drivers expressed themselves within HC-Co. Flamholtz and Randle (2011) argued 
there were five orientations to a company’s corporate culture (customers, employees, 
performance and accountability, innovation and change, and processes). Whilst I had 
categorised the Drivers from a resource-based view (Barney, 1991), I recognised that these 
five cultural orientations potentially overlapped with two of the resource-based types, 
raising the possibility that many of the Driver could be impacted by HC-Co’s culture. 
However, whilst this emphasised the areas in which culture may be expressing an 
influence, it did not explain how the culture came to be what it was. 
 Tangible Intangible Human 
Resource 
Customer    
Employee    
Performance & 
Accountability 
   
Innovation & Change    
Processes    
Fig. 18: Cultural Orientations vs Resource Types 
Moberly (2014) saw culture in terms of a garden; something will grow there regardless. 
What effect it had, and whether it was beneficial would depend on the balance of weeds 
and flowers, and how well the garden was tended. I recognised that, in reality, we had been 
tending our cultural ‘garden’ without realising it. For example, Pitts (2015) argued that an 
organisations values were an important influence on its corporate culture, noting that 
whilst many people saw the purpose of a company as being to make profits for its 
shareholders, others saw it as something more than this. The importance of profits was not 
lost on me, without which the company would cease to exist, but my wife and I also treated 
it as an extension of our own values; we always wanted HC-Co to be something that we 
were proud to be associated with. I could see that this approach to balancing profits with 
wider responsibilities was probably expressing itself in our choice of employee ownership, 
focusing on internally promoting, and focusing on doing the right thing for our clients 
ahead of considerations for profitability. I could see echoes of these policies in a number 
of the internal Participants responses which may be suggesting they were now part of the 
corporate culture of HC-Co. For example, the strong preference shown for internal 
promotions and concern that our clients’ interests were taken into account as part of the 
leadership succession process. However, would our values be a dominant influence after 
we had left? I wondered if, in the same way dominant scientific theories tend to change 
when their proponent was no longer around to defend them (Azoulay et al., 2019), the 
same might be true of what future values guided HC-Co’s corporate culture. If this were 
the case, it would be better that there was a gradual shift rather than a sudden shock, 
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which reinforced our intention to proactively involve the Leadership Candidates and others 
in how the corporate vision developed, see Transferring Knowledge.  
Whilst HC-Co’s culture and the values that influence that culture may change, I could see 
that culture might be a factor in the Leadership Candidates’ willingness to accept an 
outsider successor if none of them were ultimately able to take over. Part of the Company’s 
culture was that we strove to be a meritocracy. It was therefore understandable if a 
Leadership Candidate chose to stay ‘on message’ even if this varied to how they were 
actually thinking. I therefore suspected how accepting they were of an outsider successor 
was likely to be a balance of how strongly they felt committed to the Company’s culture vs 
any personal feelings they may have. This seemed to be an example of where HC-Co’s 
culture may be suppressing the Driver of playing games, see Perceived Fairness, but I 
recognised might also be mitigated by my wife and my continuing presence, and may 
therefore change after we had gone. 
I also wondered if culture might be a factor in how staff reacted to any possible loss of 
confidence in a successor. Johnson (2000) describes culture acting as a lens that influences 
debate and the action people take. In the sense of a CAS, the cultural lens could act like a 
filter or mental model (Senge, 1992) that structured how the members viewed the 
incoming messages. If the culture continued to be a positive one where people were 
supported by ‘telling them the truth kindly’, I could see any such crisis of confidence being 
managed without too much difficulty. However, if the commitment to open 
communications was lost this may not be the case, such as might conceivably happen after 
my wife and I left and were no longer around to defend our logic.  
I therefore wanted to consider to what extent we were the authors of HC-Co’s culture, and 
how robust it may be after our departure. My conclusions were two-fold. Our corporate 
culture had not so much been ‘designed’ as emerged as part of a socially-constructed 
‘garden’ Moberly (2014) that involved more than the conversations between my wife and 
I. Whilst our vision of how the Company should be was inevitably cascaded down through 
the conversations we had with our colleagues, I recognised those conversations had also 
modified this vision from time to time, such as when our ideas were impractical and which 
was only obvious to those working closer to our clients. ‘Our’ vision was therefore already 
collective in part, which I saw as another example of CAS at work (Holland, 2012), albeit 
our influence was almost certainly the greatest because of our salience. However, whilst I 
had already recognised that what had happened inadvertently in the past had to be done 
more proactively in the future if my wife and I were to be able to step away, see 
Transferring Knowledge above, my conclusion was that this also had implications for 
whether the logic of ‘our’ ideas was shared by others or would be replaced after we left. It 
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seemed beyond doubt that culture was playing an important part in how the leadership-
succession Drivers were expressing themselves, and so I next considered to what extent. 
The following figure illustrates the possible forces for an internal successor, with some 
possible ones included for against. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 19: Internal Successor Force-Field Analysis Example 
Adapted from Lewin (1933) 
(forces against are possible examples only) 
Lewin's (1933) Field Theory argued that for the status quo to change there would be factors 
pressing for the change, and others against. It seemed reasonable to assume the same 
would be true of how individual Drivers expressed themselves. For example, the 
preference for promoting internally seemed to be in part culturally influenced, but this 
policy created further promotion opportunities too. Self-interest was probably a factor 
also, as one of the internal Participants conceded. However, if personal ambition was a 
factor, I recognised it might be difficult to assess how powerful a force for change it was 
compared to culture, and that it probably varied by each individual concerned. 
I came to the perhaps obvious conclusion that the cultural lens through which our 
stakeholders looked at the Drivers was a significant moderating factor on whether they 
were moving the founder-leadership succession forward or backwards, and to what 
degree. However, as with much about founder-leadership succession, the number of 
factors at play made it possible to only to draw broad conclusions in this regard. However, 
of all the Drivers, culture was amongst the most significant because it had the potential to 
impact nearly every-other Driver. 
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5.4 COMPARISON TO EXISTING KNOWLEDGE  
After three iterations of the PAR cycle addressing the Research Question, I wanted to 
explore how our own research had supported or challenged the literature. I discussed 
above the overarching role of culture, which was not picked up on in the literature, and 
whilst the Participants’ contributions reinforced many of the findings in the literature, 
there were also other differences. 
5.4.1 Tangible-Resource Drivers 
I did not directly explore tangible-resource drivers with the Participants, as they related 
mainly to ownership transitions or leadership transitions were there are greater financial 
consequences than is the case with HC-Co’s. However, there was little to indicate that the 
findings of the literature would not apply to HC-Co in term of ownership-transition Drivers, 
risk appetite, and access to debt. However, the same was not true of intangible-resource 
Drivers. 
5.4.2 Intangible-Resource Drivers 
Whilst the Participants also reinforced the validity of many of the findings in the literature, 
there were some notable exceptions. The fact that we were seriously planning for our own 
leadership succession was inconsistent with the literature, but was also clearly specific to 
HC-Co. However, other factors were more generalisable. For example, the literature did 
not consider employees to be key stakeholders in the leadership-succession process, 
where our findings were clearly that they were. This did not appear to be for HC-Co specific 
reasons, but more that a successful leadership succession requires other to be prepared to 
follow their lead (Hollander, 1992). This Driver therefore seemed generalisable to other 
founder-leadership successions were the organisation had employees. The same was true 
for clients were the literature seemed to underplay their importance as stakeholders, 
whereas the Participants highlighted the reputational damage they could do. This may be 
explained by the greater power consumers have as a result of the proliferation of social 
media. 
Another intangible Driver that received widespread coverage in the literature was the role 
of family in any leadership succession, and which was not relevant to HC-Co because there 
were no family members in consideration to take over the leadership. Whilst I explored 
whether the findings might be useful as an analogy for how pseudo-family members might 
behave, i.e. long-serving employees, the wider point seemed to be that there were many 
SME leadership successions that did not have a family dimension. 28% of SME’s were not 
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family owned, and only 16% had a family member as the successor (Lomax et al., 2015). 
The literature therefore seemed to be neglecting this important area. 
A further intangible Driver that seemed important to me was strategy. This received no 
meaningful coverage in the literature but seemed to me to be of the essence when it came 
to leadership successions. Given that the CEO would be responsible for interpreting and 
delivering on the company’s strategy, the appointment of a CEO seemed a strategic event 
in itself. For example, Miller et al's (2003) highlighted that successors often radically 
changed the strategic direction of a company with often disastrous results, and I therefore 
felt this was an area that would benefit from greater focus and research. 
5.4.3 Human-Resource Drivers 
Save for the importance of employees and clients as stakeholders, discussed above, the 
Participants largely supported the findings of the literature. In particular, the importance 
of teamwork was underlined, and its various antecedents drawn out, such as perceived 
fairness, role clarity, as well as ensuring the successor was developed adequately. In fact, 
given that only the professional Participants would have had any experience of founder-
leadership succession, I was impressed by how many of the Driver areas the Participants 
covered, especially as only one was covered by a PP alone. 
5.5 PARTICIPANT CONTRIBUTIONS 
Turning to the Participants’ contributions, the table below shows which were covered in 
each iteration by each Participant type. 
I concluded that perhaps my first-iteration questions were more leading than I had 
intended, or perhaps the issues raised in the literature review were more intuitive than I 
had thought they were. The areas they did not cover I found less surprising, such as 
Governance which, save for the Professional Participants, they would have had little insight 
into. Other areas, such as Succession Planning, they were likely to have assumed were 
covered already, and whilst they may have been personally concerned with some of the 
Drivers identified under Stakeholder Salience, they perhaps did not have the distance from 
them to see them as Drivers. 
Whilst each of the Participants responded to all the questions, I was surprised that the 
Leadership Candidates’ comments were only quoteworthy on five issues. Apart from my 
wife, the Leadership Candidates were the most senior and experienced employees in the 
Company, and I had anticipated they would therefore have the most to say. Whilst this is 
a somewhat arbitrary measure, and subject to my own bias in selecting quotes, I did 
wonder if this indicated the Leadership Candidates were holding back. As they were the 
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key winners or losers of the FLC, perhaps they were taking a wait-and-see approach, or 
possibly they felt the spotlight on them and were suffering from a form of stage-fright. I 
concluded this was something to watch out for in the next iteration. I was also surprised 
by the number of contributions from the Staff Participants who, because of possible 
nerves, I had expected to make the least contributions, particularly as I was only able to 
interview two of them. However, it was not just who had made contributions that surprised 
me, but what some of those contributions were. 
Tangible-Resource Drivers Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3 
Capital    
Dividend Policy    
Ownership-Transition Drivers    
Risk Appetite    
Access to Debt    
Intangible-Resource 
Drivers 
   
Succession Planning    
Planning Failures MP, OP, PP, SP   
Firm vs Family Objectives    
Successor Selection    
Selection Criteria LC, MP, OP, PP, 
SP 
  
Selection Decision  LC, PP, SP  
Insider vs Outsider MP LC, MP, SP LC, MP 
Performance Management    
Task Completion MP   
Policies & Procedures LC, MP   
Governance  LC, MP, SP  
Strategy  LC, OP, PP, SP  
Human-Resource Drivers    
Stakeholder Salience    
Founder MP   
Successor    
Family    
Employee MP, OP, SP OP, MP, PP  
Client  MP, PP  
Founder-Successor Issues    
Relationship    
Letting Go PP LC, MP, OP, PP, SP  
Delegating  LC, MP, OP, SP, PP  
Workload MP, OP, PP LC, OP, SP  
Intimidation    
Over Dependence   LC, MP 
Transfer of Power MP, SP   
Successor Strategies    
Timing    
Successor Development    
Job Specification MP, SP   
Capabilities Development LC, MP, OP, PP   
Experience    
Transferring Knowledge LC, MP, OP, SP LC, MP, PP  
Teamwork MP, SP LC, MP, SP  
Managing Commitment    
Process Communications MP, OP, PP   
Perceived Fairness LC, SP LC, OP, SP, PP LC, MP 
Satisfaction MP, OP   
Founder Commitment LC, MP, PP LC, MP, PP  
Successor Commitment MP   
Employee Commitment MP, OP, SP OP, MP, PP LC, MP 
Clients Commitment MP, SP   
Bank Commitment LC, OP, PP   
Outsider Commitment MP, OP, PP   
Fig. 20: Working Analysis Framework – Phase Contributions 
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In the second iteration, the contributions of the Management Participant’s and OP were 
broadly consistent in quantity with the first iteration, but the formerly shy Leadership 
Candidates were now the largest contributors, with the Professional Participants’ and Staff 
Participants’ contributions increasing markedly also. Whilst I recognised I should not read 
too-much into what was an arbitrary measure, which was also subject to my own bias in 
selecting quotes, these changes seemed interesting.  
I had noted in the first iteration that I would look out for the quality and quantity of the 
Leadership Candidates’ contributions, and had made no conscious intervention in this 
regard, but their contribution was up four-fold. Did they need the first iteration to settle 
their nerves, or was there something about the second iteration that played to their 
strengths? The first iteration asked broad questions to gather everyone’s unvarnished 
views, whereas the second iteration asked specific questions about specific issues. I did 
wonder in the first iteration whether this particular group were looking for too-much 
meaning in the questions, whereas the specificity of this iteration’s questions left less room 
for ambiguity, which perhaps let their greater experience and confidence shine through. 
The Management Participants’ and Owner Participant’s contributions remained broadly 
consistent with iteration-one, but the Professional Participants’ more-than doubled, and 
the Staff Participants’ nearly doubled. I wondered if in both cases they felt better able to 
contribute when faced with more specific questions too. With all of the above, I also 
recognised that it was likely conversations would have been going on within each CAS, 
which would in turn influence the responses of the various Participants, save for the 
Professional Participants who almost certainly had no contact with the other Participants. 
I was also pleased to note that none of the CAS appeared to have modified their boundary 
rules (Holland, 2012) to exclude cooperation with my thesis; in fact all the Participants, 
save for one Staff Participant, remained engaged with, and enthusiastic about the process, 
despite the seventeen-month gap between iterations one and two. 
During this gap I had kept the Participants informed that I was having challenges 
progressing with this thesis, and I was concerned as to what impact this might have on their 
contribution. However, they could see the parallel employee-ownership transition 
continuing uninterrupted, along with the development of the Leadership Candidates. I 
therefore believed they saw this delay as nothing more than technical challenges I was 
having personally, rather than as a lack of commitment to the founder-leadership 
succession process. In hindsight, I also wonder if the pause was beneficial as it allowed the 
Participants to take a longer-term view of the founder-leadership succession process than 
three, quick PAR iterations would have provided. 
Notwithstanding this time delay, there were also some interesting differences as to where 
each group contributed. For example, I had expected the Leadership Candidates to be more 
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vocal on outsider-successor resistance, as this was a possible threat to one or all of them 
being appointed to the leadership roles, but they were silent; although I had previously 
raised the possibility that a Management Participant was voicing a ‘warning’ on their, or 
their own behalf. However, I also considered whether this was a recognition that they were 
in a process towards making them the new leaders, and which they felt was going well. 
Why would they feel threatened? 
One area where the Staff Participants were less vocal was in regard to commitment, save 
for their own and the clients. This did not surprise me as they would naturally look to their 
own interests and, being a career that attracts people who are vocationally motivated, they 
would also want to make sure the people they cared about were looked after. Conversely, 
I found it easy to believe that they had assumed the commitment of the founders, as we 
had started the process, and the presumed successors, as they were going through the 
development process. It was also possible that this was an issue they paid little attention 
to as their roles were customer-facing rather than concerned with ensuring the 
foundations of the Company remained in place. 
The rest of the areas were covered by most of the Participant groups, but I did wonder if 
there were some Company-wide contextual issues that were influencing Participants’ 
responses. One obvious one was that the founder-leadership succession process was the 
subject of this thesis, which may have contributed to all classes of Participant commenting 
on the faith, possibly overconfidence, they had in the process,. Another was culture. There 
had been a number of comments, particularly in regard to appointing insider successors, 
to the effect that ‘this is what the Company does’, indicating that they did not see HC-Co 
as being just like any other company. There were other comments indicating Participants 
may also have a high level of trust in my wife and myself, and each other. If this was more 
than my bias towards seeing things that were flattering to me (Lakshman, 2008), I 
wondered whether a cultural dimension may be having a wider cultural influence on the 
Drivers and, if so, would this persist after our departure? 
What became obvious in the forum was that the Leadership Candidates and, to a lesser 
extent, the Management Participants felt comfortable. They were used to sitting in 
meetings with me and each other and sharing their view openly. Typically, the Leadership 
Candidates would speak first, with the Management Participants adding their points next, 
but I failed in making the Staff Participant sufficiently comfortable, and which I discussed 
further in section 6.2. 
  
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
 Discussion - Page 124 of 161 
 
Iteration Areas Addressed LC MP OP PP SP 
One 26 5 (19%) 19 (73%) 10 (38%) 8 (31%) 9 (35%) 
Two 16 13 (81%) 11 (69%) 6 (38%) 11 (69%) 9 (56%) 
Three 5 5 (100%) 4 (80%) N/A N/A 0 (0%) 
Fig. 21: Iteration Quotes by Source 
Another issue raised earlier was whether the insider Participants were placing too-much 
confidence in my wife and me. A number of responses seemed to be strongly supportive 
of the decisions my wife and I had made to date, which appeared to be sincere, but which 
I recognised may also have had other motivations such as, caution about speaking truth to 
power, or that the Participants did not want to unsettle a process that had delivered 
decisions they were happy with. However, it also indicated the Participants may be putting 
too-much faith in us. For example, on a number of issues, the insider Participants seemed 
to have great faith that my wife and I had a plan to deal with it, whether it was financial 
risk, strategy, or successor selection. The Participants were also generally in favour of any 
decisions regarding our successors remaining with my wife and me rather than being put 
out to third parties. Further, a number of the Participants seemed to be of the opinion that 
my wife and I had a robust plan that we would deliver on, and that we had considered and 
mitigated all relevant risks.  
Whilst confidence in fellow team members was an important part of team cohesion, and 
the fact that this matter was the subject of a thesis suggested more than casual 
consideration had been put into any planning, overreliance on individuals can clearly be 
problematic. If their planning or decision making was sub-optimal, issues may remain 
unaddressed, and if they were lost to the Company, they may leave a gap that was hard to 
fill. I therefore wanted to explore with the Participants whether putting too much faith in 
my wife and me was a Driver. 
5.6 ACTION RESEARCHER LEARNING 
Working through the PAR cycles was a particularly interesting experience for me as I was 
having to juggle a number of hats. I was the founder part of the leadership succession, and 
one of the two current owners where I frequently had to consider conflicts of interest with 
my other roles. I was the lead researcher, which meant I had a greater overview than the 
other Participants, and a more detailed knowledge of the literature. I was also a Participant, 
which meant often examining my own thinking and motivation as founder and owner. This 
role duality was often challenging and did lead me to a number of learning opportunities. 
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One example was I was frequently reflecting on my own challenges as an executive to 
transfer the necessary knowledge in order for my successor to be able to do undertake the 
role. I found it relatively easy to stand back and be objective about the performance of 
others, but here was a Driver that was my key responsibility, and which was not going 
smoothly. I found this less comfortable initially to find out my approach was intuitive rather 
than explicitly understood to me, but then found it a cathartic experience to look at myself 
in the third person. This enabled me to better see how I fitted in the overall picture, 
including where I may be helping or hindering the process. It also helped me to identify 
potential remedial actions for testing and reflecting upon. 
I also found myself confronting my own bias. What I found was that this was not something 
I could easily switch off, and in many ways became compounded by the extra insights and 
thinking skills undertaking the research gave me. It also led to a form of impatience that 
people were not seeing things that were clearer to me, forgetting the time it had taken for 
me to see things this way. Trying to unwind this perspective to be better able to see 
through the eyes of my colleagues was therefore an ongoing issue for me, and which on a 
number of occasions led me to the humbling conclusion that my perspective was flawed. 
I also became aware of the risk this more experienced perspective gave me. What became 
apparent in the discussions with the insider Participants was how much faith they were 
putting in my wife and me in regard to both the leadership and ownership transitions. 
Human nature is such that we tend to subconsciously use the evidence to support our own 
interests (Van Dijk et al., 2004). Being aware of this bias and guarding against therefore 
became more important given that my colleagues did not feel currently equal to 
challenging me in these two areas. Something I recognised was likely to change as their 
confidence and competence grew but may then undermine trust if they perceived I had 
acted improperly. 
At the start I also anticipated superior access to some types of information through my 
position as founder, but inferior access to others, such as what people’s unvarnished 
thoughts might be. I concluded my research believing this to be true but came to two 
further realisations. There was normally abductive evidence (Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011) to 
suggest when people’s expressed views were substantially different to their actual views, 
such as they were far more likely to follow through when there was a congruency between 
the two (Comfort et al., 2001).  This was a gap that human nature meant would never be 
fully closed, such as with the preference for an insider successor, but it was a clue to focus 
on the issues that might cause the gap in the first place, such as a misalignment of goals or 
values (Sosik et al., 2009). 
I was also particularly aware of the tension that existed between my two roles as Lead 
Researcher and founder. As Lead Researcher I was often reflecting on issues to do with the 
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founder-leadership succession, which involved me considering my own interests as 
founder against those of the other stakeholders. Peeling back the layers of self-selection 
bias (James, 2006) was both challenging and cathartic, although it is difficult to know how 
many layers may be left. I found it enlightening to proactively try and see what might be in 
my own ‘unknown’ window (Schein, 2009), as well as helping my colleagues to explore 
theirs when they were repeatedly failing to get the results they wanted. I also recognised 
a change in me that meant this tension between my academic and executive thinking 
would continue after this DBA was finished as it had now become a habit. Continuing to 
blend an academic approach with my professional practice was therefore bound to 
uncover further incongruencies in the way I went about things.  
 Known to Self Not Known to Self 
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Not Known to Others 
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Unknown 
Fig. 22: Johari’s Windows 
Schein (2009)  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
My conclusions chapters considered how effective my research approach had been in 
addressing the Research Question, what impact the whole DBA process had on my 
professional and organisation’s practice, before concluding with what further research I 
considered might be helpful. 
6.2 RESEARCH APPROACH & EFFECTIVENESS 
The choice of PAR as a research approach was in some ways a natural evolution of the 
University of Liverpool’s DBA process, which emphasised this particular approach in the 
early stages of study. However, as I argued in the Methodology section, I felt it was also 
the right approach to take at the start of the research phases, and which was also my 
opinion at the end; albeit I would have done some things differently. 
In regard to effectiveness, Fetterman (2015) suggested ten factors that can help to assess 
this. In regard to whether it had brought about an improvement, the premise of the 
research was to understand the Research Question and how the Drivers of founder-
leadership succession applied to HC-Co, which I felt we had made good progress towards. 
I also felt that the PAR approach had meaningfully promoted community ownership, both 
through the direct involvement of Participants, but also through their role as a conduit to 
and from their colleagues. This in turn ensured there was a democratic participation in the 
process. The Research Question itself was focused on a socially just cause, the preservation 
of the Company and the benefits it brought to various stakeholders, and it had promoted 
community knowledge about the Company too. I also felt the PAR process was rigorous in 
taking an evidenced-based approach, built organisational capacity through the 
development of PAR as a skill that could be applied in other areas, which in turn 
contributed to organizational learning. However, part of this organisational learning was 
how we might use PAR better in future. 
For example, I had selected the Participants on the basis of achieving a fair representation 
from each of the services, and a number of different levels within the company (staff, 
managers, Leadership Candidates and my wife). In the one-on-one conversations I think 
this worked well, but not so in the forums. Once there was a hierarchy of people in the 
room, some voices were inevitably lost, and I discuss below some possible solutions. 
As the Lead Researcher, I had taken the approach that it was my role to undertake the 
planning, observation, and reflection stages on my own, reserving the action stages for 
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working with the Participants. In reality, this included some reflection on the questions I 
had from the previous iteration with the Participants, but I was also aware that this meant 
we were potentially missing some useful insights. The answer was not obvious to me as 
some of the Participants would have found it very hard to engage with the academic 
language of many of the articles, and most would have struggled to find the time. Perhaps 
providing a clear-English summary might have been a useful contribution. I also wondered 
whether a discussion-board approach might have allowed them to join in with the 
planning, observation and reflection stages in a way that fitted in with their schedules and 
experience, whilst providing a wider perspective on the issues being considered, although 
this also had its own problems. In order to maximise the Participants’ contributions, these 
were kept confidential to me as the Lead Researcher but would have had to be opened up 
to all Participants if they were to reflect on the detail of the conversations as part of the 
PAR process; rather than just some of the issues raised. Apart from reducing 
confidentiality, it might also have had the effect to reduce the quality of the contributions 
in the first place as Participants may have filtered more of what they said if they knew 
others would read it. Perhaps the solution would have been, in the same way that the 
iteration questions were a summary of the collective contributions of the Participants, to 
share an anonymised version of everything said for collective reflection. I felt I could only 
be sure by experimenting on further PAR projects. 
6.3 PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
Regarding my professional practice, there were a number of areas where I felt I had 
developed. For example, I recognised that the same triple-loop learning approach (Raelin, 
2009) I recommended to the Leadership Candidates in order to improve their ability to 
think strategically was also impacting how I approached my work. Previously, I would apply 
single-loop feedback to ask whether the actions we were taking were effective in achieving 
the desired target and would only tend to resort to double-loop feedback when there was 
a problem, or the target was particularly novel. I did undertake triple-loop thinking as part 
of larger-scale strategic reviews, or when there was an existential challenge to the 
Company. However, I now found that I was far-more frequently proactively using a triple-
loop approach to guide my own work and help me to coach others. I would ask questions 
in regard to whether the goal was still appropriate, were there any mediating factors such 
as access to resources, people factors such as misaligned goals or values, what might the 
unintended consequences of any action be, and whether there were any nuances as to 
how the action should be approached and monitored. These considerations would then 
influence my choice of theoretical approach, how the action was applied, and how much 
attention I paid to the process. 
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Fig. 23: Proactive Triple-Loop Feedback 
Adapted from Raelin (2009) 
I found this approach, combined with the whole DBA process, had also modified my mental 
model (Senge, 1992) of how organisations function, and in particular the role of culture 
and CAS. Previously I presumed that, when things did not go according to plan, there was 
often a social element at work (Fairhurst and Grant, 2010); I may have trodden on some 
sensibilities I was either unaware of or had forgotten about. However, I now saw this 
socially-constructed element as not being asleep until prodded, but happening all the time 
as part of the ever-changing culture of the Company, and that this culture was to a large 
part formed by the conversations that took place within the various CAS in and around the 
Company (Holland, 2012). The two insights I drew from this were the importance of taking 
Company culture seriously as a mediating factor that can kill or cure most initiatives, and 
also considering it prior to action, a pre-mortem (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016), rather than 
as part of a post-mortem when things were going wrong. 
In terms of this research, I saw evidence that the Company’s culture was mediating how a 
number of Drivers were playing out. For example, the game playing (Blumentritt et al., 
2012) that might be expected amongst the Leadership Candidates was very mooted, and 
arguments for an internal successor amongst the Participants seemed to be more 
influenced by culture than self-interest. 
6.4 ORGANISATIONAL PRACTICE 
I next considered how the DBA process had impacted my organisation’s practice from the 
perspectives of applying the PAR process in future, and what the key implications had been 
for HC-Co. 
Triple-Loop Feedback 
Why this target? Mediating factors? People factors? Unintended consequences? 
Double-Loop Feedback 
Is this the best theoretical approach? 
Single-Loop Feedback 
Is the action effective? 
Theory Action Goal 
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6.4.1 Application of PAR 
Having gone through the PAR iterations, I grew to appreciate how powerful it was at 
dealing with complex problems, but my reflections above also indicated where 
improvements could be made. 
As discussed in section 6.2, I planned to pay more attention to ensuring that all voices 
were heard. This may mean that any forum approach needed to bolster the numbers 
of more junior staff in the hope they collectively felt more able to speak out, but I 
recognised it may be necessary to explore other approaches to forum type meetings 
if this proved ineffective. 
I would also consider how the whole of the PAR process could be made more 
democratic, which inevitably meant giving participants better access to the data; 
whether from the literature review or each-other’s contributions. Access to the 
literature review data had its own challenges as academic knowledge tended to be 
presented in a form that non-academics find inaccessible but could perhaps be dealt 
with by way of plain-English summaries. However, giving better access to each-
other’s contributions raised questions of confidentiality. Perhaps this could be dealt 
with by lowering expectations in regard to what is confidential, but which may impact 
the quality of what people are prepared to share or use anonymised forms of sharing. 
I could see that both might have their challenges but, in the same way that PAR looks 
to find a solution through trial and error, I anticipated that subsequent PAR projects 
would provide further insights as to how any problems could be better overcome. 
6.4.2 Implications for HC-Co 
Notwithstanding that I could see ways to implement PAR projects more effectively in 
future, I felt this project had already had a positive impact on HC-Co, including revealing a 
number of areas in which to pursue further enquiries. 
For example, when I had considered whether I would have problems letting go, I had seen 
myself as largely separate from the Company. However, the focus on culture had made me 
aware that, in this sense at least, it was very personal to me. I wanted the Company to 
reflect my values and had probably therefore put far greater emphasis into its culture than 
I had realised. My reflections on the various Drivers had also made me realise the role that 
culture played in how they impacted the founder-leadership succession, and quite how 
strong HC-Co’s culture was. It was therefore a key area to understand better. 
It also became clear towards the end of the research that, whilst the management team 
felt happy to challenge me on areas where they felt they had a degree of expertise, this 
was not the case in regard to founder-leadership succession, or the accompanying 
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employee-ownership transition. In part this was because these were subjects they knew 
little about, but also because they felt somewhat intimidated by the fact I was studying for 
a doctorate. This created two substantial risks to my mind: that they might never become 
expert in these two areas, meaning they would be forever dependent on my wife and me 
to understand the nuances of them, and; founder-leadership succession and the employee-
ownership transition processes would be sub-optimal for not having the benefit of their 
full contributions. I felt this was therefore an important area to address more fully. 
In regard to how optimal the founder-leadership succession could be, a key plank of our 
plan was for the Leadership Candidates to develop sufficiently to be able to take over the 
leadership, but what if one or all of them failed to cross the finishing line? It was possible 
that either their own confidence and competence thresholds were insufficient for them to 
feel happy, or some other key stakeholders’ thresholds were not passed in this regard; such 
as my wife and mine, the staff’s, or the bank’s. I suspected the impact would vary 
depending on the circumstances. For example, where everyone agreed, including the 
Leadership Candidates, that they had been given every opportunity but it was not for them, 
there would be disappointment but the aftershocks were likely to be mitigated by the 
degree to which the process was perceived to be fair to everyone concerned (Ramos et al., 
2014). However, where either the Leadership Candidates were not seen as being given a 
fair chance, or if there was a difference of opinion as to their readiness to take over, the 
aftershocks could be considerably greater. This therefore seemed to be a particularly 
important Driver to monitor to ensure everyone’s goals and expectations remained closely 
aligned. 
Further, I now had a far better understanding of when my wife and I might help or hinder 
the founder-leadership succession too, but I also recognised that self-selection bias (James, 
2006) meant we were at risk of viewing these issues as ‘dealt with’. I therefore believed 
this would remain a risk until our colleagues had developed their own competence and 
confidence in the founder-leadership succession process and felt empowered to speak out. 
My conclusion was that Drivers that related to the founder should receive particular 
attention to uncover any bias on our part that may emerge, or groupthink as a whole 
(Chevalier & Buckles, 2013). 
Finally, the major implication for HC-Co was that this thesis had highlighted a number of 
Drivers that were likely to impact the founder-leadership succession, and for which plans 
therefore needed to be made as to how these should be monitored and managed. A 
number already were being put into action. 
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6.5 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research undertaken as part of this thesis was in specific regard to the Drivers of 
leadership succession and how they were relevant to HC-Co. As part of the research a large 
number of potential Drivers were identified from both the literature and the Participatory 
Action Research process which highlighted a number of gaps, discussed in Comparison to 
Existing Knowledge, above: 
Further research would be helpful to identify to what extent these inconsistencies 
were specific to HC-Co, or whether they were generalisable to other organisations. 
For example, were employees stakeholders in leadership successions generally, or 
was this this idiosyncratic to HC-Co. 
Another issue raised as part of the research was to what extent did culture mitigate 
the way leadership-succession Drivers expressed themselves. By its nature, corporate 
culture is unique to each organisation, but it would be helpful to better understand 
both the mechanisms by which culture expressed its influence and, given the close 
connection between founders and their companies’ cultures, to what extent the 
culture may change as part of the succession process. 
The orientation of much of the literature was towards family leadership successions, 
whereas 72% of SME’s were family owned and controlled in the first generation,  but 
only 16% were controlled by a family member if they survived to the second 
generation (Lomax et al., 2015). A great deal of successors were therefore not family 
members, and further specific research that. Addressed non-family successions, 
whether the company was family owned or not, would be helpful to the significant 
number of companies in this category. 
6.6 FINAL REFLECTIONS 
There were three final thoughts I reached, the first being to do with the PAR process, the 
second to do with the leadership and ownership transition, and the third in regard to the 
Participants and their colleagues. 
My overall conclusion was that the PAR process was a powerful way to address complex 
challenges, and whilst I had learnt a great deal through the iterations of this PAR process, I 
recognised that it was in itself an iteration in my wider PAR learning experience. The lessons 
I learned from this experience I would take forward to my next PAR projects, and I would 
in turn learn from them. 
This thesis’s focus was to specifically address the Research Question, which I felt we had 
made significant progress towards understanding the challenge ahead, but I was also left 
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with a strong sense of how connected this and the employee-ownership transition were. 
Whilst it was possible to compartmentalise the founder-leadership succession for this 
research, I suspected my colleagues largely saw it and the employee-ownership transition 
as one-and-the same, and it would therefore be difficult to achieve success in one without 
the other. 
In the same way that there was a strong connection between the founder-leadership 
succession and employee-ownership transition, the same was also true of the insider 
Participants and their work colleagues. Whilst this had been by design, the Participants 
were meant to be representative, they not only consistently spoke up for themselves and 
their colleagues, but those colleagues also maintained an interest in this research 
throughout. I started the thesis by acknowledging the invaluable contribution that all the 
Participants made, and whilst I felt I should reaffirm my gratitude to the Participants, both 
internal and external, I wanted to also recognise and thank all my colleagues for not only 
their indirect contributions to this thesis, but to the founder-leadership succession and 
employee-ownership transition also. 
 
THE END J
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7 APPENDICES 
7.1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
Drivers Any factor that may impact a founder-leadership succession, whether 
positively or negatively 
HC-Co A pseudonym for the company which is the subject of the thesis 
Lead Researcher Nick Bruce who, with his wife, owns HC-Co 
MP Management Participant 
OP Owner Participant 
PAR Participatory Action Research 
Participants Participant researchers (see front page) 
PP Professional Participant 
SME Small to Medium-Sized Enterprises. 
SP Staff Participant 
Supervisor Dr. Meera Sarma, who was appointed by the University of Liverpool to 
oversee this research 
WAF Working Analysis Framework 
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7.2 PARTICIPANT DOCUMENTS 
7.2.1 Invitation Email to Participants 
Dear [Name] 
Succession planning is an important issue for all companies and particularly when it comes 
to replacing the founders. Whilst there are no immediate plans for this to happen, research 
shows that this can be a vulnerable time for companies. Planning is therefore required to 
ensure there is an effective transition plan for when the time comes. This question is being 
considered now because preparation time is likely to be needed to get the future leader, 
or leaders, and the company ready. 
In order for the transition plan to be as robust as possible it is important that key groups of 
people contribute to this planning process. As a member of one of those groups, this email 
is to invite you to take part in a study to explore this issue. Whilst your participation is 
entirely voluntary, it is hoped you will take part for the valuable contribution your 
perspective is likely to bring. To ensure you have the necessary information to make an 
informed decision in this regard I have attached a Participants Information Sheet. 
If you have any questions please ask, but otherwise I very much hope you will feel able to 
contribute to the study in which case you will be asked to sign the attached Participant 
Consent Form. 
When you have had time to consider the above and ask any questions, would you please 
let me know whether or not you would like to take part by responding to this email. It 
would be helpful to have your response by [DATE] so other potential participants can be 
approached in good time if you decide not to take part. 
Kind regards 
Nick 
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7.2.2 Participant Information Sheet 
Title of Study 
Making a success of succession: Mitigating the inherent risks SME’s face when replacing 
their founders1 
Version number and date: Version 1 dated 10th February 2016 
Invitation paragraph 
This document is intended to help you make an informed decision in regard to an invitation 
for you to take part in a study that focuses on the future leadership of [HC-Co]. It is being 
done under the supervision of the University of Liverpool as part of a management degree 
Nick Bruce, a director and co-owner of [HC-Co], is undertaking. This Participants 
Information Sheet sets out what this study hopes to achieve, who is being invited to take 
part and other details as to how the study will be conducted. Please take the time to read 
it. Should you have any questions please address them to Nick either by telephone (020 
3405 2120) or email (nick.bruce@online.liverpool.ac.uk) who will be happy to respond. 
Whilst Nick has an executive role within [HC-Co] and this specifically addressed his 
succession in this role, this research is being carried out in his role as a student at the 
University of Liverpool. Whilst he therefore has an interest in the outcome of this research, 
there are no known conflicts of interest. 
What is the purpose of the study 
99% of the UK economy is made up of small to medium sized enterprises, more normally 
known as SME’s, with the majority of these being family owned. Unfortunately, 70% of 
these firms will typically go out of business whilst trying to transition from the original 
owners to the next generation. One approach [HC-Co] is taking to mitigate this risk is to 
start transitioning to employee ownership, but the issue of who will lead the company once 
[the owners] leave has yet to be resolved. The purpose of this study is therefore to identify 
how best to address this. 
Why have I been chosen to take part 
There are a number of people who are likely to have valuable contributions to make to this 
research, including potential successors, non-successor managers, employees and key 
professionals. You may have been chosen as part of a larger group where there are too 
 
1 The title of the thesis changed during the research phases. 
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many potential participants from any one group to interview personally, or you may have 
a unique perspective that it is important the research addresses.  
Do I have to take part 
No one has to take part and there will be absolutely no adverse consequences for anyone 
who chooses not to. Choosing to take part will involve completing questionnaires and one-
to-one interviews on a strictly confidential basis, and as part of focus groups where you will 
be asked to respect the confidentiality of each participant’s contribution. Whilst it is hoped 
you will take part, to do so is entirely voluntary.  
If you do choose to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form to this effect. 
What will happen if I take part 
The study will follow a number of phases starting with Nick undertaking a review of 
academic articles addressing how other organisations have approached this challenge, 
what problems they came across and how they resolved them. Internal [HC-Co] documents 
that may have a bearing on the transition challenge may also be reviewed. 
This will then form the basis for discussions with focus groups and individual participants 
along with surveys to try to identify how best this knowledge can be applied to [HC-Co] 
own unique situation. Nick will conduct all these personally. 
This will then lead to a plan that addresses what the best timing is and how the [HC-Co] 
team might implement the leadership transition when the time comes. 
To ensure your views remain confidential the final report will not cite any names and will 
remove any other details that may give away the identity of the person. However, you may 
opt to have your contribution recognised by being listed as a contributor to the research. 
It is difficult to give an exact estimate of how much of your time this process may take as it 
will in part depend on which group you are chosen from, and the direction any interviews 
or focus groups take. For external participants the involvement is likely to be limited to two 
or three interviews, and for internal participants a similar number of interviews 
supplemented by focus groups and questionnaires. Each session is likely to take between 
thirty to ninety minutes of your time. 
Expenses and/or payments 
As your contribution would voluntary and to maintain the integrity of the research, no 
payments will be made for your contribution. If you are an employee of [HC-Co] interviews 
and focus groups may take place whilst you are at work when you will be being paid, but 
no payments will be made for any contributions made outside of your working hours. 
Are there any benefits to taking part 
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Everyone being consulted has an interest in the success of [HC-Co], whether as an 
employee, customer or supplier. It is hoped that, by taking part, you will be contributing to 
the future success of [HC-Co] by helping to form a robust succession plan. You might also 
find it an interesting process through learning more about how others have approached 
this challenge, and directly contributing to how [HC-Co] will approach this process. 
What if I am unhappy or there is a problem 
Any concerns you may have with taking part can be put to Nick. If he is unable to resolve 
them or for any reason, or you feel uncomfortable discussing the matter with him, you may 
contact the University of Liverpool directly using the following details: 
Call (USA) 001-612-312-1210 or email liverpoolethics@ohecampus.com 
Will your participation be kept confidential 
As specified above, your views will be kept confidential but the fact you are participating 
may be evident to others, such as co-focus group participants, and you may be observed 
having conversations with Nick if they take part on company premises. If you are concerned 
about this, arrangements will be made for interviews to be conducted somewhere more 
private, and taking part in focus groups will be discretionary. Any physical data gathered as 
part of this study will be kept in a locked cabinet, and any electronic data will be secured 
through encryption and two-stage access verification. 
However, as the outcome of the process will be a joint effort by all concerned you may 
wish to be acknowledged for your contribution. Anyone taking part will therefore have the 
option to have his or her name added as a contributor to the final report. 
What will happen as a result of the study 
There are two primary anticipated outcomes to this study being a report that will set out 
an action plan to manage the leadership succession process, including identifying the 
appropriate timing. The combination of academic articles on founder succession and the 
data arising from discussions with, and inputs from all the participants will be the principal 
foundation to developing this action plan. The report that follows will also form the final 
submission to the University of Liverpool in regard to Nick being considered for a Doctorate 
of Business Administration. 
What will happen if I want to stop taking part 
Participants may withdraw from the study at any time without consequence. You may also 
ask that any data or views you have contributed to the study be destroyed, and any that 
have been contributed as part of a group process, such as focus groups, will be disregarded 
by the study. 
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Who you can contact if you have further questions 
Please contact Nick on 020 3405 2120 or email him at nick.bruce@online.liverpool.ac.uk 
7.2.3 Participant Informed Consent Form 
Research Project 
Making a Success of Succession: Mitigating the inherent risks SME’s face when replacing 
their founders 
Researchers 
Nick Bruce (Student), Dr David Higgins (Supervisor) 
 Please initial box 
I confirm that I have read and have understood the information sheet 
dated 10th February 2016 for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. 
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, and without my rights 
being affected. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular 
question or questions, I am free to decline. 
 
 
I understand that, under the Data Protection Act, I can at any time ask 
for access to the information I provide and request for the destruction 
of that information if I wish, prior to anonymisation. 
 
 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to 
my anonymised responses. 
 
 
The methodology used in this research is Participatory Action 
Research, which is a collaborative process between the student 
researcher and participants. No participants’ name will be linked with 
the research materials, and you will not be identified or identifiable in 
the report or the reports that result from the research. However, you 
may opt to have your contribution acknowledge as a contributor by 
ticking the box below. This consent may be withdrawn at any time up 
until the publication of the report. 
 
 
I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future 
research. 
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I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
Please initial this box if you are happy for any meetings and discussions 
you have as a participant in this study to be electronically recorded to 
aid subsequent consideration by the Researchers. You will still be able 
to take part in the study even if you prefer not to have these meeting 
and discussions recorded. You may change this consent at any time. 
 
 
 
Please initial this box if you would like your name to appear in the final 
report as a contributor; you may change this consent at any time. 
 
 
  
Participant’s Name  Date  Signature 
 
Student Researcher’s Name 
 
Date  Signature 
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7.3 EMPLOYEE-OWNERSHIP TRANSITION 
After two years of consultation, the Company entered an employee-ownership process on 
1st June 2014. By working harder and smarter, it was anticipated the staff would be able to 
generate additional profits, half of which would go towards ‘earning’ them half the 
Company based on an inflation adjusted 2014 valuation. This was to be done in two parts: 
first the trading side of HC-Co; and then the property side. The first part was scheduled to 
complete in ten years and was on target at the time of writing.  
  
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
  Appendices - Page 142 of 161 
7.4 PAR ITERATION QUESTIONS 
7.4.1 First-Iteration Questions Script 
Introduction 
This is conversation one of our research so I want to start by giving you some context for 
the conversations, so you know what to expect. It’s all about making a success of leadership 
succession. 
The Company is approaching a crossroads where the leadership baton will be passed. 
However, 70% of companies drop the baton when they're doing this and fail. We want to 
make sure that we are part of the 30% that succeed. This first conversation is to capture 
your unvarnished thoughts in this regard. We're then going to have a second conversation 
in a few weeks to look at the academic research that has been done on the subject and 
discuss how it might apply to us. The third conversation will be about how we can bring it 
all together. 
The whole process is confidential. Nothing you say will be shared with anyone else save 
possibly my DBA supervisor in Liverpool. Anything that you do say will only be used in 
anonymised forms that can't be traced back to you. People who haven't gone through the 
process may be interested to learn about it. By all means discuss the process with them. 
However, please don't discuss your input as we are trying to capture people's individual 
input rather than a collective one. 
Finally, this is a general conversation rather than an interview. Therefore, if you want to 
ask questions please do. I have some questions to ask of a general nature to get the 
conversation going, but we can take the conversation wherever we like. 
Questions: 
i. What does leadership succession or, to put it another way, what does appointing 
a new leader or leadership team mean to you both generally and in regard to the 
Company? 
ii. What do you see as the key objectives, or what are those things we need to 
achieve in order for the process to be successful? 
iii. What are the stumbling blocks we should try and avoid? In other words, what 
might go wrong? 
iv. Are there opportunities that may be created that we should take advantage of? 
v. What skills or capabilities should the new leader or leadership team have? 
vi. Who else do we need to consider and what are their needs during this process? 
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7.4.2 Second-Iteration Questions Script 
Questions marked with an * were not put to outsider Participants as they would have no 
knowledge of the issue raised. 
Introduction 
This conversation is on the same basis as the first one and is covered by the same 
confidentiality agreement. Everything remains private. I am recording the conversation to 
help my subsequent analysis, but this too will remain private. So please feel free to speak 
your mind. 
You may find that a number of these questions are outside your immediate comfort zone, 
but which are being asked because they are important to the leadership succession. 
Bearing in mind that these are being asked in confidence and under the cover of the 
University of Liverpool’s code of ethics, I hope you will feel able to answer candidly, 
particularly where they relate to me. I promise there will be no adverse consequences to 
doing so, and potentially some very helpful ones. 
Questions: 
i. A key step in any founder leadership succession is the founder’s ability to let go. 
I have recognised that, for me, a key factor is knowing I was handing control to a 
‘safe pair of hands’. However, this is rather vague. What do you feel qualifies 
someone or a team as a safe pair of hands in this regard? 
ii. Another risk is the founder not letting go enough and becoming a back-seat 
driver. This is often a factor when post-succession companies fail. In raising this I 
recognise it may be a difficult issue for some Participants to address. They would 
only be human if they were reluctant to speak out, but to hold back risks the 
Company’s failure. With this in mind, I hope you will feel free to share any 
concerns or observations you may have in this regard. 
iii. Another potentially difficult but important question relates to the founder’s 
ability to delegate. The literature suggests this may not happen effectively when 
they are perfectionists, leading to a failed succession. How much of an issue do 
you think this is within our leadership succession? 
iv. The company-founder’s commitment is identified as a major Driver in the 
literature, but was only commented on by a few Participants, although one 
thought it was important throughout the whole process. What are your thoughts 
in regard to this issue? 
v. Much of the research focused on the behaviour of family members and, whilst 
our Company is currently family owned, there are no other family members to 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Founder Leadership Succession in Family-Owned SME’s: A Case of HC-Co – Submitted 12th April 2019 
  Appendices - Page 144 of 161 
consider in regard to leadership succession. My question therefore is should this 
research be ignored or is it relevant for us too? In other words, are we seeing the 
actions cited in the literature from family members amongst our colleagues in 
regard to the leadership succession? Examples of how families can behave 
include: 
vi. Giving and withholding support for the successor/s, either covertly or overtly, 
based on whether: 
vii. They got a ‘fair deal’ personally; 
viii. They had clarity over roles and responsibilities; 
ix. Personal likes and animosities; 
x. Forming self-interest groups; 
xi. Potential successor candidates not stepping forward or giving up through lack of 
support, but also; 
xii. Family members disagreeing in private but keeping a uniform voice in public. 
xiii. The literature review did not put forward any arguments for clients being 
considered key stakeholders, but a number of the Participants did. My instinct is 
that they were rightly highlighting the moral responsibility the Company has to 
its clients, but my conclusion was that, in order to be a Driver, clients either had 
to be able to significantly influence or prevent the leadership succession process. 
What are your thoughts? 
xiv. A number of Participants also identified the staff as key stakeholders, whereas 
the literature did not. Do they hold a similar status to clients where the Company 
perhaps has a moral responsibility, but they have insufficient power to 
meaningfully prevent or change the succession plan, or do you have another 
view? 
xv. A number of groups were identified by some of the Participants as being 
important to keep informed, such as clients, families and staff. Who do you feel 
should be kept informed, what should they be told, when and why? 
xvi. *Teamwork was identified in the literature as being an important Driver to 
leadership succession, but a number of responses by the Participants seemed to 
question how well the senior management team were achieving this. What are 
your thoughts? 
xvii. A major reason for post-succession companies failing was that control was 
handed to a successor who was either not yet ready, or who was not up to the 
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job. To overcome this some companies turned to an outsider to take over the 
reins, either as a seat-warmer for an insider, or on a permanent basis. However, 
only one Participant made any comment at all in regard to outsiders. What are 
your thoughts? 
xviii. *A further potentially important Driver raised by the Participants, but not in the 
literature review, was workload. Implicitly, preparing for a new role takes time 
and the concern seemed to be that already busy leadership candidates’ were 
struggling to find the time for this too. What are your thoughts? 
xix. I had presumed that the decision as to who would be the successor would be 
made by my wife and me after consultation with other stakeholders. However, 
the literature review highlighted that this risked leading to a poor choice of 
successor. What are your thoughts and recommendations? 
xx. The literature review picked up a number of financial risks to companies going 
through a leadership succession, including the possibility of a downturn in 
performance and that lenders may be reluctant to extend more debt, or may 
want existing debt repaid. However, these risks were not focused on by the 
Participants, and I therefore wanted to explore further whether you felt they 
were drivers for us? 
xxi. The question of transferring tacit knowledge from founder to successor is 
underlined in the literature review but received only passing comment by the 
Participants. What are your thoughts about this? 
xxii. The literature review identified a number of potential constraints happening at 
the time of a succession, including: potential additional governance restrictions; 
changes to bank, client and supplier confidence, and; tensions between passive 
and active shareholders. What are your thoughts in regard to our company? 
xxiii. Finally, there was very little input from either the literature review or the 
Participants in regard to strategy, which is normally considered an essential 
Driver for companies whatever else might be happening. What are your 
thoughts? 
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7.4.3 Third-Iteration Questions Script 
Introduction 
This conversation is on the same basis as the first two, save it is as a forum rather than one-
on-one conversations. It also only includes the internal Participants as I felt everyone would 
feel more comfortable not talking in front of outsiders. 
It is covered by the same confidentiality agreement which means that everything remains 
private, but this time to everyone taking part in the form. Please do not repeat anything 
that is said outside of this forum. 
As before, I am recording the conversation to help my subsequent analysis, and this too 
will remain private. However, because this is a forum, there are far more opportunities for 
people to talk over each other, which would make my analysis very difficult. Could we 
therefore please make sure we speak one at a time, and ideally signal you would like to 
speak so I can acknowledge you by name, which will make understanding who said what 
very much easier. 
This conversation is also covered by the University of Liverpool’s code of ethics, so I hope 
you will continue to feel able to answer candidly. Again, I promise there will be no adverse 
consequences to doing so, and potentially some very helpful ones. 
Finally, I am going to project each question on the wall to give people the best chance of 
understanding what I am asking, but please feel free to ask clarifying questions if needed. 
Questions: 
i. All of the internal Participants showed a strong preference for internal candidates 
to take over the leadership. I wondered if this may be because of the 
opportunities this provided for further internal promotions, but there were also 
a number of comments made that suggested it may be for cultural reasons; 
‘promoting internally is what the Company does’. However, others speculated 
that it would be very difficult for an outsider to succeed. I therefore wanted to 
understand more about what the Participants felt in regard to this, and under 
what circumstances, if any, an outsider would be tolerated? 
ii. All the Participants were generally supportive of the decisions that had been 
made to date, whether in regard to risk assessment, successor selection, or 
transition planning. Whilst on one level this lack of criticism is encouraging, on 
other levels it gives me cause for reflection: 
• Perhaps the Participants did not feel able to state their candid opinions; 
• Or did not want to risk rocking the boat of a process they felt happy with; 
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• Or were simply putting too-much faith into [your wife’s] and my planning, 
which may have implications for the robustness of any succession plan or 
mean the future leaders had not developed their critical thinking skills. 
What are your thoughts? 
iii. All the Participants’ responses indicated a lack of game playing within the 
Company. In other words, people seemed not to be acting in a selfish way, but 
for the greater good instead. I wondered if this was because to act this way was 
now part of the Company’s culture or might just be because my wife and I were 
around to act as referee, in which case the Company may become difficult for 
any successor to manage. 
What are your thoughts? 
iv. To date the staff have been largely supportive of the leadership succession 
process, but most of the Participants considered that they could disrupt this 
process if they wanted to. 
What issues do you feel might lead them to do this? 
v. At the moment, those who get paid by the Company do so principally because of 
the work they do, but my wife and I also receive dividends as shareholders. A 
comment made in jest by one of the Participants hinted that our continuing to 
take money once we are no longer working may not be considered fair. 
Do you think this is a potential issue? 
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7.5 PRIMARY  CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW ARTICLES 
Title, Journal, Rating and Citations 
Author Year Focus 
Game theory and family business succession: An introduction – Family Business 
Review - 3 - 58 
Blumentritt, 
Mathews, & 
Marchisio 
2012 Stakeholders trade to achieve their objectives. 
Family business succession: Suggestions for future research – Family Business Review 
- 3 - 440 
Brockhaus 2004 Lists issues needing more research. 
Making succession a success: Perspectives from Canadian small and medium-sized 
enterprises – Journal of Small Business Management - 3 - 102 
Bruce & 
Picard 
2006 Lack of preparation, and typically technical-focus when done. 
The courage to choose! Primogeniture and leadership succession in family firms – 
Strategic Management Journal – 4* - 8 
Calabrò  et 
al. 
2018 Socio-economic wealth impact on successor choice. 
The succession process from a resource- and knowledge-based view of the family 
firm – Family Business Review - 3 - 942 
Cabrera-
Suarez et 
al.  
2001 Tacit knowledge hard to transfer.  
Succession as a sociopolitical process: Internal impediments to outsider selection – 
Academy of Management Journal - 4* - 541 
Cannella Jr 
& Lubatkin 
1993 Socio-economic wealth impact on successor choice. 
Successor team dynamics in family firms – Family Business Review - 3 – 16 
Cater et al.  2016 Conflicts occur for both substantive and emotional reasons. 
Succession narratives in family business: The case of Alessi – Entrepreneurship, 
Theory and Practice - 4 - 360 
Dalpiaz et 
al. 
2014 Succession narratives tend to focus on succession strategy, 
family identity, and successor identity. 
Examining family firm succession from a social exchange perspective: A multiphase, 
multistakeholder review – Family Business Review - 3 - 101 
Daspit et 
al. 
2016 Generalised communications typically more effective than 
restrictive. 
Exit strategies in family firms: How socioemotional wealth drives the threshold of 
performance – Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice - 4 - 94 
De Tienne 
& Chirico 
2013 Key followed focus on stewardship, financial reward, and 
cessation.  
Passing the baton: The importance of sequence, timing, technique and 
communication in executive succession – Journal of Business Venturing - 4 - 449 
Dyck et al. 2002 Relay race as an analogy for succession. 
Motives and outcomes in family business succession planning – Entrepreneurship, 
Theory and Practice - 4 - 67 
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Gilding et 
al.  
2015 Effect of motives of generational continuity and family 
harmony on successions. 
Succession in family business: A review of the research – Family Business Review - 3 - 
924 
Handler 1994 Characteristics of successful successions. 
Succession in family firms: The problem of resistance - Family Business Review - 3 - 
387 
Handler & 
Kram 
1988 Resistance to succession can be expressed at individual, group, 
organisational and environmental levels. 
Firm performance and managerial succession in family managed firms – Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting - 3 - 81 
Hillier & 
McColgan 
2009 Poor performance is less likely to lead to a family CEO being 
dismissed. 
The nature of reciprocity in family firm succession – International Small Business 
Journal - 3 - 4 
Janjuha-
Jivraj & 
Spence 
2009 Traditional theories of reciprocity inadequate for family 
successions. 
Influence of family relationships on succession planning and training: The 
importance of mediating factors – Family Business Review - 3 - 383 
Lansberg 
& 
Astrachan 
1994 Impact of family cohesion and adaptability on successions. 
The weakness of strong ties: Sampling bias, social ties, and nepotism in family 
business succession – Leadership Quarterly - 4 - 22 
Liu et al.  2015 Nepotism can lead to sub-optimal succession choices. 
Management succession in the family business – Journal of Small Business 
Management - 3 - 377 
Longenecker 
& Schoen 
1978 Seven stages of successor preparation. 
Factors preventing intra family succession – Family Business Review - 3 - 474 
De Massis 
et al.  
2008 Factors preventing successful successions. 
Communication traps: Applying Game Theory to succession in family firms – Family 
Business Review – 3 - 41 
Michael-
Tsabari & 
Weiss 
2015 Reasons for poor founder-successor communications. 
Lost in time: Intergenerational succession, change, and failure in family business – 
Journal of Business Venturing - 4 - 705 
Miller et 
al. 
2003 Organisational history’s impact on successors.  
Family business succession and its impact on financial structure and performance – 
Family Business Review - 3 - 217 
Molly et 
al. 
2010 Succession impact on debt, growth and profitability. 
Succession planning in SME’s: An empirical analysis – International Small Business 
Journal - 3 - 122 
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Motwani 
et al. 
2006 Correlation of firm size to succession planning. 
Paternalistic leadership in family firms: Types and implications for intergenerational 
succession – Journal of Family Business Strategy - 2 - 44 
Mussolino 
& Calabrò 
2014 Impact of founder paternalism on successor. 
An entrepreneurial process perspective on succession in family firms – Small Business 
Economics - 3 - 98 
Nordqvist 
et al.  
2013 Founder and successor requirements to be entrepreneurial. 
CEO succession, strategic change, and post-succession performance: A meta-analysis 
– Leadership Quarterly - 4 - 10 
Schepker 
et al.  
2017 Cost of leadership succession. 
Left in the dark: Family successors’ requirement profiles in the family business 
succession process – Journal of Family Business Strategy - 3 - 30 
Schlepphorst 
& Moog 
2014 Successor requirements. 
Determinants of initial satisfaction with the succession process in family firms: A 
conceptual model – Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice – 4 - 485 
Sharma et 
al. 
2001 Drivers of succession satisfaction. 
Structuring family business succession: An analysis of the future leader's decision 
making – Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice - 4 - 218 
Shepherd 
& 
Zacharakis 
2000 Impact of financial and behavioural sunk costs on successor 
commitment. 
Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firms – 
Journal of Corporate Finance - 4 - 373 
Smith & 
Amoako-
Adu 
1999 Impact on valuation of family and non-family successors. 
How feedback about leadership potential impacts ambition, organizational 
commitment, and performance –Leadership Quarterly - 4 - 0 
Steffens et 
al.  
2018 Effect of feedback. 
Intergenerational ownership succession: Shifting the focus from outcome 
measurements to preparatory requirements – Journal of Family Business Strategy 
3 - 14 
Sund et al. 2015 Relationship between ownership and leadership succession 
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